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Abstract: The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on the South China Sea (SCS) 
Disputes is coming to a critical stage. On 7-13 July 2015 a Hearing was conducted 
to review China’s informal preliminary objections demonstrated by its Position 
Paper released on 7 December 2014 and other jurisdiction and admissibility issues. 
Whether the legality issues of China’s actions complained by the Philippines’ 
Memorial can be entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter “Tribunal”) in 
the merits phase will depend on what China actually responds officially before 
17 August 2015 and what China may respond as reflected by academic papers 
published before the award on jurisdiction and admissibility is granted.
This paper serves as scholarly advice as to what China may argue to challenge 
Philippines’ oral statements at the July Hearing. It provides a comprehensive 
structure by answering six different levels of questions fundamental for Tribunal’s 
ruling on jurisdiction and admissibility. These questions are: among Philippines’ 
Submissions 1~14 (1) which Submission suffers from lack of dispute and why; (2)
which Submission does not convey legal dispute and why; (3) which Submission 
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fails to provide a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS 
and why; (4) which Submission fails to fulfill the requirements contained in Section 
1 of Part XV of UNCLOS and should be deemed inadmissible for the dispute 
settlement mechanisms under Section 2 of Part XV to address and why; (5) which 
Submissions may not be entertained by the Tribunal due to application of Article 
298 and why; and (6) whether Article 297 limits the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to 
address the Philippines’ Submissions and why?
Before addressing these questions, this paper raises an even more fundamental 
issue. So far all the academic papers commenting on the SCS Arbitration have been 
focusing on the jurisdiction issues of the Tribunal over the disputes submitted by 
the Philippines, as well as the admissibility issues concerning the claims presented 
by the Memorial. A critical but ignored issue is the consequences of withholding 
those Sino-Philippine SCS (unsubmitted) core disputes by the Philippines. Would 
these consequences undermine the effectiveness of the award of this Arbitration? 
To what extent will such consequences affect the Sino-Philippine relations in 
the SCS after this Arbitration is over? Having completed an in-depth research 
on this issue, the author concludes that the Philippines’ partial submission of its 
multi-layered SCS disputes with China will turn the award of this Tribunal totally 
useless in terms of resolving the confrontations between the Parties indicated by 
Philippines’ Memorial. It concerns the Tribunal when approaching the stage of 
producing the first award on the jurisdiction and admissibility issues for this case. 
This paper advises the Tribunal to apply Article 27(2) of its Rules of Procedure and 
to terminate the arbitral proceedings as its continuation is unnecessary due to such 
inefficacy of the award in the merits phase.
Key Words: South China Sea Arbitration; The Hearing on 7-13 July 2015; 
UNCLOS; Annex VII Tribunal; Jurisdiction and admissibility; Res judicata; Sino-
Philippine territorial disputes in the South China Sea; Sea boundary delimitation
I. Introduction
The South China Sea Arbitration initiated by the Philippines against China is 
coming to a critical stage. On 7-13 July 2015 a Hearing was conducted to review 
the informal preliminary objections of China and other jurisdiction and admissi-
bility issues. Whether the legality issues of China’s actions identified by the Phili-
ppines’ Memorial can be entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter “Tri-
bunal”) will depend on what China has said before 17 August 2015. 
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This arbitration started on 22 January 2013, when the Philippines invoked 
Article 287 and Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS)1 and presented a diplomatic notification to initiate arbitration 
against China.2 As said by the Notification and Statement of Claim (hereinafter 
“Notification”),3 the goal is “to seek a peaceful and durable resolution of the 
dispute in the West Philippine Sea [South China Sea]” between these two States. 
The Philippines challenged against China’s claims and entitlement to the eastern 
part of South China Sea (SCS) enclosed by the “U-Shaped Line”, requesting the 
Tribunal to declare the area as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental 
shelf.4 Five groups of claims were presented by the Notification: 
(1) China’s rights concerning the SCS maritime areas are those established by 
UNCLOS only and consist of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ and 
the continental shelf. China’s maritime claims therein based on the “nine-dash line 
(U-Shaped Line)”5 contravene UNCLOS and are invalid.6
(2) Mischief Reef, McKennan Reef, Gaven Reef and Subi Reef are submerged 
features not above sea level at high tide, and should not be deemed as islands or 
rocks according to Article 121 of UNCLOS. None of them are located on China’s 
continental shelf. Rather, the Mischief and McKennan Reefs are parts of the 
Philippines’ continental shelf. China’s occupation of these four maritime features 
and construction activities thereon are unlawful and should be terminated.7
(3) Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef 
1      United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, U.N.T.S., Vol. 1833, 1982, 
p. 3. [hereinafter “UNCLOS”] 
2       For the official explanations of the Philippines, see Institute for Maritime and Ocean Affairs, 
Statement by the Secretary of DFA on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China, 
at http://www.imoa.ph/press-releases/statement-by-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-albert-
del-rosario-on-the-unclos-arbitral-proceedings-against-china-to-achieve-a-peaceful-and-
durable-solution-to-the-dispute-in-the-wps/, 10 March 2015.
3      Notification and Statement of Claims, issued by Department of Foreign Affairs of Republic 
of the Philippines in Manila to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila, 
Serial No. 13-0211, 22 January 2013, p. 1, para. 1, at https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/
component/docman/doc_download/56-notification-and-statement-of-claim-on-west-
philippine-sea?Itemid=546, 10 March 2015. [hereinafter “Notification”] 
4      Notification, paras. 31 (Section III: The Philippines’ Claims) & 41 (Section V: Relief 
Sought).
5       The term “nine-dash line” is interchangeable with “U-Shaped Line” and “eleven-dash line.” 
For various names of this line, see Keyuan Zou, China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China 
Sea Revisited, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 43, 2012, p.18.
6       Notification, paras. 31 (first and second claims) & 41 (first to third reliefs).
7       Notification, paras. 31 (third to fifth claims) & 41 (fourth to seventh reliefs).
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should be considered as rocks under Article 121(3), and may only generate State 
entitlement to the territorial sea. Having unlawfully claimed maritime entitlements 
beyond twelve nautical miles (NM) from these features, China should refrain 
from preventing Philippine vessels from exploiting the living resources in waters 
adjacent to Scarborough Shoal and Johnson Reef, and from undertaking other 
activities inconsistent with UNCLOS at or in the vicinity of these features.8
(4) The Philippines is entitled under UNCLOS to a 12 NM territorial sea, a 
200 NM EEZ, and a continental shelf measured from its archipelagic baselines. 
China has unlawfully claimed and exploited the living and non-living resources in 
this EEZ and continental shelf, and prevented the Philippines from exploiting the 
living and non-living resources therein.9
(5) China has unlawfully interfered with the Philippines’ exercise of its 
navigational rights and other rights under UNCLOS within and beyond the 
Philippines’ EEZ. China should desist from these unlawful activities.10
On 19 February 2013, China officially rejected this arbitration,11 based 
on, inter alia, its 2006 Declaration12 which covers the disputes brought by the 
Philippines and deprives the Tribunal of necessary jurisdiction to entertain the case. 
The default rules13 were then applied to establish the Tribunal on 25 June 2013, 
when the fifth arbitrator was appointed. 
The first meeting of the Members of the Tribunal was held on 11 July 2013, 
when they decided to use the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) as Registry.14 
On 27 August 2013, the Tribunal adopted the PH-CN Rules of Procedure (ROP) 
for this arbitration and issued the first Procedural Order to fix 30 March 2014 as 
8       Notification, paras. 31 (sixth and seventh claims) & 41 (eighth and ninth reliefs).
9       Notification, paras. 31 (eighth and ninth claims) & 41 (tenth and eleventh reliefs).
10     Notification, paras. 31 (tenth claims) & 41 (twelfth and thirteenth reliefs).
11     Statement Made by the Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of China on 9 February 2013, at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1015317.shtml, 10 March 2015. 
12     On 25 August 2006 China made a written declaration according to Article 298 of UNCLOS. 
It reads: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the 
procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all 
the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the 
Convention.” United Nations Ocean & Law of the Sea, Declarations and Statements, at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China 
upon ratification, 10 March 2015.
13     UNCLOS, Annex VII, Art. 3(e).
14    For the information released by the PCA, see PCA, The Republic of the Philippines v. The 
People’s Republic of China, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529, 10 
March 2015.
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the deadline for the Philippines to submit its Memorial. The Tribunal directed the 
Philippines to fully address all issues in the Memorial, including matters relating 
to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the admissibility of the Philippines’ claims, and 
the merits of the dispute.15 As directed, the Philippines presented the Memorial 
consisting of 15 Submissions which maintain the structure of the Notification. 
Fifteen Submissions were listed in the Memorial, where the Tribunal is requested 
to adjudge and declare that: 
(1) China’s maritime entitlements in the SCS, like those of the Philippines, may 
not extend beyond those permitted by UNCLOS; 
(2) China’s claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and to “historic 
rights”, with respect to the maritime areas of the SCS encompassed by the so-
called “nine-dash line” are contrary to UNCLOS and without lawful effect to 
the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s 
maritime entitlements under UNCLOS;
(3) Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an EEZ or continental 
shelf; 
(4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are low-tide 
elevations (LTEs) that do not generate entitlements to a territorial sea, EEZ 
or continental shelf, and are not features that are capable of appropriation by 
occupation or otherwise; 
(5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the EEZ and 
continental shelf of the Philippines; 
(6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are LTEs 
that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf, 
but their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is 
measured; 
(7) Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no 
entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf; 
(8) China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of 
the sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living 
resources of its EEZ and continental shelf; 
15    ROP, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PH-CN%20-%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20(ENG)
a7ec.pdf?fil_id=2504, 10 March 2015. 
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(9) China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from 
exploiting the living resources in the EEZ of the Philippines; 
(10) China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from 
pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at 
Scarborough Shoal; 
(11) China has violated its obligations under UNCLOS to protect and 
preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas 
Shoal; 
(12) China’s occupation of and construction activities on Mischief 
Reef: (a) violate the provisions of UNCLOS concerning artificial islands, 
installations, and structures; (b) violate China’s duties to protect and preserve 
the marine environment under the Convention; and (c) constitute unlawful act 
of attempted appropriation in violation of the Convention; 
(13) China has breached its obligation under UNCLOS by operating 
its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner causing serious risk of 
collision to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal; 
(14) Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China 
has unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things: 
(a) Interfering with the Philippines’ rights of navigation in the waters at, and 
adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal; (b) Preventing the rotation and resupply of 
Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal; and (c) Endangering 
the health and well-being of Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas 
Shoal. 
(15) China shall desist from further unlawful claims and activities.16 
To echo the above-mentioned Philippine claims, the US Department of 
State released on 5 December 2014 its serial study on “Limits in the Seas No. 
143” entitled “China: Maritime Claims in the SCS” that questioned each of 
China’s possible SCS maritime claims associated with the U-Shaped Line.17 
Simultaneously, the Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam 
for the Attention of the Tribunal in the Proceedings between the Republic of the 
16      The Philippines’ Memorial is on file with this author.
17    US Department of State Bureau of Oceans & International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (Limits in the Sea, No. 143), at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf, 14 March 2015.
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Philippines and the People’s Republic of China was received by the Tribunal.18 As 
said by the press, this Vietnamese document supported the Philippine position that 
the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the disputes presented.19 On 7 December 2014 the 
Position Paper of the Government of the PRC on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the 
SCS Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter “China’s 
Position Paper”) was released. Arguing that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over 
the disputes, China’s Position Paper however was neither meant to be China’s 
Counter-Memorial,20 nor treated as such by the Tribunal.21 This made Article 
25(2) of ROP22 applicable. Accordingly, the Tribunal gave the Philippines 26 
questions to be answered before 15 March 2015 in the form of Further Written 
Argument. China is also requested to provide its comments on such Philippine 
supplemental arguments by 15 June 2015.23 China did not respond as requested. 
However, China’s Position Paper has affected the way how this arbitration should 
be conducted, as the Tribunal considered the document to constitute, in effect, a 
plea concerning jurisdiction.24 In other words, this document is taken as an informal 
preliminary objection against the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Hence, the Tribunal 
decided to bifurcate the process of this arbitration. As a result, the Hearing took 
18    Press Release by the Tribunal, 17 December 2014, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.
asp?fil_id=2846, 14 March 2015.
19   Camille Diola, International Tribunal Seeks More Arguments from Philippines, The 
Philippine Star, 18 December 2014, at http://www.philstar.com/disputed-seas/2014/12/18/14
04065/intl-tribunal-seeks-more-arguments-philippines, 14 March 2015.
20    China’s Position Paper on South China Sea, China Daily, 7 December 2014, at http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-12/07/content_19037946.htm, 14 March 2015.
21    Press Release by the Tribunal, 17 December 2014, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.
asp?fil_id=2846, 14 March 2015.
22     Article 25(2) of the ROP reads: In the event that a Party does not appear before the Arbitral 
Tribunal or fails to defend its case, the Arbitral Tribunal shall invite written arguments 
from the appearing Party on, or pose questions regarding, specific issues which the Arbitral 
Tribunal considers have not been canvassed, or have been inadequately canvassed, in the 
pleadings submitted by the appearing Party. The appearing Party shall make a supplemental 
written submission in relation to the matters identified by the Arbitral Tribunal within three 
months of the Arbitral Tribunal’s invitation. The supplemental submission of the appearing 
Party shall be communicated to the non-appearing Party for its comments which shall be 
submitted within three months of the communication of the supplemental submission. The 
Arbitral Tribunal may take whatever other steps it may consider necessary, within the scope 
of its powers under the Convention, its Annex VII, and these Rules, to afford to each of the 
Parties a full opportunity to present its case. 
23     This is requested by the Procedural Order No. 3 of the Tribunal issued on December 17, 
2014. Press Release by the Tribunal, 17 December 2014, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showfile.asp?fil_id=2846, 14 March 2015.
24    Procedural Order No. 4 of 22 April 2015 issued by the Tribunal, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage65f2.html?pag_id=1529, 18 July 2015.
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place on 7-13 July 2015 in the Peace Palace, only to address the jurisdictional 
objections raised by China’s Position Paper as well as other jurisdictional and 
admissibility issues. As said by the 6th Press Release by the PCA dated on 13 July 
2015, the award on the part of jurisdiction will be produced by the end of 2015.25 
After the July Hearing,26 the Transcripts of the Hearing were sent to the 
Philippines and China for review and correction. A deadline on 23 July 2015 was 
set for the Philippines to submit written answers to the questions posed by the 
Tribunal during the Hearing and to amplify the oral arguments in writing. China has 
the opportunity to send written comments by 17 August 2015 to refute (1) anything 
said in the Hearing and (2) any written answers from the Philippines filed by 23 
July 2015.27 It means that the Tribunal will not start its deliberation until after 17 
August 2015 on all the issues covered by the Hearing so as to produce an Award on 
the Jurisdiction and Admissibility of this case. Only if the arbitral award finds that 
the Tribunal has jurisdiction over any disputes submitted by the Philippines will a 
second phase of trial on the merits be held to review the substantive legal issues for 
those disputes.28 
Now, the critical question is: what is the Hearing all about? As requested 
by the Tribunal, the legal team of the Philippines should address (1) the legal 
positions that have been stated by China’s Position Paper and (2) other possible 
25    Procedural Order No. 4 of 22 April 2015 issued by the Tribunal, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage65f2.html?pag_id=1529, 18 July 2015; 5th press release issued for the hearing on 
7 July 2015, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage65f2.html?pag_id=1529, 18 July 2015; 6th 
press release issued on 13 July 2015, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage65f2.html?pag_
id=1529, 18 July 2015.
26     On the applicant side, lawyers were sent to present Philippines’ case. China as the respon-
dent was absent through the Hearing, without even sending any observers. It is interesting 
to note that observers did come from countries bordering South China Sea (Vietnam, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia) and outside this region (Japan and Thailand). See the 6th press 
release issued by the PCA for this arbitration on 13 July 2015.
27    The 6th press release issued by the PCA for this arbitration on 13 July 2015. Also see Clo-
sing Remarks by Thomas Mensah, President of the Tribunal, in Transcripts of the Hearing 
on 13 July 2015, pp. 81~82. The Transcripts for the Hearing, at http://www.pcacases.com/
web/view/7, 18 July 2015. 
28     This does not mean the end for objections against jurisdiction and admissibility. As said by 
the Tribunal, those jurisdictional and admissibility issues without exclusively preliminary 
nature will be reviewed during the second phase of this arbitration. See the 6th Press 
Release made on 13 July 2015 by the PCA for this arbitration.
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issues of jurisdiction and admissibility.29 To comment on China’s Position Paper, 
Professor Philip Sands refuted China’s first objection by contending that none of 
the Submissions raised sovereignty question.30 Mr. Lawrence Martin focused on 
China’s second objection by saying that nothing in Articles 281~283 of UNCLOS 
bars the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.31 Professor Bernard Oxman then rebutted China’s 
third objection by saying that Philippines’ Submissions are not covered by Article 
298(1)(a) relating to sea boundary delimitation.32 
For the other jurisdiction and admissibility issues outside China’s Position 
Paper, the lead counsel of the Philippines, Mr. Paul Reichler addressed the issues 
of historic bay and titles under Article 298(1)(a).33 Professor Oxman challenged 
China’s possible objections under Article 298(1)(b) relating to law enforcement 
activities and military activities.34 Professor Alan Boyle argued that first, the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction to try China’s violations of Articles 192 and 194 of 
UNCLOS concerning marine environmental protection and preservation; second, 
Article 297(2)~(3) cannot limit Tribunal’s jurisdiction; and third, Article 297(1)
(c) and 297(3) give jurisdiction to the Tribunal.35 Professor Sands argued that the 
indispensable third party issue does not exist in this case, while a legal dispute 
29    Procedural Order No. 4 of 22 April 2015 issued by the Tribunal. Also see Opening Re-
marks by Thomas Mensah, President of the Tribunal, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 
July 2015, p. 3. As revealed by Professor Oxman during the July Hearing, the Tribunal 
in its letter to the parties of 23 June said that: “... the Arbitral Tribunal does not accept 
that any issue of jurisdiction or admissibility is waived by virtue of its non-inclusion in 
China’s communications to date.” See First-round submissions by Professor Oxman, in 
the Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, p. 74. Also see First-round submissions by 
Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, p. 131. As said by Professor 
Sands, “… on 23rd June 2015, the Tribunal wrote to us to request that we ‘address any 
objection that [the Philippines] considers could reasonably be advanced to the jurisdiction 
of the Arbitral Tribunal or to the admissibility of the Philippines’ claims’, irrespective of 
whether such objection had at any point been raised by China.”
30     First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of Hearing on 7 July 2015, pp. 
60~100.
31      First-round submissions by Mr. Martin, in Transcripts of Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 6~37.
32      First-round submissions by Professor Oxman, in Transcripts of Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 
37~57.
33    First-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 
58~73.
34     First-round submissions by Professor Oxman, in Transcripts of Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 
73~93.
35      First-round submissions by Professor Boyle, in Transcripts of Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 
93~120.
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exists in each of Philippines’ Submissions.36 
On the final day of the Hearing, which is on 13 July 2015, the Philippines’ 
legal team answered 6 questions posed by the Tribunal during the Hearing. The 
questions are for the Philippines to (1) cite the sources relied upon to establish the 
existence of a legal dispute on each Submission;37 (2) elaborate the relevance of 
Mauritius v. UK to the present arbitration;38 (3) explain the applicability of the prin-
ciple of estoppels to the present case;39 (4) comment on the Convention on Biolo-
gical Diversity (CBD), especially Article 27(4) of CBD and its relation to Article 
281 of UNCLOS,40 and comment on the Treaty of Amity & Cooperation and 
compulsory nature of High Council;41 (5) comment on military activities exception 
under Article 298(1)(b) concerning activities at Mischief Reef under Submission 
12;42 and (6) answer if there are issues of jurisdiction & admissibility not having 
exclusively preliminary nature, which should be deferred till the merits phase.43
In order to assist the Tribunal in its deliberation on the award on jurisdiction 
and admissibility, this paper will discuss “other possible issues of jurisdiction and 
admissibility outside China’s Position Paper”. Section III of this paper attempts to 
comment on the following six different levels of questions deemed important by 
the Tribunal, with special reference to the oral statements by Philippines’ legal team 
during the Hearing. 
These six levels of questions are: among Philippines’ Submissions 1~14, (1) 
which submission suffers from lack of dispute and why; (2) which Submission 
does not convey legal dispute and why; (3) which Submission fails to provide 
a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS and why; 
36    First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 
120~150.
37     Mr. Reichler answered this question. See Second-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in 
Transcripts of Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 3~24.
38     Professor Sands answered this question. See Second-round submissions by Professor Sands, 
in Transcripts of Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 24~25.
39    Mr. Martin answered this question. See Second-round submissions by Mr. Martin, in 
Transcripts of Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 28~37.
40     Professor Boyle answered this question. See Second-round submissions by Professor Boyle, 
in Transcripts of Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 41~47.
41    Mr. Martin answered this question. See Second-round submissions by Mr. Martin, in 
Transcripts of Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 38~41.
42    Professor Oxman answered this question. See Second-round submissions by Professor 
Oxman, in Transcripts of Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 47~58.
43      Professor Sands answered this question. See Second-round submissions by Professor Sands, 
in Transcripts of Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 26~28.
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(4) which Submission fails to fulfill the requirements contained in Section 1 
of Part XV of UNCLOS and should be deemed as inadmissible for the dispute 
settlement mechanisms under Section 2 of Part XV to address and why; (5) which 
Submissions may not be entertained by the Tribunal due to application of Article 
298 and why; and (6) whether Article 297 limits the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to 
address Philippines’ Submissions and why?
Before addressing the foregoing legal issues, something of primary importance 
must be presented. So far all the academic papers commenting on the SCS 
Arbitration have been focusing on the jurisdiction issues of the Tribunal over 
the disputes submitted by the Philippines, as well as the admissibility issues 
concerning the claims presented by the Memorial (as Section III of this paper 
will also do). A no-less-important aspect of this Arbitration has been ignored but 
worthy of serious deliberation, namely, the consequences of withholding those 
Sino-Philippine SCS core disputes that are not submitted by the Philippines. Would 
these consequences undermine the effectiveness of the award of this Arbitration? 
To what extent will such consequences affect the Sino-Philippine relations in the 
SCS after this Arbitration is over? Having completed an in-depth research on this 
issue,44 the author has reasons to believe that Philippines’ partial submission of its 
multi-layered SCS disputes with China will turn the award of this Tribunal totally 
useless in terms of resolving the confrontations between the Parties as indicated 
by Philippines’ Memorial. It concerns the Tribunal when approaching the stage of 
producing the first award on the jurisdiction and admissibility issues for this case. 
Section II of this paper shall be devoted to this issue. Finally, after laying down all 
the comments, a conclusion will be given by Section IV of this paper.  
II. The Ineffectiveness of the Award as the Factor Making
      the Continuation of the Arbitral Proceedings 
      Unnecessary under Article 27(2) of ROP
A. The Goal of Initiating SCS Arbitration by the Philippines
The goal of this arbitration, as declared by the Philippines, is to resolve certain 
44     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, Special Report: The Prospects for the Sino-Philippine Arbitration on 
the South China Sea (U-Shaped Line) Dispute, Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International 
Law and Affairs, Vol. 31, 2013. (to be published)
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parts of the Sino-Philippine SCS disputes, narrow the disputes, reduce the tensions, 
and facilitate the diplomatic resolutions of those issues beyond the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, without being barred by China’s 2006 Declaration.45 However, doubts 
remain that this Tribunal with limited subject-matter jurisdiction46 eventually may 
not even resolve any Sino-Philippine SCS disputes at all. The author must venture 
to ask two questions here. If the Philippines loses the case in the merits, will it also 
lose legal grounds to counter China’s activities as identified by the Memorial? If 
the Philippines wins in the merits phase, will China become legally unjustified to 
carry on those activities as complained by the Philippines’ Memorial? 
Both answers are no. To provide a detailed examination of this fundamental 
issue so as to evaluate the efficacy47 of this arbitration, the author has written an 
extensive paper to reveal the available legal arguments for the losing party to justify 
the continuation of its disputed yet over-ruled actions. This paper will be published 
by the end of 2015 in Vol. 31 of Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law 
and Affairs, as a special report. As the Philippine Submissions are divided into four 
groups for the sake of discussion, the examination of the possible legal arguments 
45    On 22 January 2013, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Mr. Albert del 
Rosario, made a statement in a press conference which explained the initiation by the 
Philippines of an arbitral proceedings against China to achieve a peaceful and durable 
solution to the dispute in the WPS (South China Sea). Statement: The Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China, 22 January 2013, at http://
www.gov.ph/2013/01/22/statement-the-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-unclos-arbitral-
proceedings-against-china-january-22-2013/, 10 March 2015. Also see First-round 
submissions by Solicitor General Hilbay, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, p. 8; 
Fist-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, p. 27.
46    Andreas Zimmermann and Jelena Bäumler, Navigating through Narrow Jurisdictional Strai-
ts: The Philippines – PRC South China Sea Dispute and UNCLOS, The Law & Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 12, 2013, p. 431; Ted L. McDorman, The South 
China Sea: The U-Shaped Line, Islands and the Philippine-China Arbitration, German 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 56, 2013, p. 33; Stefan Talmon and Bing Bing Jia 
eds., The South China Sea Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2014; Mincai Yu, China’s Responses to the Compulsory Arbitration on the South China Sea 
Dispute: Legal Effects and Policy Options, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 
45, 2014, p. 1; Sienho Yee, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. China): 
Potential Jurisdictional Obstacles or Objections, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 
13, 2014, p. 663; Mincai Yu, China’s Informal Participation in the Annex VII Philippines 
v. China Arbitral Tribunal’s Proceedings, International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law, 
Vol. 30, 2015, p. 54.
47      In the very first case which came before the Permanent Court of International Justice, it
was decided that the PCIJ neither could nor should contemplate the possibility of its 
judgment not being complied with. See PCIJ, S.S. “Wimbledon”, 1923 P.C.I.J., Series A, 
No. 1, 17 August 1923, p. 32. Also see Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals, London: Steven & Sons, London, 1953, pp. 339, 356. 
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are also made in each of the groups accordingly. Most importantly, the general 
principle of res judicata embodied by Article 296 of UNCLOS is applied to support 
these possible contentions throughout the examination.
B. The Principle of Res Judicata as Codified by Article 296 of UNCLOS
     and Its Application to the Unsubmitted Core Disputes
Entitled “finality and binding force of decisions”, Article 296 of UNCLOS 
reads: “1. Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under 
this section shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the 
dispute. 2. Any such decision shall have no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular dispute”.48 Article 11 of Annex VII to 
UNCLOS49 and Article 26(2) of ROP50 restate this rule of res judicata that is also a 
general principle of law recognized by civilized nations.51 
Clearly, the finality and binding force of decisions cannot be established 
without two conditions. First, the dispute must fall within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the tribunal.52 Second, the dispute must have been presented to the 
tribunal for settlement. Sometimes the tribunal is presented with a dispute that 
allegedly goes beyond the scope of the tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Then 
most likely the tribunal will have to address such a preliminary dispute concerning 
whether it has jurisdiction over the dispute.53 Should the answer be negative, the 
tribunal will refrain from determining the merits. Consequently, the dispute in 
merits will be left unsettled. On the other hand, any dispute beyond the scope of the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction will definitely remain unresolved if it is clearly withheld by 
the Parties and not presented to the tribunal for resolution. 
48     UNCLOS, Art. 296.
49    Article 11 (Finality of Award) of Annex VII to UNCLOS reads: “The award shall be final 
and without appeal, unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate 
procedure. It shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute.” 
50     Article 26(2) of PH-CN Rules of Procedure adopted on 27 August 2013, reads: “Pursuant 
to Article 11 of Annex VII to the Convention, the award shall be final and without appeal, 
unless the Parties agree in advance to an appellate procedure. It shall be complied with by 
the Parties.” 
51    Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
London: Steven & Sons, London, 1953, p. 336.
52    Stefan Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitration: Is There a Case to Answer?, in Stefan 
Talmon and Bing Bing Jia eds., The South China Sea Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 15, 26~53.
53     UNCLOS, Art. 288(4). Also see ROP, Art. 20(1).
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In this Sino-Philippine Arbitration, the situation is complex where the two 
Parties have disputes of different levels or layers in the SCS. The inner disputes (or 
the core disputes) are: 
(1) Territorial disputes: Sino-Philippine SCS territorial disputes relate to 
Scarborough Shoal and Kalayaan Islands Group (which is only part of Spratly 
Islands Group claimed by China); and 
(2) Sea boundary delimitation disputes: Based on the land territories claimed 
by China in the SCS, China claims maritime entitlements of EEZ and continental 
shelf. Such maritime claims overlap with those of the Philippines in the SCS. 
However, due to the on-going Sino-Philippine territorial disputes it is hard for the 
Philippines to accept that China has any maritime entitlements in the eastern part 
of SCS at all. Thus, inside such maritime boundary delimitation disputes there is 
a basic disbelief of the Philippines that China does not even have any maritime 
entitlement to create any maritime boundary delimitation disputes with the 
Philippines in the first place. 
Besides, there are incidental or ancillary issues that will affect and concern the 
settlement of these core disputes (the ancillary disputes),54 namely, 
(1) Disputes on legal status of maritime features as identified by Submissions 
3~7: The bigger maritime entitlements China has in the SCS, the bigger overlap 
there will be between China and the Philippines, and the bigger slice of maritime 
area China may receive after sea boundary delimitation with the Philippines is 
completed. So it is important to find out exactly what kind of maritime entitlement 
each China-claimed maritime feature can have under UNCLOS from Philippines’ 
perspective. In this context, the legal status of maritime features affects the sea 
boundary delimitation between China and the Philippines. 
(2) Dispute on the alleged China’s historic rights to support its SCS maritime 
claims within the U-Shaped Line that is identified by Submission 2 (see Section 
III-E-1 of this paper); and 
(3) Dispute on the legality of the U-Shaped Line as the alleged China’s outer 
limits of SCS maritime claims that is also identified by Submission 2 (see Section 
54     See First-round submissions by Solicitor General Hilbay, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 
7 July 2015, pp. 7~8. “Professor Oxman will also explain how your determination of the 
potential maritime entitlements of the parties will serve to narrow the disputes between 
them, reduce tensions, and facilitate the diplomatic resolution of those issues that lie outside 
your jurisdiction; namely, sovereignty over small maritime features and the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries.”
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III-B-1 of this paper). 
Apart from the above-mentioned two levels of disputes, there are some 
“consequences”55 of the lack of settlement of the core disputes. Not being disputes 
per se, such consequences are nevertheless called by the Philippines in the SCS 
Arbitration as “disputes” and submitted to the Tribunal for settlement. If they can 
count as disputes at all, they should be called the “surface disputes”. In terms of 
SCS Arbitration such surface disputes are the disputes concerning China’s trespass 
into Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf, as identified by Submissions 8~14 (see 
Section III-E-4 of this paper).56 
While the ancillary disputes and surface disputes have been presented to the 
Tribunal for settlement, the core disputes clearly and definitely are neither falling 
within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal nor have been brought to the 
Tribunal “directly or indirectly”57 by the Philippines,58 as confirmed repeatedly by 
55   Chargos Marine Protection Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 211. 
56      Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-Dash-
Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 28, 2014, 
p. 121.
57    See First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 
2015, pp. 68~69. As said by Professor Sands, “… there is agreement between the parties 
that their differences in the South China Sea are complex and multifaceted. One aspect 
certainly concerns sovereignty over insular features in the South China Sea, but that issue is 
not before this Tribunal, not directly and not indirectly. This dispute concerns other matters 
– and this touches on your question, sir – that plainly do fall within your jurisdiction.”
58     Paragraph 7 of the Notification reads: “The Philippines does not seek in this arbitration a 
determination of which Party enjoys sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of them. 
Nor does it request a delimitation of any maritime boundaries. The Philippines is conscious 
of China’s Declaration of 25 August 2006 under Article 298 of UNCLOS, and has avoided 
raising subjects or making claims that China has, by virtue of that Declaration, excluded 
from arbitral jurisdiction.” Para. 40 then reads: “It follows that the Philippines’ claims do 
not fall within China’s Declaration of 25 August 2006, because they do not: concern the 
interpretation or application of Articles 15, 74, and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitation; 
involve historic bays or titles within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the 
Convention; concern military activities or law enforcement activities; or concern matters 
over which the Security Council is exercising functions assigned to it by the UN Charter.” 
Notification, pp. 3 & 16.  
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Philippines’ counsel at the July Hearing.59 Given the situation of non-submission 
of core disputes, the award will not be able to settle the Sino-Philippine maritime 
confrontations reflected by the Philippine Submissions. The confrontations will 
go on, if not getting worse. The reason for such protraction of clashing policies, 
claims, and actions in the SCS is because the unsettled core disputes rather 
constitute the real causes of conflict while applying the res judicata principle in 
such a scenario. This will be proved by all the available reasonable legal arguments 
for the losing Party to this arbitration to advance, while the paper to be published 
in Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs by this author 
provides all such legal arguments on both the Philippines’ and China’s sides, when 
losing the case.
In this connection, the authoritative study by Professor Bin Cheng is inspiring. 
According to him, res judicata has two effects: (1) “that which is res judicata is 
definitive”; and (2) “what has been finally decided by a tribunal is binding upon 
the parties”.60 More important is the limits of such principle, “[it] applies only 
where there is identity of … the question at issue”.61 In the words of Article 296 of 
UNCLOS, any decision rendered by a tribunal having jurisdiction under Section 2 
59   See First-round submissions by Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Del Rosario in the July 
Hearing, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, p. 12. “Mr President, allow me to 
respectfully make it clear: in submitting this case, the Philippines is not asking the Tribunal 
to rule on the territorial sovereignty aspect of its disputes with China.” Also see First-
round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in the Transcript of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, p. 
31, 46; First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in the Transcript of the Hearing on 7 
July 2015, pp. 61~62, 76~77, 99. As said by Professor Sands: “Let us be very clear. The 
Philippines’ case is, in essence — if it is “in essence” about anything — about the character 
of certain features; it is not about territorial sovereignty. None of our submissions require 
the Tribunal to express any view at all as to the extent of China’s sovereignty over land 
territory, or that of any other state.” (pp. 61~62) “There is nothing that you have read in 
the pleadings to address the question of which state does or does not have sovereignty over 
a particular insular feature, and the Tribunal is not asked to — and does not need to —make 
any determination as to sovereignty over any island or any rock in order to determine the 
maritime entitlements of that feature.” (pp. 76~77) “The Philippines has not invited the 
Tribunal, directly or indirectly, to adjudicate on China’s claims of sovereignty over any 
island or rock, or the claims of any other state.” (p. 99)
60      Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
London: Steven & Sons, London, 1953, pp. 337~338.
61     This was held by the British-United States Claims Arbitral Tribunal (1910), as quoted by 
Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
London: Steven & Sons, London, 1953, pp. 339~340.
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of Part XV shall have no binding force except in respect of that particular dispute.62 
In other words, res judicata principle is “to prevent legal principles accepted by the 
Court in a particular case from being binding … in other disputes”,63 and “what is 
not res judicata between the parties has no authoritative and binding effect”.64 
This “limits” of the res judicata principle, as analyzed by Professor Bin 
Cheng, explain the possible outcome of this arbitration that is the lingering row. To 
be submitted, no matter which Party wins the case in the merits phase, the losing 
Party will not be stripped of its legal grounds to carry on its disputed yet over-ruled 
actions. It is based on the unaffected and undefeated claims of the losing Party for 
the unsubmitted core disputes on territorial sovereignty over SCS maritime features 
and maritime delimitation in the SCS region. Such uninterrupted behaviors would 
not do violence to the award and could even conform to the res judicata principle.65
C. The Application of Article 27(2) of ROP and the Termination of 
     the Arbitral Proceedings
Article 27(2) of ROP provides that “[i]f, before an award is made, the continu-
ation of the arbitral proceedings becomes unnecessary … for any reason not men-
tioned in paragraph 1, the Arbitral Tribunal shall inform the Parties of its intention 
62    The identity of “that particular case”, as one of the conditions of res judicata, means “the 
matter in that dispute” or “the same question at issue”. It covers both “the object” and “the 
grounds of the claim” of that dispute. “[W]here new rights are asserted, there is a new case 
which ought not to be barred by a previous decision even if the parties and the object be 
identical.” “In the case of the Compagnie generale de l’Orenoque (1905), it was decided 
that counter-claims, as well as claims that might be presented by way of setoff, constituted 
independent actions. Even though they could have been pleaded in a previous action, if 
in fact they were not presented and considered, subsequent action upon them was not 
precluded by the previous decision.” See various decisions cited by Bin Cheng, General 
Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, London: Steven & 
Sons, London, 1953, notes 16~17, pp. 341, 343, 345~347.
63    Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
London: Steven & Sons, London, 1953, p. 341, note 22 (summarizing the PCIJ’s position).
64    Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
London: Steven & Sons, London, 1953, p. 341.
65    There are four reasons for this: First, the core Sino-Philippine territorial and maritime 
delimitation disputes rather constitute the causes of the confrontations reflected by the 
Philippine Submissions. Second, such core disputes are undoubtedly beyond the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal and have not been formally brought to the Tribunal 
for settlement in the first place. Third, the legality of claims of either Party in such core 
disputes shall not be adjudged by the Tribunal that may not settle such disputes indirectly 
and informally. Fourth, no matter which award the Tribunal may give in the merits, there 
can be no res judicata between the Parties over such core disputes.
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to issue an order for the termination of the proceedings.”66 What is the “reason 
not mentioned in paragraph 1” of this article? Article 27(1) provides that, due to 
agreement between the Parties to settle the disputes, the Tribunal shall either order 
a termination of the proceedings or, when requested by the Parties and accepted 
by the Tribunal, record the settlement in the form of an award on agreed terms. 
Therefore, the term “any reason not mentioned in paragraph 1” in Article 27(2) 
clearly means all the situations other than the existence of agreement between the 
Parties for settling the disputes. In other words, Article 27(2) grants the right to the 
Tribunal to terminate the proceedings without settlement of the disputes between 
the Parties as long as the continuation of such proceedings is unnecessary. 
But, what makes the continuation of the arbitral proceedings unnecessary? 
If eventually the Philippines wins the case in the merits phase, China’s possible 
non-compliance (by appearance) with the unfavorable award will conveniently be 
seen as violating Article 296 of UNCLOS to which China is a Contracting Party. 
However, if this is a problem, it is not merely China’s problem. As discussed by 
the paper to be published in Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and 
Affairs by this author, this is not at all an issue of infringing Article 296 by nature, 
but rather a common phenomenon for the losing Parties (be it the Philippines or 
China) that conforms to res judicata principle and Article 296.
Given the circumstance that the maritime confrontations identified by the 
Philippines’ Memorial will continue even after an award on the merits is issued, 
such ineffectiveness of the award on the merits will most probably constitute one 
of the predictable situations rendering the continuation of the arbitral proceedings 
unnecessary. It is suggested that the Tribunal should seriously consider applying 
Article 27(2) of ROP and decisively terminate the rest of the arbitral proceedings 
for this case.
66     Article 27 of ROP provides: “1. If, before an award is made, the Parties agree on a settle-
ment of the dispute, the Arbitral Tribunal shall either issue an order for the termination 
of the arbitral proceedings or, if requested by the Parties and accepted by the Arbitral 
Tribunal, record the settlement in the form of an award on agreed terms. The Arbitral 
Tribunal is not obliged to give reasons for such an award. 2. If, before an award is made, the 
continuation of the arbitral proceedings becomes unnecessary or impossible for any reason 
not mentioned in paragraph 1, the Arbitral Tribunal shall inform the Parties of its intention 
to issue an order for the termination of the proceedings. The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the 
power to issue such an order unless there are remaining matters that may need to be decided 
and the Arbitral Tribunal considers it appropriate to do so …”
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III. Inadmissibility and Lack of Jurisdiction for the 
       Claims and Disputes Submitted
A. Lack of Dispute
According to Part XV of UNCLOS, one of the conditions to initiate the 
Arbitration under Annex VII is the existence of a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS. Any claim impossible to constitute 
even a dispute67 should be considered hypothetical, moot and inadmissible by the 
Tribunal. The following statements will prove that Submissions 1~7 convey no real 
dispute for the Tribunal to try and should be declared inadmissible.
1. For Submission 1: Philippines’ Misinterpretation of “Relevant Waters” 
Mentioned in China’s 2009 Note Verbales
One of the biggest misunderstandings and misinterpretations about China’s 
South China Sea maritime claim originated from the text of and the map (Fig. 1 of 
this paper) attached to China’s two Note Verbales (NVs) dated on 7 May 2009. As 
put by the leading lawyer of the Philippines, Mr. Paul Reichler, in his first-round 
submissions in the afternoon of 7 July 2015,
This is a map of the South China Sea showing the nine-dash line that China 
67     Article 283 of UNCLOS requires the existence of a dispute before the dispute settlement 
mechanism of Part XV of UNCLOS can operate. In Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, 
both Parties emphasized the need of the existence of a dispute according to Art. 283. The 
Tribunal accepted such interpretation. See Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Award, UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal (11 April 2006), paras. 74, 80, 196~200, at http://www.pcacpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1152, 10 March 2015. In the judgment of The Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions, the Permanent Court of International Justice has defined a dispute 
as “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between 
two persons.” The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, [30 August 1924] PCIJ Series A, 
No. 2, p. 11, at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_02/06_Mavrommatis_en_Palestine_
Arret.pdf, 10 March 2015. Seen as an elaboration of such a definition, J.G. Merrills said 
that, “a dispute may be defined as a specific disagreement concerning a matter of fact, law 
or policy in which a claim or assertion of one party is met with refusal, counter-claim or 
denial by another.” J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 4th ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 1. A.V. Lowe and J. Collier also describe the dispute 
as “a specific disagreement relating to a question of rights or interests in which the parties 
proceed by way of claims, counter-claims, denials and so on.” J. Collier and A.V. Lowe, 
The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions and Procedures, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 1. Clearly, a dispute is built upon an exchange of claims 
and counter-claims through such a process the point of conflict becomes specific and 
crystallised.
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brought to the world’s attention in 2009. China did so in notes objecting to a 
joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf, and to a separate submission made by Vietnam. This 
is the same map that was attached to the notes asserting China’s objections. 
Those notes stated:
“China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China 
Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached 
map).”68
The notes and map are at tab 1.2 of your folders. 
…
To be sure, the wording of China’s 2009 note, taken by itself, leaves 
some question over the purpose of the nine-dash line, although the line would 
appear to represent the outer limits of the maritime areas over which China’s 
note was claiming sovereign rights and jurisdiction.69
The above position was also stated in Philippines’ Memorial dated 30 March 
2014.70 However, this is a misinterpretation of the China’s position as revealed in 
its 2009 NVs. It has been explained by the paper published in China Oceans Law 
Review by this author.71 
When seeing the word “relevant”, one cannot help asking “relevant to what”. 
The answer can only be found by looking at the background against which China 
sent these two NVs in 2009 to the UN, which was also acknowledged by Mr. 
68    Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/17/2009 (7 May 2009). 
MP, Vol. VI, Annex 191; Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
No. CML/18/2009 (7 May 2009). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 192.  
69    Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, pp. 32~33. Also see Second-round submissions 
by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, p. 6.
70     Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 70~71.
71    Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 175~181.
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Reichler.72 They were in fact used to protest73 against (1) the Vietnam/Malaysia 
Joint Submission for the Outer limits of Outer Continental Shelf in SCS,74 and (2) 
the Vietnamese Individual Submission for the Outer Limits of Outer Continental 
Shelf in SCS.75 Fig. 276 and Fig. 377 of this paper are the illustrations provided by 
these two submissions respectively. Putting these two figures together with Fig. 
1 of this paper, it becomes evident why China raised objections and what China 
objected against. It was because the areas of the two submissions overlap with 
China’s EEZ and continental shelf generated by the Spratly Islands Group and 
the Paracel Islands over which China maintains territorial claims. Hence, it is 
justified to say that the word “relevant waters” means the waters (and the seabed 
and subsoil thereof) enclosed by these two outer continental shelf submissions, 
instead of the whole range of waters enclosed by the U-Shaped Line. Fig. 4 of this 
paper78 demonstrates all these factors as it puts the regions under those two outer 
continental shelf submissions into a SCS map with the U-Shaped Line, together 
with the locations of the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands Group that are next 
72     Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, p. 32.
73    Para. 5(a) of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) provides that: “[i]n cases where a land or maritime dispute 
exists, the Commission shall not consider and qualify a submission made by any of the 
States concerned in the dispute. However, the Commission may consider one or more 
submissions in the areas under dispute with prior consent given by all States that are parties 
to such a dispute.” China provided two NVs to the UN to (1) prove the existence of land 
and maritime disputes that are involved in the Vietnam/Malaysia Joint Submission and the 
Vietnamese Submission, and (2) express the unwillingness of China, as one of the parties to 
such land and maritime disputes, for the CLCS to consider these two outer continental shelf 
submissions. Therefore, the words “relevant waters” in China’s NVs can indicate nothing 
but the maritime region of outer continental shelves as reflected by those two submissions. 
The Rules of Procedure of the CLCS, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N08/309/23/PDF/N0830923.pdf?OpenElement, 10 March 2015.
74     Mission of the PRC to the UN, Note Verbale, CML/17/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 1, at http://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_
e.pdf, 10 March 2015.
75      Mission of the PRC to the UN, Note Verbale, CML/18/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 1, at http://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf, 10 
March 2015.
76   Executive Summary of the Vietnam/Malaysia Joint Submission Dated on 6 May 2009, 
p. 5, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_
vnm2009excutivesummary.pdf, 10 March 2015.
77   Executive Summary of the Vietnam Individual Submission Dated on 7 May 2009, p. 
5, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/vnm2009n_
executivesummary.pdf, 10 March 2015.
78     Lori Fisler Damrosch and Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: The South China Sea, Editors’ Intro-
duction, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, 2013, pp. 95~96.
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to (and almost within) the areas marked by these two submissions. 
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that China uses the U-Shaped Line as the outer 
limits of maritime claims in SCS based on China’s 2009 NVs to the UN. Such a 
self-evident meaning for the term “relevant waters” proves the inaccuracy of the 
above interpretation of Mr. Reichler. In the same context, we cannot fail to note the 
statement of China in its 2011 NV,
In addition, under the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, as well as the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) and the Law 
on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s 
Republic of China (1998), China’s Nansha Islands is fully entitled to 
Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.79 
Clearly, China adheres to UNCLOS and UNCLOS-compliant domestic laws 
when making maritime claims in the SCS. It is China’s Nansha Islands (Spratly 
Islands Group) treated as a singular unit, instead of the U-Shaped Line, that is used 
to generate EEZ and continental shelf in SCS. This is consistent with the “land 
dominates the sea” principle. No dispute can thus be created between China and the 
Philippines concerning the legality of the U-Shaped Line used as either basis or the 
outer limits of China’s SCS maritime claims.80
79    Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, NV, CML/8/2011, 14 
April 2011, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/
chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 10 March 2015.
80    For the reasons why Philippines’ Submission 1 should be deemed inadmissible, please see 
Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 172~186.
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Fig. 1    The Map Produced by China in Its 2009 NVs to Protest Vietnam/
Malaysia Outer Continental Shelf Submissions in SCS
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Fig. 2    Vietnam/Malaysia 2009 Outer Continental Shelf Joint Submission
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Fig. 3     Vietnam’s 2009 Outer Continental Shelf Submission in SCS
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Fig. 4     2009 Malaysia/Vietnam Joint Submission & Vietnam Submission 
Overlap with China’s SCS Territorial/Maritime Claims Inside 
2. For Submission 2: Philippines’ Misinterpretation of Chinese Scholars’ 
Papers as to “China’s Claim of Historic Rights in the SCS”
Another big misinterpretation by the Philippines for China’s historic right 
claim in the SCS is based on academic papers by Chinese scholars. In his first-
round submissions, Mr. Reichler invoked the paper published in the American 
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2015 No. 2)116
Journal of International Law by Judge Gao Zhiguo and Professor Jia Bingbing. As 
said by Mr. Reichler,
We accept that Judge Gao’s explanation of China’s position is not an official 
one, but it is nevertheless, we submit, worthy of your attention. Judge Gao 
stated that the nine-dash line has more than one meaning:
“First, it represents the title to the island groups that it encloses. In 
other words, within the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, China has 
sovereignty over the islands and other insular features, and has sovereignty, 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction – in accordance with UNCLOS – over the 
waters and seabed and subsoil adjacent to those islands and insular features. 
Second, it preserves Chinese historic rights in fishing, navigation and such 
other maritime activities as oil and gas development in the waters and on the 
continental shelf surrounded by the line.”81
In the same article, Judge Gao made even clearer that the “historic 
rights” claimed by China in areas surrounded by the nine-dash line are 
beyond those provided in the Convention:
“In addition to these rights conferred by UNCLOS, China can assert 
historic rights within the nine-dash line – under Article 14 of its 1998 law 
on the EEZ and the continental shelf – in respect of fishing, navigation, and 
exploration and exploitation of resources.”82
…
China’s first formal assertion of maritime rights beyond its UNCLOS 
entitlements was in Article 14 of its 1998 EEZ law.83 You will recall that 
Judge Gao wrote, in the AJIL article I cited yesterday, that the 1998 law is 
the source of China’s “historic rights” claim and the justification for the 
nine-dash line, which he says “preserves Chinese historic rights in fishing, 
navigation and such other marine activities as oil and gas development in the 
81    Gao Zhiguo and Jia Bingbing, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, 
and Implications, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, 2013, pp. 123~124. 
MP, Vol. X, Annex 307.  
82    Gao Zhiguo and Jia Bingbing, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, 
and Implications, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, 2013, pp. 109~110.
83    People’s Republic of China, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (26 June 
1998), Art. 14. MP, Vol. V, Annex 107.  
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waters and on the continental shelf surrounded by the line”.84 Judge Gao thus 
equated China’s “historic rights” claim to a claim of sovereign rights, not 
sovereignty.85
In the Philippines’ Memorial, more academic papers were invoked to support 
its position that China is using Article 14 of its 1988 Law on the EEZ and the 
Continental Shelf to claim historic rights in the SCS enclosed by the U-Shaped 
Line. However, as shown by Paragraphs 4.29~4.30 of the Memorial, renowned 
legal scholars from Chinese Mainland and Taiwan could only speculate on the 
legal effect of Article 14 of the 1998 Law. They do not know whether Chinese 
Government has invoked that provision to justify its historic rights claim in SCS as 
enclosed by the U-Shaped Line.86 Had China done that, they would have known it 
and said so. Such ambiguity of China’s maritime claims based on historic right is 
noticed by other renowned scholars who are non-Chinese.87 
As said by this author in his paper published in China Oceans Law Review,88 
none of those Chinese and non-Chinese scholars represent Chinese Government, 
while their opinions on the China’s assertion of historic rights within U-Shaped 
Line are uncertain. Most importantly, instead of saying that China has been or is 
asserting historic rights…, Judge Gao and Professor Jia in their well-quoted paper 
say that “China can assert historic rights…” This clearly confirms their uncertain 
view. 
84    Gao Zhiguo and Jia Bingbing, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, 
and Implications, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, 2013, p. 124. MP, Vol. 
X, Annex 307.  
85    See First-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, 
pp. 41~42; and in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, p. 61. Also see Second-round 
submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, p. 13.
86   Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 80~81. The scholars are Keyuan Zou, Yann-huei Song, Li 
Jinming, and Li Dexia. See Yann-huei Song and Keyuan Zou, Maritime Legislation of 
Mainland China and Taiwan: Developments, Comparison, Implications, and Potential 
Challenges for the United States, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 31, No. 4, 
2000, p. 318; Li Jinming and Li Dexia, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South 
China Sea: A Note, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 34, Nos. 3~4, 2003, 
p. 293; Keyuan Zou, Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice, Ocean 
Development & International Law, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001, p. 160.
87      Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Potential 
South China Sea Change, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29, 
2014, p. 205.
88    Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 181~182.
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2015 No. 2)118
Therefore, it is fair to say that the above statement of Mr. Reichler is 
incorrect. Eminent Chinese scholars’ academic papers are not sufficient to prove 
the position that China is claiming historic rights based on Article 14 of its 1998 
Law in the SCS enclosed by the U-Shaped Line. Instead, what those papers clearly 
demonstrate is the ambiguity of China’s position in the SCS within the U-Shaped 
Line. Yet, ambiguous position is hard to build up a dispute for the Tribunal to try in 
the first place.
3. For Submission 2: No Dispute concerning the Alleged “China’s Historic 
Rights” in Waters beyond 12 NM from Scarborough Shoal
First of all, China claims territorial sovereignty in the waters 12 NM from 
Scarborough Shoal as its territorial water. More importantly, no evidence provided 
by the Philippines’ Memorial and its lawyers’ oral statements in the Hearing on 7, 8 
and 13 of July 2015 can prove that China in fact is claiming historic right to justify 
its law enforcement activities beyond territorial waters from Scarborough Shoal in 
the northern part of SCS enclosed by the U-Shaped Line. The lack of historic right 
claims beyond China’s territorial water surrounding Scarborough Shoal is further 
demonstrated by the absence of Sino-Philippine maritime confrontations in this 
outer belt of waters. Moreover, Submissions 10, 11, and 13 endorse such a position. 
These Submissions reflect Sino-Philippine maritime confrontations which occurred 
only in the waters within 12 NM from Scarborough Shoal. Therefore, the facts can 
hardly substantiate the existence of a Sino-Philippine dispute concerning China’s 
invocation of historic rights to justify its maritime claims beyond territorial waters 
in this region. 
If China has made any real maritime claim beyond 12 NM from Scarborough 
Shoal, it might be EEZ which has to be supported by UNCLOS, but not by historic 
rights. The statements made by Philippines’ lawyers in the Hearings of July 2015 
give the impression that China has claimed EEZ in such waters.89 If it is correct to 
say that China claims EEZ in such waters, then it will be irreconcilable for China to 
claim historic rights to support its maritime claim in the same area. It follows that, 
as far as the northern part of SCS is concerned, the facts shows that Submission 2 
only conveys a moot issue (instead of a real dispute) in terms of China’s historic 
rights claim.
89    See First-round submissions by Mr. Martin, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, 
pp. 29~30, footnote 34. Also see Second-round submissions and Response to Tribunal 
questions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 13~14, 68.
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4. For Submission 2: No Dispute concerning the Alleged “China’s Historic 
Rights” in Waters beyond 200 NM from Non-Rock Islands in Spratly Islands 
Group
It is an undeniable fact that China claims territorial sovereignty over all 
the islands, rocks and maritime features in the Spratly Islands Group, of which 
Kalayaan Islands Group (KIG) is only a part. Such Chinese territorial claim is of 
much older origin and with more comprehensive geographical scope than that of 
the Philippines in the KIG, as evidenced by this author’s paper published in China 
Oceans Law Review.90 
China is claiming EEZ and continental shelf generated by the Spratly Islands 
Group as a singular unit.91 Besides, among those numerous maritime features 
located in the Spratly Islands Group, quite a few of them are islands individually 
meeting the conditions of Article 121 of UNCLOS. One scholar who teaches at 
Navy Command and Staff College of National Defense University in Taiwan, 
Captain Ruei-Lin Yu, has compiled top 15 non-rock islands in terms of area in 
the Spratly Islands Group,92 while Robert Beckman and Clive Schofield consider 
12 of them as “islands” under Article 121.93 After double-checking the official 
information provided by the PRC Government concerning the spelling of the 
English and Chinese names (including pin-yin) of these islands, as well as the 
coordinates for these islands, a Table of Names and Coordinates of the 15 Biggest 
Islands in Spratly Islands Group is produced as Table 1 of this paper. It is very easy 
90   Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 209~222.
91   In its 2011 NV, China declared that “[s]ince 1930s, the Chinese Government has given 
publicity several times the geographical scope of China’s Nansha Islands and the names of 
its components. China’s Nansha Islands is therefore clearly defined. In addition, under the 
relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well 
as the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone (1992) and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the 
People’s Republic of China (1998), China’s Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial 
Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.” See Mission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the United Nations, NV, CML/8/2011, 14 April 2011, at http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 10 
March 2015.
92    Ruei-Lin Yu, A Study of Strategic Options for [Taiwan] in the South China Sea during 
the Possible Potency of Islands Delimitation, National Defense Journal, No. 1, 2014, pp. 
14~15. (in Chinese)
93     Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Potential 
South China Sea Change, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29, 
2014, pp. 210~211.
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to know the situations of these islands through the publicly available information 
provided on the internet. 




Names of the islands
Coordinates OccupantEnglish Chinese Pin-Yin
1 Itu Aba95 太平岛 Taiping Dao
10°23' N
114°22' E Taiwan









115°02' E  Philippines





5 Northeast Cay (Parola)99 北子岛 Beizi Dao
11°27' N
114°22' E Philippines















94       The names of the SCS islands are those adopted by the National Toponymy Committee of 
China and published in the People’s Daily, 25 April 1983. For the size ranking of these 
islands, see Ruei-Lin Yu, A Study of Strategic Options for [Taiwan] in the South China 
Sea during the Possible Potency of Islands Delimitation, National Defense Journal, No. 1, 
2014, pp. 14~15. (in Chinese)
95         For a photo of this island, at http://www.glocal.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/45208
564.jpg, 10 March 2015.
96      For a photo of this island, at http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/23/247525/china-vietna
m-dispute-over-spratlys/, 10 March 2015.
97        For a photo of this island, at http://www.panoramio.com/photo/56907434, 10 March 2015.
98        For a photo of this island, at http://www.unanhai.com/a/nansha/daojiaogaikuang/2012/052
7/nanweidao.html, 10 March 2015.
99     For a photo of this island, at http://www.panoramio.com/photo/56910828, 10 March 
2015. 
100      For a photo of this island, at https://www.flickr.com/photos/60082435@N05/7409387472/, 
10 March 2015.
101     For a photo of this island, at http://www.unanhai.com/a/nansha/daojiaogaikuang/2012/041
7/JinghongDao.html, 10 March 2015.
102      For a photo of this island, at http://chenwei18196555.blog.163.com/blog/static/142325546
20123297738389 and http://baike.sogou.com/v61274.htm, 10 March 2015.
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12 Namyit Island106 鸿庥岛 Hongxiu Dao
10°11' N
114°22' E Vietnam



















Such kind of data withheld by the Memorial and Philippines’ counsel in 
103      For a photo of this island, at http://gming1983.blog.163.com/blog/static/111390122011713
103033153/, 10 March 2015.
104      For a photo of this island, at http://baike.sogou.com/v61290.htm, 10 March 2015.
105      For a photo of this island, at http://asiadivingvacation.com/diving/layang-layang-island
and http://www.timawa.net/forum/index.php?topic=10149.45, 10 March 2015.
106      For a photo of this island, at http://www.unanhai.com/a/nansha/daojiaogaikuang/2012/110
2/942.html, 10 March 2015.
107      For a photo of this island, at http://www.unanhai.com/a/nansha/daojiaogaikuang/2012/110
2/944.html, 10 March 2015.
108        For a photo of this island, at http://blog.163.com/ytmydihc@126/blog/static/67068195201
35361959673/, 10 March 2015.
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the July Hearing109 is critical for the Tribunal to examine, in order to accurately 
calculate the real maritime entitlements China may claim in the eastern part of SCS 
enclosed by the U-Shaped Line (hereinafter “Relevant Area”).
In the Memorial, the Philippines identified five low-tide elevations (LTEs) that 
China occupies in KIG which is part of Spratly Islands Group. They are Mischief 
Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, and McKennan Reef. It is 
argued by the Philippines that none of these LTEs forms part of China’s continental 
shelf. Hence, China must desist from occupying these features and from exercising 
sovereign rights and jurisdictions in the waters surrounding these features and 
beyond. The Philippines identified four other maritime features that China occupies 
in the eastern part of SCS, namely, Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron 
Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef. They are not considered by the Philippines as “islands” 
but “rocks” meeting the conditions of Article 121(3), as misinterpreted by the 
Memorial.110 The Philippines contends that China relies on historic rights to justify 
its law enforcement activities in the waters beyond 12 NM from these four “rocks”. 
Additionally, Reed Bank was identified by the Memorial as the site of Sino-
Philippine maritime dispute,111 as Reef Bank is not deemed by the Philippines as 
part of China’s EEZ or continental shelf.
It is submitted that the above-mentioned five “LTEs”, three “rocks” (not 
109     Professor Sands, as Philippines’ counsel, was unwilling to provide such critical information 
to the Tribunal. See First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in the Transcripts of the 
Hearing on 7 July 2015, pp. 86~88. It was said by Professor Sands that “[w]hat China says 
is that we have ‘deliberately excluded’ the largest ‘island’ occupied by China, Itu Aba, 
and that we have been mischievous in doing this. To be very realistic, the basis upon 
which the Philippines selected nine maritime features is explained fully in the Memorial. 
There are more than 750 features in the Spratly Islands, and possibly this Tribunal may 
want to engage in the exercise – which would last a very lengthy period of time, having 
regard to a similar experience in the case of Slovenia and Croatia on a huge number of 
different matters – but we felt it would simply be unmanageable and unreasonable for the 
Philippines to request the Tribunal to determine the nature of so many features, and we 
said so. So we have asked the Tribunal to rule only on those features that are occupied or 
controlled by China, on the basis that this would assist in the resolution of differences as 
to the entitlements generated by all the other features. Once we’ve got your award, we can 
apply your award to all the other features. So we have not ‘deliberately excluded’ anything 
for any malign purpose; we have simply tried to be pragmatic in relation to what is doable 
in a reasonable period of time. And that was motivated, for right or for wrong, to assist the 
Tribunal.”
110    Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 199~209.
111      Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 164~166, paras. 6.16~6.22.
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counting Scarborough Shoal), and Reed Bank, all fall within EEZ and continental 
shelf China may claim from, inter alia, Itu Aba, Thitu, and West York islands, as 
well as the Spratly Islands Group as a single unit. In the Hearing, Professor Sands 
denied Itu Aba the legal status as an island under Article 121 of UNCLOS.112 
However, the factual situation of Itu Aba has been released by Taiwan on 7 July 
2015 which is the first day of the July Hearing.113 In addition, Table 2 below 
illustrates the distance between these three non-rock islands on the one hand and 
each of these maritime features identified by the Philippines, on the other hand.
Being all within 200 NM from these three non-rock islands, these five “LTEs” 
constitute part of China’s continental shelf and EEZ as well. China is thus entitled 
to continue its occupation and to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction under 
UNCLOS regime of EEZ and continental shelf for these LTEs and the waters 
surrounding them. By the same token, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery 
Cross Reef, even if considered as “rocks” under Article 121(3), are maritime 
features located in China’s EEZ and continental shelf. Hence, for the maritime 
area surrounding and beyond these three “rocks”, China is still entitled to exercise 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction under EEZ and continental shelf regime of 
UNCLOS. As the Sino-Philippine maritime confrontations identified by the 
Philippines’ Submissions 8~14 are all located in the EEZ and continental shelf 
generated by, inter alia, these three non-rock islands, the legality dispute concer-
112     See First-round submissions by Professor Sands, from the Transcripts of the Hearing on 
7 July 2015, pp. 88~89. “Itu Aba, which is the largest feature in the southern sector, has 
been occupied by the authorities in Taiwan since 1946. It is no more than 0.43 square 
kilometres in size. It has no permanent population. It provides no water suitable for 
drinking, and it does not provide a meaningful amount of agricultural produce. It is 
similar in nature to Colombia’s Serrana Cay, which is also roughly 0.4 square kilometres 
in size. In fact, Serrana Cay is 10 metres in height, and there there is a well to supply 
water for visiting fishermen and law enforcement officers. In the case of Nicaragua 
v Colombia, although the International Court found it unnecessary to decide whether to 
apply Article 121 of the Convention to Serrana Cay, it granted this feature no more than 
a 12-nautical mile territorial sea. But in any event, Itu Aba has not been “deliberately 
excluded” by the Philippines, as China puts it. Our written pleadings do address the 
largest features in the Spratlys, including Itu Aba, Thitu and West York. And we have 
demonstrated that the features in the Spratly area are “rocks” within the meaning of 
Article 121 of the Convention, so that none is capable of generating an entitlement to any 
EEZ or continental shelf.”
113        The information of Itu Aba Island released by Taiwan, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/
RelFile/661/150648/a1fe8e7f-aeeb-4953-8921-ef2607294072.pdf, 10 August 2015; 
The Statement of the South China Sea by Taiwan, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_
Content.aspx?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&s=EDEBCA08C7F51C98, 10 August 2015.
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ning the alleged China’s historic right claim116 for justifying its law enforcement 
activities in the area surrounding and beyond those five LTEs, three rocks, and 
Reed Bank becomes hypothetical,117 moot, non-justiciable,118 and pointless for the 
Tribunal to address.119
5. For Submission 3: No Maritime Confrontations Complained by the 
Philippines in This Case Occurred in Waters beyond 12 NM 
from Scarborough Shoal
It is interesting to see that Submission 3 of the Philippines requests the 
Tribunal to declare that “Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an EEZ 
or continental shelf”. To establish a dispute based on this Submission, China 
must have claimed an EEZ or continental shelf that is generated by this “rock”. 
However, the Philippines’ legal team admitted in the Hearing of July 2015 that all 
Sino-Philippine maritime confrontations involving Scarborough Shoal happened 
in the territorial water of this “rock”.120 Once again, the lack of Sino-Philippine 
clashes in terms of law enforcement activities in the waters beyond territorial sea 
116     See First-round submissions by Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Del Rosario, the Transcripts 
of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, pp. 14~16. Also see First-round submissions by Mr. 
Reichler, in the Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, pp. 26~27, 30.
117     Article 283 of UNCLOS requires the existence of a dispute before the dispute settlement 
mechanism of Part XV of UNCLOS can operate. In Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, 
both Parties emphasized the need of the existence of a dispute according to Art. 283. 
The Tribunal accepted such interpretation. See Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Award, 
UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (11 April 2006), paras. 74, 80, 196~200, at http://www.
pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1152, 10 March 2015.
118    J. Collier and A. V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions 
and Procedures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 10, 13, 156~157. After the 
heading “Justiciability” the two eminent scholars say that “[i]t was mentioned above that 
not all disputes are suitable for judicial settlement. To be suitable, the dispute must be 
justiciable. A dispute is said to be justiciable if, first, a specific disagreement exists, and 
secondly, that disagreement is of a kind which can be resolved by the application of rules 
of law by judicial (including arbitral) processes … Thus far we have been concerned with 
the task of establishing that a dispute has come into existence. In the case of most (but 
not all) tribunals a further aspect of this precondition of justiciability is that the dispute 
remains in existence up to the point that the judgment or award is given. To put it another 
way, most tribunals will refuse to give rulings on disputes that are hypothetical or have 
become moot.” 
119     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 224~227.
120    See Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, pp. 8, 23 (Statement of Solicitor General 
Hilbay), 99 (Statement of Professor Sands); Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 
30 (Statement of Mr. Martin), 86~87 (Statement of Professor Oxman); Transcripts of the 
Hearing on 13 July 2015, p. 15 (Statement of Mr. Reichler). 
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from Scarborough Shoal undermines the position that China is making EEZ and 
continental shelf claims surrounding Scarborough Shoal. 
Moreover, the two evidences invoked by Mr. Martin121 and Mr. Reichler122 
in the Hearing of July 2015 indicated that China had positively claimed EEZ 
generated by Scarborough Shoal only in 1997-1998, but not later.123 Mr. Martin did 
provide another two evidences to show the protest of the Philippines against China 
on 15 and 16 of April 2012.124 However, this will not be sufficient to show that 
China is still maintaining its EEZ claim in the said water unless information can be 
provided to show China’s positive maritime claim of this nature made at the same 
times.
To be added, Scarborough Shoal is called by Chinese as Huang-Yan-Dao（黄
岩岛）, literally meaning Yellow Rock Island. The third word Dao（岛）means 
island in Chinese. This name was given by Chinese Government 11 years before 
UNCLOS entered into force. It would be unfair to say that this feature with such a 
name must have been treated by China as an “island” according to UNCLOS. To 
be noted, the National Toponymy Committee of China was commissioned by the 
PRC Government to conduct a census on the names of maritime features in SCS, 
which was part of a general project to standardize geographical names in China. On 
April 25, 1983, this Committee used People’s Daily to announce the List of Partial 
Standard Names for China’s Islands in South China Sea for 287 maritime features 
121     See First-round submissions by Mr. Martin, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, 
pp. 29~30, footnote 34. 
122     See Second-round submission and Response to Tribunal questions by Mr. Reichler, in 
Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 13~14, 69. 
123   (1) Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese Foreign Ministry 
Statement regarding Huangyandao (22 May 1997), p. 2. MP, Vol. V, Annex 106. (2) 
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, Record of Proceedings: 
10th Philippines-China Foreign Ministry Consultations (30 July 1998), p. 23. MP, Vol. VI, 
Annex 184 (stating Chinese view that Scarborough Shoal “is not a sand bank but rather an 
island,” indicating an entitlement to an EEZ). See First-round submissions by Mr. Martin, 
in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 29~30, footnote 34. Also see Second-
round submissions and Response to Tribunal questions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of 
the Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 14 (footnotes 15~16), 68.
124    Note Verbale from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines to the Embassy 
of the People’s Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-1030 (15 Apr. 2012). MP, Vol. VI, 
Annex 206 (indicating that Scarborough Shoal does not generate an EEZ); Note Verbale 
from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines to the Embassy 
of the People’s Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-1137 (26 Apr. 2012). MP, Vol. VI, 
Annex 207 (indicating that Scarborough Shoal does not generate an EEZ). See First-round 
submissions by Mr. Martin, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 29~30, 
footnote 34.
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in the four groups of SCS islands and maritime features.125 The name of Huang Yan 
Dao for Scarborough Shoal was indicated in the name list.
Clearly, no credible evidence can doubtlessly prove that China is now claiming 
an EEZ and continental shelf surrounding Scarborough Shoal. It is fair to conclude 
that what is presented by Submission 3 should be considered as a moot issue, 
incapable of forging any dispute for the Tribunal to try in the first place.
6. For Submissions 4~7: Overlooking Spratly Islands “as a Singular Unit” 
Used by China to Claim EEZ and Continental Shelf in SCS under China’s 
2011 NV
On the third day of the hearing, the leading lawyer of the Philippines, Mr. 
Reichler, answered Question 1 posed by the Tribunal to provide “the sources relied 
upon for ascertaining China’s position with respect to each of the Philippines’ 
specific submissions in the context of establishing the existence of a legal dispute.” 
When Mr. Reichler touched upon Submissions 4~7, he seriously misinterpreted 
China’s 2011 NV to the UN (dated 14 April 2011), by saying
The source list also shows that China has likewise opposed the claims 
made by the Philippines in submissions 4 through 7 in regard to the character 
and entitlements of eight other specific features, all of which are in the 
Spratlys, and which the Philippines regards as low-tide elevations with no 
maritime entitlements, or rocks with only a 12-mile entitlement. In contrast, 
China claims a 200-mile EEZ and continental shelf for all of these Spratly 
features.126
It is absolutely important to note the background of China’s 2011 NV in 
order to understand the nature of the Sino-Philippine disputes demonstrated 
by this NV. The disputes started with China’s two NVs delivered to the United 
125       The name-list was said to be only part of the complete names of maritime features Chi-
na claims in SCS. It appeared on page A4 of People’s Daily on 25 April 1983. It was 
reproduced on the website of http://www.unanhai.com/nhzddm.htm.  
126     See Second-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 
2015, p. 14 and his footnote 17 (Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/8/2011 (14 
Apr. 2011), p. 2. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 201.)
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Nations on 7 May 2009 (China’s 2009 NVs) and the map attached thereto.127 They 
are meant to challenge the Malaysia/Viet Nam Joint Submission128 and the Viet 
Nam Submission129 to the CLCS concerning extended continental shelf in certain 
SCS areas on 6 and 7 May 2009 respectively. Later on, the Philippines, inter 
alia, delivered its NV (No. 000228) on 5 April 2011 (Philippines’ 2011 NV)130 to 
challenge China’s 2009 NVs. To respond to the Philippines’ 2011 NV, the PRC 
produced its NV dated on 14 April 2011 (China’s 2011 NV).131 
It is necessary to go through the text of these 4 NVs to precisely ascertain the 
Sino-Philippine disputes and to judge the accuracy of Mr. Reichler’s statement. The 
language of both China’s 2009 NVs is identical:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea 
and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the 
relevant waters, as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map). 
The above position is consistently held by the Chinese Government, and is 
widely known by the international community.132
The relevant part of the Philippines’ 2011 NV is as follows:
127      Dated on May 7, 2009, the two Chinese Notes Verbales (CML/17/2009 and CML/18/2009) 
were issued to oppose the Malaysia-Viet Nam Joint Submission and Viet Nam Individual 
Submission for Outer Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the SCS Region. 
At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_
mys_vnm_e.pdf and http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/
chn_2009re_vnm_c.pdf, 10 March 2015. 
128    Executive Summary of the Vietnam/Malaysia Joint Submission, at http://www.un.org/
depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_vnm2009excutivesummary.pdf, 
10 March 2015.
129    Executive Summary of the Vietnam Individual Submission, at http://www.un.org/depts/
los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/vnm2009n_executivesummary.pdf, 10 March 
2015.
130     Philippine Note Verbale dated 5 April 2011 (No. 000228), at http://www.un.org/depts/los/
clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/phl_re_chn_2011.pdf, 10 March 2015.
131    Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, NV, CML/8/2011, 14 
April 2011, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/
chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 1 March 2015.
132     Dated on May 7, 2009, the two Chinese Notes Verbales (CML/17/2009 and CML/18/2009) 
were issued to oppose the Malaysia-Viet Nam Joint Submission and Viet Nam Individual 
Submission for Outer Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the SCS Region. 
At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_
mys_vnm_e.pdf and http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/
chn_2009re_vnm_c.pdf, 10 March 2015.
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On the Islands and other Geological Features
FIRST, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) constitutes an integral part 
of the Philippines. The Republic of the Philippines has sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the geological features in the KIG.
On the “Water Adjacent” to the Islands and other Geological Features
SECOND, the Philippines, under the Roman notion of dominium maris 
and the international law principle of “la terre domine la mer” which 
states that the land dominates the sea, necessarily exercises sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the waters around or adjacent to each relevant geological 
feature in the KIG as provided for under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
At any rate, the extent of the waters that are “adjacent” to the relevant 
geological features are definite and determinable under UNCLOS, specifically 
under Article 121 (Regime of Islands) of the said Convention.
On the Other “Relevant Waters, Seabed and Subsoil” in the SCS
THIRD, since the adjacent waters of the relevant geological features are 
definite and subject to legal and technical measurement, the claim as well by 
the People’s Republic of China on the “relevant waters as well as the seabed 
and subsoil thereof” (as reflected in the so-called 9-dash line map attached to 
Noted Verbales CML/17/1009 dated 7 May 2009 and CML/18/2009 dated 7 
May 2009) outside of the aforementioned relevant geological features in the 
KIG and their “adjacent waters” would have no basis under international law, 
specifically UNCLOS. With respect to these areas, sovereignty and jurisdiction 
or sovereign rights, as the case may be, necessarily appertain or belong to 
the appropriate coastal or archipelagic state – the Philippines – to which 
these bodies of waters as well as seabed and subsoil are appurtenant, either 
in the nature of Territorial Sea, or 200 M Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 
or Continental Shelf (CS) in accordance with Articles 3, 4, 55, 57, and 76 of 
UNCLOS.133
The relevant part of China’s 2011 NV reads:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea 
133    At http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/phl_re_
chn_2011.pdf, 10 March 2015.  
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and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the 
relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. China’s sovereignty 
and related rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea are supported by 
abundant historical and legal evidence. The content of the Note Verbale No. 
000228 of the Republic of the Philippines are totally unacceptable to the 
Chinese Government.
The so-called Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) claimed by the Republic 
of the Philippines is in fact part of China’s Nansha Islands. In a series of 
international treaties which define the limits of the territory of the Republic of 
the Philippines and the domestic legislation of the Republic of the Philippines 
prior to 1970s, the Republic of the Philippines had never made any claims 
to Nansha Islands or any of its components. Since 1970s, the Republic of the 
Philippines started to invade and occupy some islands and reefs of China’s 
Nansha Islands and made relevant territorial claims, to which China objects 
strongly. The Republic of the Philippines’ occupation of some islands and 
reefs of China’s Nansha Islands as well as other related acts constitutes 
infringement upon China’s territorial sovereignty. Under the legal doctrine 
of “ex injuria jus non oritur”, the Republic of the Philippines can in no way 
invoke such illegal occupation to support its territorial claims. Furthermore, 
under the legal principle of “la terre domine la mer”, coastal states’ Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and CS claims shall not infringe upon the territorial 
sovereignty of other states.
Since 1930s, the Chinese Government has given publicity several times 
the geographical scope of China’s Nansha Islands and the names of its 
components. China’s Nansha Islands is therefore clearly defined. In addition, 
under the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, as well as the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone(1992) and the Law on the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic 
of China(1998), China’s Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.134 
134    Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, NV, CML/8/2011, 14 
April 2011, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/
chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf, 10 March 2015.  
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Clearly, the China’s 2011 NV does not claim a 200 NM EEZ and continental 
shelf for all of the 8 maritime features identified by Philippines’ Submissions 4~7. 
China’s 2011 NV takes Spratly Islands Group (Nansa Islands) as a singular unit 
that generates EEZ and continental shelf, as the wording used in this NV is not “are”, 
but “is”.135 Secondly, the names of the 8 maritime features identified by Philippines’ 
Submissions 4~7 were not even mentioned in China’s 2011 NV.136 Thirdly, these 
4 NVs demonstrate (China-opposed) Philippines’ territorial sovereignty claims 
over each of the maritime features located in the KIG. Some of the features are 
obviously considered by the Philippines as rocks that generate territorial waters 
only. Some other features are clearly deemed islands that generate EEZ and 
continental shelf. It will be wrong for the Philippines to misinterpret the foregoing 
China’s unequivocal position in the Spratly Islands Group as using each maritime 
135    Here, it is wrong for the Philippines’ legal team to say (at the Hearing of 8 July 2015), 
“The Philippines’ fourth submission is for a declaration that: ‘Mischief Reef, Second 
Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations that do not generate entitlement to 
a territorial sea, [EEZ] or continental shelf, and are not features ... capable of appropriation 
by occupation or otherwise ...’ China has asserted that these reefs are part of ‘China’s 
Nansha Islands’, the Spratlys, and that they ‘are fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive 
Economic Zone ... and Continental Shelf’”. To be noted, at the end of this quotation, 
there is footnote 143 which says that “Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of 
the People’s Republic of China to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 
CML/8/2011 (14 Apr. 2011). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 201; Memorandum from the Embassy 
of the Republic of the Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-070-2014-S (7 Mar. 2014), p. 2.” See First-round 
submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, p. 137. It 
is also totally misleading for Mr. Reichler to say on 13 July 2015 that “China’s note is 
at tab 4.5. In this sector of the South China Sea, China claims both historic rights within 
the nine-dash line and 200-mile entitlements, purportedly under UNCLOS, for all of the 
Spratly features. It has said repeatedly that: ‘China’s Nansha Islands are fully entitled to 
Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf.’” To be noted, at the end 
of this quotation, there is footnote 12, which reads: “Note Verbale from the Permanent 
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
No. CML/8/2011 (14 Apr. 2011), p. 2. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 201.” See Second-round 
submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, p. 11. 
136      Relying on the same China’s 2011 NV, Mr. Reichler again misinterpreted China’s positions 
by saying, “The source list also shows that China has likewise opposed the claims made 
by the Philippines in submissions 4 through 7 in regard to the character and entitlements 
of eight other specific features, all of which are in the Spratlys, and which the Philippines 
regards as low-tide elevations with no maritime entitlements, or rocks with only a 12-mile 
entitlement. In contrast, China claims a 200-mile EEZ and continental shelf for all of these 
Spratly features.” To be noted, at the end of this quotation, there is footnote 17 which 
reads: “Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/8/2011 (14 Apr. 2011), p. 2. MP, 
Vol. VI, Annex 201.” See Second-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the 
Hearing on 13 July 2015, p. 14.
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feature to generate maritime entitlements under UNCLOS, just because this method 
is followed by the Philippines. Fourthly and most astonishingly, it is admitted by 
Philippines’ 2011 NV that certain maritime features in KIG are islands (in plural 
but not singular form) under UNCLOS legal regime and capable of generating EEZ 
and continental shelf for the owner (the Philippines) of those maritime features. 
To be noted, Professor Sands in his oral statement delivered at the July Hearing 
even provided a Philippines’ Supreme Court Ruling to confirm the above position 
in Philippines’ 2011 NV.137 It totally defeats Philippines’ own position in this 
arbitration that none of the maritime features in the KIG should be considered as 
island under Article 121 of UNCLOS.138
To conclude, Philippines’ Submissions 4~7 cannot reflect the real China’s 
position that is opposed by the Philippines. It is groundless to say that any dispute 
exists concerning the situations reflected by these submissions.
7. For Submissions 4 and 6: It Is Not China’s Claim that Mischief Reef, Second 
Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, and McKennan Reef Are Not LTEs
Please see Section III-A-6 of this paper. No dispute exists for Submissions 4 
and 6.
8. For Submission 7: It Is Not China’s Claim that Johnson Reef, Cuarteron 
Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef Generate Entitlement to an EEZ or Continental 
Shelf
Please see Section III-A-6 of this paper. No dispute exists for Submission 7.
9. For Submission 5: What China Objects Is Not that Mischief Reef and 
Second Thomas Shoal Are Part of Philippines’ EEZ and Continental Shelf
137    It was said by Professor Sands on 8 July 2015 that, “The Philippines Supreme Court has 
affirmed the constitutionality of RA 9522 in its 2011 judgment in the case of Magallona 
v Ermita. The Supreme Court ruled in that case that the Philippine Congress’s decision 
to classify the Kalayaan Island Group as a regime of islands under the Republic of the 
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS: ‘... manifests the Philippine State’s 
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS ...’” See 
Response to Tribunal questions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 
July 2015, pp. 4~5.
138    Mr. Reichler in his First-round submissions delivered on 7 July 2015 said, “As we have 
also shown in our written response to the Tribunal’s questions of December 2014, only 
a handful of the remaining Spratly features not mentioned in our submissions are above 
water at high tide, and even the largest of those comprises no more than 0.4 square 
kilometres. None is capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of its own. 
Thus, none is entitled to more than a 12-mile territorial sea.” See Transcripts of the 
Hearing on 7 July 2015, p. 47; Second-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts 
of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, p. 12; Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 142~146, paras. 
5.96~5.105.
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For Submission 5, the Philippines totally distorts the point of issues by 
requesting the Tribunal “to adjudge and declare that Mischief Reef and Second 
Thomas Shoal are part of the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines”. 
However, neither Philippines’ Memorial nor its lawyers’ statements in the July 
Hearing have proved China’s denial of Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal 
to be part of Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf.139 Instead, according to both 
the Philippines’ Memorial and oral statements said in the July Hearing, China 
understands140 and admits that the Philippines, as another coastal State and Party to 
UNCLOS, also has maritime entitlements of EEZ and continental shelf extending 
from its archipelagic baselines, thus necessitating Sino-Philippines sea boundary 
delimitation in SCS.141 
To be submitted, the real issue dividing the two Parties is the Philippines’ 
opposition against China’s position that China also enjoys EEZ and continental 
shelf in the SCS which extends to the location of these two maritime features, due 
to Philippines’ denial of (1) China’s territorial claims over all the maritime features 
in KIG and (2) the legal status as islands for all China-occupied maritime features 
139     See the statement by Professor Sands on 8 July 2015, “The Philippines’ fifth submission is 
for a declaration that: ‘Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines ...’ Mischief Reef is located 
126 nautical miles from the nearest point on Palawan in the Philippines, and 596 miles 
from the nearest point on Hainan Island in China, and over 50 miles from Nanshan, the 
nearest high-tide feature in the Spratlys that is claimed by China. Second Thomas Shoal 
is 104 miles from the nearest point on Palawan in the Philippines, and 614 miles from the 
nearest point on Hainan Island in China, and 55 miles from Nanshan. The legal dispute 
here – again, self-evidently – is whether Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are 
part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines or, as China 
puts it, of ‘China’s Nansha Islands’, and the dispute turns on whether the Spratly Islands 
can generate an EEZ and continental shelf. This dispute will be resolved definitively 
by the application of Articles 13(2), 57, 76 and 121 of the Convention.” See First-
round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 
138~139.
140    Paragraph 4.32 of the Memorial admitted that “[i]n a 21 June 2011 demarche to the 
Philippine Embassy in Beijing, General Hong Liang, Deputy Director of the Asia 
Department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asserted that, while the Philippines has 
rights under UNCLOS, ‘China also has ‘historical rights’ which are acknowledged under 
UNCLOS. Historical rights cannot be denied and must be respected’. General Hong Liang 
further elaborated: ‘China’s 9-dash line claim and map is based on the 1948 declaration by 
the Kuomintang government. UNCLOS also has a provision that historic rights cannot be 
denied and should be respected. UNCLOS is there, and the parties can use any clause that 
is useful to support its claim … China understands that the Philippines claim is based on 
its 200 mile EEZ. China hopes, however, that its historic rights in the SCS be respected by 
the Philippines’.” See Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 81~82. 
141     See remarks by Mr. Xiao Jiangguo quoted by the Philippines, infra note 243.
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in KIG. For detailed counter-arguments, please see Sections III-C-1 and III-A-4 
of this paper. Not focusing on China’s exact opposition, Submission 5 therefore 
cannot constitute any “dispute” for the Tribunal to settle.
B. Lack of Legal Dispute
It is fundamental that a legal dispute142 must exist before the Tribunal can 
work. This is exactly the reason why the Tribunal requested the Philippine team on 
10 July 2015 to, inter alia, “direct the Arbitral Tribunal to the sources relied upon 
for ascertaining China’s position with respect to each of the Philippines’ specific 
submissions in the context of establishing the existence of a legal dispute.” Section 
III-A of this paper has provided the obstacles for Submissions 1~7 to establish any 
“dispute” in the first place. Section III-B will indicate extra problems to prevent 
Submissions 2 and 11 from creating any “legal dispute”.
1. For Submission 2: The U-Shaped Line as a Possible “Provisional 
Maritime Boundary” Is a Political Claim Subject to Political Negotiations 
Leading to Boundary Delimitation Agreement
It was stated by the Philippines’ lawyer at the Hearing of July that the 
U-Shaped Line was not the target of this arbitration for the Philippines to 
challenge.143 What the Philippines opposes is China’s historic right claims in the 
142     As said by Professor Sands in the Hearing on 8 July 2015, “Mr Reichler explained 
what we understand by the concept of a ‘legal dispute’ in the annex that you prepared: 
namely that China has adopted a position that is positively opposed by the Philippines, 
and that the difference can be resolved by the interpretation and then the application of 
the Convention.” See First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the 
Hearing on 8 July 2015, p. 134. Also see J. Collier and A. V. Lowe, The Settlement of 
Disputes in International Law: Institutions and Procedures, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999, pp. 10, 13, 156~157. After the heading “Justiciability” the two eminent 
scholars say that “[i]t was mentioned above that not all disputes are suitable for judicial 
settlement. To be suitable, the dispute must be justiciable. A dispute is said to be 
justiciable if, first, a specific disagreement exists, and secondly, that disagreement is of 
a kind which can be resolved by the application of rules of law by judicial (including 
arbitral) processes … Thus far we have been concerned with the task of establishing that a 
dispute has come into existence. In the case of most (but not all) tribunals a further aspect 
of this precondition of justiciability is that the dispute remains in existence up to the point 
that the judgment or award is given. To put it another way, most tribunals will refuse to 
give rulings on disputes that are hypothetical or have become moot.”
143     First-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, p. 
49.
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SCS region enclosed by the U-Shaped Line.144 In this sense, U-Shaped Line is seen 
by the Philippines as the boundary or outer limits of China’s maritime claim based 
on historic rights in the SCS. Therefore, it is fair to say that the legality issue of 
the U-Shaped Line is one side of the coin, while the legality of China’s maritime 
claims in the SCS based on the historic right is on the other side of the coin. As has 
been discussed in Sections III-A-2, III-A-3, and III-A-4 of this paper, Submission 2 
does not contain any real dispute concerning the alleged China’s maritime claims in 
the SCS based on the historic rights. This section is meant to address the other side 
of the coin, which is the legality issue of the U-Shaped Line. It is submitted that the 
dispute concerning the use of the U-Shaped Line as a boundary of China’s maritime 
claim in the SCS is not a legal issue, but a non-justiciable political position in the 
context of maritime boundary delimitation negotiations.
As discussed by this author’s paper in China Oceans Law Review,145 the 
original (1948) eleven-dash line, the 2009 nine-dash line, and the present (2013) 
ten-dash line are relating to and concerning maritime boundary delimitation 
negotiation between China and other States with opposite coasts, based on (1) the 
diplomatic practice by China related to its negotiations with Vietnam concerning 
the disputes in the Gulf of Tonkin, (2) one of the dashes between Taiwan and the 
Philippines, and (3) another one dash between Taiwan and Japan.
The original U-Shaped Line or eleven-dash line was placed on the Location 
Map of the South China Sea Islands published by the Republic of China 
Government in 1948 (see Fig. 5 of this paper). There were two dashes between 
China’s Hainan Island and Vietnam. These two dashes were removed in 1960s. The 
PRC Government did not explain the reason. Based on his observation, Professor 
Zou Keyuan is of the opinion that such removal might have been related to the 
transfer of the sovereignty over the Bai Long Wei (or Bach Long Vi) Island in the 
Gulf of Tonkin from China to Vietnam.146 If Professor Zou’s observation is correct, 
then those two dashes would have a bearing on China’s territorial claim while not 
directly related to China’s maritime claims. Still, an indirect impact would be made 
upon maritime boundary delimitation negotiations between China and Vietnam as 
144     First-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, pp. 
31~33.
145    Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 193~196.
146     Keyuan Zou, Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Prospects, London: Routledge, 2005, 
p. 50.
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Bai Long Wei Island would affect and be important to the process of delimitation 
in Vietnam’s favor.147 If Professor Zou’s observation is untrue, the fact that those 
two dashes were removed before China and Vietnam reached maritime boundary 
delimitation agreement in Gulf of Tonkin148 would strongly suggest that those 
two dashes were previously used by China as a provisional maritime claim that 
cannot co-exist with the boundary agreed upon by these two States in that area. If 
those two dashes had nothing to do with China’s maritime claims, there wouldn’t 
have been any need for their deletion after the maritime boundary agreement was 
reached. It follows that the presence of these two dashes could affect the negotiation 
process. Making the dashes negotiable or even dispensable would then facilitate 
Sino-Vietnamese maritime boundary delimitation negotiations. Put differently, after 
drawing the maritime boundary in Gulf of Tonkin through successful negotiations, 
the maintenance of those two dashes (as China’s previous maritime claims in the 
same area) would have been both redundant and confusing.
There is another dash between Taiwan and the Philippines which appears 
both in the 1948 Map and 2009 Map, which is attached to the China’s NV (Fig. 1 
of this paper). To be added, the U-Shaped Line appearing in the most recent map 
published in January 2013 by China, as indicated by the Memorial in Figure 4.4,149 
has one more dash between Taiwan and Japan (see Fig. 6 of this paper). It is well-
known that the maritime boundary between Taiwan and the Philippines, and the 
boundary between Taiwan and Japan have yet to be drawn. Given this, nobody 
will believe that these two dashes represent Taiwan-Philippine and Taiwan-Japan 
maritime boundaries. However, when the time comes for such boundary to be 
drawn after an agreement is reached by the parties concerned, such dashes will 
be removed without any doubt. Thus, it is hard to deny that the U-Shaped Line or 
the present ten-dash line drawn by PRC is relating to or concerning sea boundary 
delimitation between China and other States with opposite coasts in the SCS.
To conclude, the U-Shaped Line has served and will serve as a negotiable and 
dispensable provisional maritime claim that constitutes China’s political position on 
147     Keyuan Zou, Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, Ocean Development 
and International Law, Vol. 30, 1999, pp. 245~246, 248.
148    The Sino-Vietnam Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in the Beibu Gulf (which is also called Gulf of 
Tonkin) was signed on 25 December 2000 and entered into force on 30 June 2004. See 
Keyuan Zou, The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the 
Gulf of Tonkin, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 36, 2005, pp. 13~24.
149      Figure 4.4 is placed after p. 74 of the Philippines’ Memorial.
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the negotiation table for resolving territorial disputes and/or maritime delimitation 
issues. Hence, the dispute concerning the U-Shaped Line becomes a political issue 
to be settled by a package deal. The controversy concerning the U-Shaped Line or 
its deletion cannot be a legal dispute.
Fig. 5  The Location Map of the South China Sea Islands
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Fig. 6  2013 Chinese Map Containing 10-Dash Line
2. For Submission 2: The Broken Nature of the U-Shaped Line Is in Agreement 
with Philippines’ Comparable Practice
China’s practice of using dashed or broken line in the South China Sea 
is actually in agreement with the practice of the Philippines that criticizes the 
U-Shaped Line as China’s maritime claim in this arbitration. Figure 3.4 of the 
Philippines’ Memorial (see Fig. 7 of this paper), entitled “The Encroachment of 
China’s Nine-dash Line into the Philippines’ EEZ and Continental Shelf”,150 has 
something very similar to the U-Shaped Line. We can take a close look at the 
dotted lines between Taiwan and the Philippines on the one hand, and between 
the Philippines and Indonesia, on the other hand. The common name given by the 
Philippines for these two dotted lines is “Provisional Equidistance Lines”. It is well-
150     Figure 3.4 is placed after p. 46 of the Philippines’ Memorial.
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known that no Philippine-Taiwan and Philippine-Indonesia maritime boundaries 
had been concluded before the Philippines’ Memorial was submitted (31 March 
2014). So what such dotted lines represent are definitely not the “settled” maritime 
boundaries, but the provisional ones unilaterally proposed by the Philippines 
during the negotiations. It is safe to say that such provisional lines will have to be 
deleted once such maritime boundary lines are drawn by the agreements between 
the parties concerned.151 Such practice of the Philippines confirms the nature of the 
U-Shaped Line being understandable and opposable to the Philippines as a political 
position subject to change in sea boundary delimitation negotiations. Under such a 
circumstance, there cannot be any Sino-Philippine legality dispute for China’s use 
of the broken or dashed line that is also being used by the Philippines. 
In other words, the fact that the Philippines is opposed to China’s use of the 
U-Shaped Line does not create a Sino-Philippine legal dispute. It is because what 
is disputed by the Philippines cannot be the lawfulness of China’s practice that is 
shared by the Philippines. Clearly, the only Sino-Philippine dispute left regarding 
China’s use of the U-Shaped Line as a political position in boundary negotiations is 
caused by Philippines’ rejection of such China’s position as, perhaps, too intrusive 
to accept.
3. For Submission 11: Article 8(c)~(d) of Convention on Biological Diversity 
(“CBD”) Invoked by the Philippines Imposes No Legal Obligations
In Section II-C-3 of Chapter 6 of Philippines’ Memorial the Philippines 
argues that China has violated the 1992 CBD.152 Professor Boyle, on behalf of the 
Philippines, astonishingly said in the Hearing that the Philippines did not want 
to pursue such a position.153 Irrespective of such difference between Philippines’ 
Memorial and Oral Arguments, it is important to review the provisions of CBD 
cited by the Memorial. The provisions identified by the Philippines as having been
151    Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 196~197.
152     The text of Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), at http://www.cbd.int/convention/
text/, 14 March 2015.
153     First-round submissions by Professor Boyle, in Transcripts of the Hearings of 8 July 
2015, p. 97. Also see Second-round submissions by Professor Boyle, in Transcripts of the 
Hearing of 13 July 2015, pp. 42~44, 46.
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Fig. 7    Philippines’ Maritime Boundary from Figure 3.4 of Its Memorial, Also 
Using Dotted-Line Method (i.e. Provisional Equidistance Lines) to the North 
and South of the Philippines
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violated by China are Article 8(c)~(d),154 which reads: 
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: …
(c) Regulate or manage biological resources important for the 
conservation of biological diversity whether within or outside protected areas, 
with a view to ensuring their conservation and sustainable use; 
(d) Promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the 
maintenance of viable populations of species in natural surroundings.155 
Importantly, the ambiguous wording “as far as possible and as appropriate” 
and “promote” demonstrates the hortative nature of these provisions. They 
lack clear standards to judge when any legal obligations will be created, what 
obligations would be produced, or how these obligations will be violated. In other 
words, no strict legal obligation has been imposed by these provisions for the 
Contracting Party to comply with. Therefore, it is hard to tell when a violation of 
these two provisions will occur by China or any other Contracting Party to the 
CBD, not to mention that it is difficult to know how China could avoid violating 
such obligations in the first place. Perhaps this is the reason for Professor Boyle 
to give up the position said in Philippines’ Memorial that China violated Article 
8(c)~(d) of CBD.156 To be noted, for another possible reason for such abandonment, 
see Section III-D-1 of this paper.
C. Lack of Dispute concerning the Interpretation or 
     Application of UNCLOS
Assuming the matters presented to the Tribunal are considered sufficient 
to create legal disputes, additional problems may preclude these disputes from 
being characterized as concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. 
This Section provides the information to prove that the real issues underlying 
Submissions 3~7 and 10~13 are not concerning the interpretation or application of 
154      Philippines’ Memorial, p. 192. paras. 6.85 & 6.87, footnotes 732 & 736.
155    The text of CBD, at http://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/default.shtml?a=cbd-08, 14 
March 2015.
156     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 271~272.
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UNCLOS. These Submissions should be deemed inadmissible by the Tribunal. 
To be noted at the outset, the Tribunal has attached importance to the 
Mauritius v U.K. and posed questions to the Philippines’ legal team during the July 
Hearing.157 Somehow, all the remarks made by Philippines’ counsel158 ignored the 
most important and central issue of the Mauritius v U.K., which is both relevant 
and applicable to the present case. Paragraphs 203~211 of the award on Mauritius 
v U.K. provide the Tribunal’s decision and reasoning to the First Submission 
of Mauritius. Four relevant and applicable rules are declared by the Annex VII 
Tribunal in this regard, as follows.
(1) When the Parties disagree as to how the disputes presented to the Tribunal 
should be characterized,159 the Tribunal, while giving particular attention to 
the formulation of the dispute chosen by the Applicant, must160 determine this 
“characterization dispute” through finding out the real issue in the case and the 
157     On the last day of the July Hearing, Professor Sands answered Question 2 (to elaborate on 
the relevance of the reference to the Mauritius v United Kingdom decision to the present 
case). See Second-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 
13 July 2015, pp. 24~25.
158    Three Philippines’ counsels, namely, Professor Sands, Mr. Martin, and Professor Boyle, 
have discussed the Mauritius v U.K. during the July Hearing. See First-round submissions 
by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, pp. 73~78; First-round 
submissions by Mr. Martin, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 26~28, 
33~35; First-round submissions by Professor Boyle, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 
8 July 2015, pp. 96~98, 101, 104~107; First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in 
Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 141~142; Second-round submissions by 
Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, p. 24; and Second-round 
submissions by Mr. Martin, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, p. 29.
159     Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 164.
160    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 229. “229. The Tribunal agrees with 
Mauritius that the issues presented by its First and Second Submissions are distinct, but 
is nevertheless of the view that Mauritius’ Second Submission must be viewed against 
the backdrop of the Parties’ dispute regarding sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. 
Although in its Second Submission Mauritius asks only for the Tribunal to determine that 
it has rights as ‘a coastal State’, the Tribunal considers that such a determination would 
effectively constitute a finding that the United Kingdom is less than fully sovereign over 
the Chagos Archipelago. As with Mauritius’ First Submission, the Tribunal evaluates 
where the weight of the Parties’ dispute lies. In carrying out this task, the Tribunal does 
not consider that its role is limited to parsing the precise wording chosen by Mauritius in 
formulating its submission. On the contrary, the Tribunal is entitled, and indeed obliged, 
to consider the context of the submission and the manner in which it has been presented in 
order to establish the dispute actually separating the Parties. Again, the Tribunal finds that 
the Parties’ underlying dispute regarding sovereignty over the Archipelago is predominant. 
The question of the ‘coastal State’—now presented in terms of the ‘attributes of a coastal 
State’—remains merely an aspect of this larger dispute.”
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object of the claim.161 Such determination must be done on an objective basis 
through examining the position of both Parties.162 During this process the “record” 
plays a role of indicating the real nature of dispute dividing the Parties;163 (2) It 
is possible for the two Parties to have multi-layered disputes, while only part of 
them are submitted for judicial resolution. For the purpose of characterizing the 
161    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 230. “230. The Tribunal accepts 
that a dispute exists between the Parties concerning the manner in which the MPA was 
declared. Nevertheless, the Tribunal is of the view that the true ‘object of the claim’ 
(Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 457 at p. 466, 
para. 30) in Mauritius’ Second Submission is to bolster Mauritius’ claim to sovereignty 
over the Chagos Archipelago. The Tribunal also notes that the relief sought by Mauritius 
in its First and Second Submissions is the same: a declaration that the United Kingdom 
was not entitled to declare the MPA. Accordingly, and notwithstanding the difference 
in presentation, the Tribunal concludes that Mauritius’ Second Submission is properly 
characterized as relating to the same dispute in respect of land sovereignty over the 
Chagos Archipelago as Mauritius’ First Submission. The Tribunal therefore finds itself 
without jurisdiction to address Mauritius’ Second Submission.” 
162    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 208. “Ultimately, it is for the 
Tribunal itself ‘while giving particular attention to the formulation of the dispute chosen 
by the Applicant, to determine on an objective basis the dispute dividing the parties, 
by examining the position of both parties’ (Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 
Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 432 at p. 448, para. 30) and 
in the process ‘to isolate the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim’ 
(Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 457 at p. 466, 
para. 30).”
163    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 209. “In the Tribunal’s view, the 
record (see paragraphs 101–107 above) clearly indicates that a dispute between the 
Parties exists with respect to sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. Since at least 
1980, Mauritius has asserted its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago in a variety of 
fora, including in bilateral communications with the United Kingdom and in statements 
to the United Nations. Mauritius has also challenged the circumstances by which the 
Archipelago was detached; questioned the validity of the Mauritius Council of Ministers’ 
approval of that decision; enshrined a claim to sovereignty over the Archipelago in 
its Constitution and legislation; and declared its own exclusive economic zone in the 
surrounding waters. Finally, the pleadings in these proceedings are replete with assertions 
of Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago.”
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dispute, the Tribunal must evaluate where the relative weight of the dispute lies.164 
The Tribunal must decide which dispute (as ancillary dispute) is only an aspect of a 
larger dispute (as the real dispute).165
(3) If the “real issues in the case” or “object of the claims” do not relate to 
the interpretation or application of UNCLOS (e.g. territorial dispute in Mauritius 
v. U.K.), the Annex VII Tribunal is powerless to settle such a dispute, even if 
the ancillary issue to such a dispute relates to the interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS.166
(4) However, if the territorial issues are neither the real issues nor the object of 
the claim, but are ancillary to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
164    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), paras. 210~211. “210. In the Tribunal’s 
view, however, a dispute also exists between the Parties with respect to the manner in 
which the MPA was declared and the implications of the MPA for the Lancaster House 
Undertakings, made by the United Kingdom in connection with the detachment of the 
Archipelago. This dispute is distinct from the matter of sovereignty and will be the subject 
of further consideration in connection with Mauritius’ Fourth Submission. 211. Finally, 
the Parties clearly differ regarding the identity of the ‘coastal State’. For the purpose of 
characterizing the Parties’ dispute, however, the Tribunal must evaluate where the relative 
weight of the dispute lies. Is the Parties’ dispute primarily a matter of the interpretation 
and application of the term ‘coastal State’, with the issue of sovereignty forming one 
aspect of a larger question? Or does the Parties’ dispute primarily concern sovereignty, 
with the United Kingdom’s actions as a ‘coastal State’ merely representing a manifestation 
of that dispute? In the Tribunal’s view, this question all but answers itself. There is an 
extensive record, extending across a range of fora and instruments, documenting the 
Parties’ dispute over sovereignty. In contrast, prior to the initiation of these proceedings, 
there is scant evidence that Mauritius was specifically concerned with the United 
Kingdom’s implementation of the Convention on behalf of the BIOT …”
165     Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 212. “Accordingly, the Tribunal 
concludes that the Parties’ dispute with respect to Mauritius’ First Submission is properly 
characterized as relating to land sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. The Parties’ 
differing views on the ‘coastal State’ for the purposes of the Convention are simply one 
aspect of this larger dispute.”
166    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 220. “As a general matter, the 
Tribunal concludes that, where a dispute concerns the interpretation or application of 
the Convention, the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal pursuant to Article 288(1) extends 
to making such findings of fact or ancillary determinations of law as are necessary to 
resolve the dispute presented to it (see Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 25 August 1925, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 6, p. 4 at p. 
18). Where the ‘real issue in the case’ and the “object of the claim” (Nuclear Tests (New 
Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 457 at p. 466, para. 30) do not relate 
to the interpretation or application of the Convention, however, an incidental connection 
between the dispute and some matter regulated by the Convention is insufficient to bring 
the dispute, as a whole, within the ambit of Article 288(1).”
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of UNCLOS,167 such territorial issues may be addressed as a minor issue or 
incidental issue by the Tribunal.168
As the following sub-sections will prove, the real issues underlying Submi-
ssions 3~7, 10~11 and 13 are all territorial disputes between China and the Phili-
ppines, which are not concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. 
Based on the foregoing ruling of Mauritius v. U.K., the Tribunal should declare 
these Submissions as inadmissible. Even assuming those territorial issues involved 
in these Submissions are not deemed the real issues but ancillary ones, the Tribunal 
still will not be given jurisdiction over such territorial disputes by the fact that the 
“real disputes” formally submitted by these Submissions relate to the interpretation 
or application of UNCLOS. The reason is that in the South China Sea Arbitration, 
the Philippines has made it clear that it is not presenting any case that needs the 
Tribunal to directly or indirectly address the Sino-Philippine territorial disputes as 
ancillary issues,169 while China repeatedly refused to have its territorial disputes 
settled by third party judicial body. 
Therefore, the Sino-Philippine territorial issues, even if treated as an ancillary 
issue, may still be untouchable by the Tribunal, the jurisdiction of which has been 
deprived due to withholding of such jurisdiction by the Parties. Most importantly, 
as indicated by Section II-B of this paper such territorial disputes are the core issues 
underlying all the Philippines’ Submissions that are merely “ancillary disputes” or 
“surface disputes” (i.e. consequences of the lack of settlement of the core disputes), 
the fact that such core disputes may not be settled by the Tribunal leads to the 
conclusion that the “ancillary and surface” disputes built on such core disputes 
should still be deemed inadmissible by the Tribunal. 
1. For Submissions 3~7: Territorial Sovereignty Dispute as the Real Dispute
For Submissions 3~7, the Philippines’ lawyers argue that these disputes 
are purely concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 13 and 121 
167    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 220.
168    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 221. “The Tribunal does not 
categorically exclude that in some instances a minor issue of territorial sovereignty 
could indeed be ancillary to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Convention. That, however, is not this case, and the Tribunal therefore has no need to rule 
upon the issue. The Parties’ dispute regarding sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago 
does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention. Accordingly, the 
Tribunal finds itself without jurisdiction to address Mauritius’ First Submission.”
169      See supra notes 57~59 and corresponding text.
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of UNCLOS with no need to address territorial sovereignty issues, as these 
submissions only request the Tribunal to decide the legal status of nine China-
occupied maritime features and the maritime entitlements these features may 
generate.170 However, these Submissions are built upon a premise that all the 
UNCLOS-consistent maritime entitlements China “may claim” in the SCS should 
be limited to those generated by the maritime features currently occupied by 
China.171 Foreign-occupied maritime features claimed by China do not count. The 
underlying rationale is that in terms of Sino-Philippine territorial sovereign dispute 
in the SCS, China is a new comer without “original titles”.172 
As the ICJ in FRG v. Iceland said, the dispute before the Court must be 
considered in all its aspects.173 One question arises. Is China a new comer in the 
Sino-Philippine territorial disputes in the SCS? The answer is no, due to much 
earlier and more comprehensive territorial claims China has made in SCS. This 
has been explained in detail by the author’s article published in China Oceans Law 
Review.174
China’s older and wider territorial claims in SCS serve to put in perspective 
the four Philippines’ military invasions in 1970, 1971, 1978, and 1980 which 
seized from China eight maritime features in the KIG,175 as part of the Spratly 
Islands Group. They are Nanshan Island, Loaita Island, Thitu Island, West York 
170      See First-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, 
pp. 46~47. Also see First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the 
Hearing on 7 July 2015, p. 76.
171      See Philippines’ Memorial, paras. 5.96, 5.137, and Submissions 3~7, pp. 142, 159, 271.
172    For the concept of original title, see Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, 
Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2008, 
p. 12, paras. 37~38.
173    Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports, 1974, p. 190, para. 40. 
174     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 210~217.
175    Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), consisting of 53 maritime features within Spratly Islands 
Group, became part of Philippines territories on 11 June 1978 in accordance with 
Presidential Order No. 1596. KIG is administered under Palawan. See Map of the 
Republic of the Philippines, No. 200, Edition 1, 30 June 1978.
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Island, Northeast Cay, Flat Island, Loaita Nan, and Commodore Reef (Fig. 8).176 
Each and every one of them has been claimed by China since 1930s till now. To be 
added, the 1983 List of Partial Standard Names for China’s Islands in South China 
Sea produced by the PRC Government also covers each of these features.177 Such 
Philippines’ military actions from 1970s to 1980s ignored by both the Memorial 
and the July Hearings warrant special attention of the Tribunal.178 With such 
territorial disputes in mind, it will be fair and imperative for the Tribunal to check 
all the maritime features in the Spratly Islands Group (despite Philippines’ refusal 
to cooperate) when assessing China’s maritime entitlements in the SCS, instead of 
looking at those nine features currently occupied by China.179
As the Tribunal is not authorized to settle territorial disputes,180 its award shall 
refrain from affecting the legal positions of either Party concerning its respective 
territorial claims. The scope of the Sino-Philippine territorial disputes in the SCS 
covers all the maritime features within the KIG and Scarborough Shoal. However, 
the Philippines only requests the Tribunal to look at those nine China-occupied 
176    Wu Shicun, Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in the South 
China Sea: A Chinese Perspective, Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2013, p. 132. Also see 
the position paper released by spokesperson Zhang Hua from Chinese Embassy in Manila 
on 3 April 2014, entitled “China’s Position Paper on Sea Disputes with Philippines”, at 
http://www.philstar.com/disputed-seas/2014/04/03/1308385/chinas-position-paper-sea-
disputes-philippines, 14 March 2015. 
177      The name-list was said to be only part of the complete names of maritime features Chi-
na claims in SCS. It appeared on page A4 of People’s Daily on 25 April 1983. It was 
reproduced on the website of http://www.unanhai.com/nhzddm.htm.
178     If the Tribunal overlooks such profound history of territorial disputes, it will be very 
easy for the Tribunal to accept the points made by Professor Oxman on 8 July 2015, 
“China’s expansive reading of the scope of the exception to compulsory jurisdiction 
would undermine the effectiveness of compulsory jurisdiction precisely in that context. 
There are many places in the world with actual or potential delimitation disputes. On 
China’s reading, Article 298 would preclude challenges to unlawful assertions of maritime 
jurisdiction on the grounds that such challenges come within the orbit of the exception for 
delimitation disputes. All a [S]tate need do to insulate its maritime claims from arbitration 
or adjudication initiated by a neighbouring coastal [S]tate would be to assert claims that 
overlap the entitlements of its neighbour, to file a declaration under Article 298, and 
to then argue that the dispute is one ‘relating to sea boundary delimitations’, even if 
Articles 15, 74 and 83 do not have to be interpreted and applied. As is evident in this very 
case, that might be done at any time. But the premise is plainly wrong.” See First-round 
submissions by Professor Oxman, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 54~55.
179    See Submissions 3~7 of the Philippines’ Memorial, p. 271. However, Philippines’ 
counsel simply refused to cooperate on this critical matter. Supra note 109. It is not at all 
unmanageable or unreasonable to look at those 12~15 islands in the Spratly Islands Group 
indicated in Table 1 and the factual situation of Itu Aba released by Taiwan.
180      Notification, p. 3, para. 7. Also see Philippines’ Memorial, p. 271. 
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features for assessing the scope of China’s maritime entitlements in the SCS.181 It is 
based on a factually and legally groundless premise that China’s territorial claims 
over numerous foreign-occupied maritime features in the Spratly Islands Group 
should be dismissed or ignored by the Tribunal as non-existent. Irrespective of the 
disclaimer made by Philippines’ counsel,182 it is not what the Philippines submitted 
that will touch upon territorial disputes. Instead, what is not directly submitted by 
the Philippines can indirectly serve to settle Philippines’ territorial disputes with 
181     See First-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, Transcript of the Hearing on 7 July 2015, 
pp. 44~45. “Mr President, the dispute between the parties over their respective maritime 
entitlements is just as apparent in the southern half of the South China Sea. Here, 
there are two different disputes over entitlements. The Philippines claims a 200-mile 
EEZ and continental shelf from Palawan. China claims a 200-mile entitlement for the 
Spratly Islands, over all of which it claims sovereignty. As you can see, almost all of the 
Philippines’ entitlement in this part of the sea is overlapped by China’s 200-mile claim in 
regard to the Spratlys. The Philippines disputes China’s claim to a 200-mile entitlement 
for the Spratly features because, in our view, none of them is entitled to an EEZ or 
continental shelf under the Convention.”
182      Based on these reasons, it is unjustified for Professor Sands to say on 7 and 13 July 2015 
that “[t]here is nothing that you have read in the pleadings to address the question of 
which [S]tate does or does not have sovereignty over a particular insular feature, and the 
Tribunal is not asked to – and does not need to – make any determination as to sovereignty 
over any island or any rock in order to determine the maritime entitlements of that feature 
… Unlike Mauritius’s first submission, the Philippines’ claim is concerned solely with 
the interpretation and application of the Convention. In this way, the Philippines’ case is 
directly analogous to Mauritius’s second submission, and that submission was framed 
in the following way by Mauritius: ‘Independently of the question of sovereignty, the 
‘MPA’ is fundamentally incompatible with the rights and obligations provided for by the 
Convention. This means that, even if the UK were entitled in principle to exercise the 
rights of a coastal State, quod non, the purported establishment of the ‘MPA’ is unlawful 
under the Convention.’ In its award of 18th March this year, the tribunal, as I mentioned, 
found unanimously that it had jurisdiction over this part of Mauritius’s case. And we 
say that, in exactly the same way, this Tribunal has jurisdiction over the entirety of the 
Philippines’ claims, which are directly analogous … The question therefore arises: what 
is the dispute between the parties? In our submission, it concerns the interpretation 
and application of various provisions of the Convention, but in particular Articles 13 
and 121, as well as Articles 56, 57, 76 and 77. In order to interpret and apply those 
provisions, the Tribunal is bound to ask itself another question: do we have to make any 
prior determination as to an issue of sovereignty? And the answer to that question, we 
say, is absolutely plain: no, you do not. You are free and able to interpret and apply those 
provisions to the facts of this case, without having to determine which [S]tate, if any, has 
sovereignty over any disputed insular feature. [7 July]” “With respect to Question 2, the 
Tribunal has invited us to elaborate on the relevance of the reference to the Mauritius 
v. United Kingdom decision to the present case, …. and second, the Mauritius v. United 
Kingdom case did raise a question about which [S]tate had sovereignty over land territory, 
while the present case very obviously does not raise such a question. [13 July]” See First-
round submissions and Second-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of 
the Hearing on 7 July 2015, pp. 75~78, Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, p. 24.
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China in Philippines’ favor.
In its Memorial, the Philippines did identify three biggest maritime features in 
the KIG (i.e. Itu Aba Island, Thitu Island, and West York Island) while considering 
them only rocks under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. However, Philippines’ 2011 
NV and its Supreme Court Ruling (see Section III-A-6 of this paper) have defeated 
this position, not to mention that more maritime features located in KIG or Spratly 
Islands Group have been widely considered as islands (see Section III-A-4). Given 
these facts, Philippines’ Memorial and its oral statements at the July Hearing still 
turn a blind eye on these remaining features.
As a result, Philippines’ competitive territorial claims will be strengthened 
massively through this arbitration. The formulation of Submissions 3~7, which 
deliberately omits all foreign-occupied maritime features in the Spratly Islands 
Group, reflects the Philippines’ goal pursued secretly on its “real disputes” with 
China, i.e., territorial disputes. To be noted, the Annex VII Tribunal in Mauritius v 
U.K. ruled that 
Although in its Second Submission Mauritius asks only for the Tribunal to 
determine that it has rights as “a coastal State”, the Tribunal considers that 
such a determination would effectively constitute a finding that the United 
Kingdom is less than fully sovereign over the Chagos Archipelago.183 
A fortiori, Philippines’ Submissions 3~7 of South China Sea Arbitration are 
requesting this Tribunal to make a decision which in effect serves as a declaration 
that China is not sovereign at all over all the foreign-occupied maritime features 
in the Spratly Islands Group (including KIG). The true object of the Philippines’ 
claim is obviously territorial.184 To wit, these Submissions in effect serve to bolster 
Philippines’ claim to sovereignty over those KIG maritime features not occupied by 
China.
As territorial disputes are not concerning the interpretation or application 
of UNCLOS, the Tribunal has no power to entertain Submissions 3~7, the real 
disputes of which are territorial ones. Assuming the Tribunal chooses to take 
jurisdiction over these Submissions, the acceptance of the premise underlying such 
183    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 229.
184    Chargos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 230. 
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Submissions will constitute an ultra vires decision. That is to say, such acceptance 
presupposes Tribunal’s dismissal of China’s territorial claims over all foreign-
occupied maritime features within Spratly Islands Group. This is tantamount to an 
indirect resolution of the territorial disputes in Philippines’ favor. 
Fig. 8  Locations of 8 and 9 Maritime Features Occupied by the Philippines 
and China Respectively185
185    The red dots are the 8 maritime features occupied by the Philippines. The frog-egg like 
points are the 9 maritime features occupied by Chinese Mainland and identified by the 
Philippines’ Memorial. Taiping Island (Itu Aba) is occupied by Taiwan. This map is drawn 
by Mr. Jui-Hsien Huang for the author.
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2. For Submission 10: No Dispute Exists concerning the Interpretation or 
Application of UNCLOS
In Submission 10, the Philippines requests the Tribunal to adjudge and 
declare that “China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing 
their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough 
Shoal”. It is submitted that such claim fails to bring any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS and, hence, should be considered as 
inadmissible, for the following reasons.
Firstly, Paragraphs 6.39~6.42 of the Memorial provide that China since April 
2012 started to exercise control over Scarborough Shoal and stopped Philippine 
fishermen from pursuing their traditional fishing activities in the adjacent water 
thereto. The last sentence of Paragraph 6.42 reads “these acts violate China’s 
obligations under the Convention.” However, as said in Paragraph 6.40, “the 
Philippines wishes to make clear that it does not here make a claim to ‘historic 
rights’ that were, as described in Chapter 4, superseded by UNCLOS.” Then 
in Paragraph 6.43 the Philippines moves on by saying “[u]nder Article 279 of 
UNCLOS, China and the Philippines are required to ‘settle any dispute between 
them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by peaceful 
means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United 
Nations’”. Clearly, the Philippines argues that China fails to comply with the 
requirements under Article 279.186 
The problem is, to apply Article 279 in the present case there must be a dispute 
between China and the Philippines concerning the interpretation or application of a 
separate article of UNCLOS. Without such condition Article 279 can open the door 
for any dispute (e.g. trade dispute under WTO legal regime) to be brought to and 
settled by the procedures under Part XV of UNCLOS. 
What is exactly the provision of UNCLOS whose interpretation or application 
has been disputed by China and the Philippines here? No answer can be found 
in Section I-B of Chapter 6 of the Memorial or in the oral statements of the 
Philippines’ counsel in July Hearings. The only thing close to this is in Paragraph 
6.45 of Philippines’ Memorial, which reads: 
186      Article 279 (Obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means) of UNCLOS provides: “States 
Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application 
of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the 
Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a solution by the means indicated 
in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.” 
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China’s actions have also unlawfully endangered justice by exacerbating the 
dispute between it and the Philippines concerning their maritime rights and 
entitlements in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal. This is also inconsistent 
with China’s obligation (and the Philippines’ right) under Article 279 to settle 
the dispute by peaceful means, a long-recognized corollary of which is the 
prohibition of any acts that might aggravate or extend the dispute.187
Summing up, apart from “justice” that is far from an issue concerning the 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS, the Philippines is only invoking Article 
279 to build up a dispute concerning interpretation or application of UNCLOS 
between China and the Philippines. It would be fair to conclude that, before any 
separate article of UNCLOS can be invoked by the Philippines, Article 279 remains 
inapplicable. 
Secondly, as the Tribunal has no power to settle Sino-Philippine territorial 
disputes in SCS, the Tribunal may not deny the territorial claims of China over 
Scarborough Shoal. Thus, the Tribunal is also powerless to deny that the 12 
NM water surrounding Scarborough Shoal constitutes China’s territorial sea. As 
UNCLOS contains no provisions that impose specific and clear obligations on the 
coastal State concerning how to conserve and manage living natural sources in its 
territorial water, China’s prevention of Philippines’ fishing vessels from harvesting 
living resources in this water cannot be an issue of interpretation or application 
of UNCLOS, apart from the UNCLOS rules governing innocent passage. 
However, the Philippines does not invoke the rules concerning innocent passage in 
presenting its Submission 10, so as to prove the existence of a dispute concerning 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS and to make Article 279 applicable. This 
inaction confirms the position that the “dispute” to be created by Submission 10 is 
far from concerning interpretation or application of UNCLOS.
Thirdly, the traditional fishing rights or historic fishing rights, if any, must 
exist in territorial water of another State, according to Section II-A-1 of Chapter 
4 of Philippines’ Memorial.188 However, the Philippines itself claims sovereignty 
over Scarborough Shoal and 12 NM waters adjacent thereto. Such territorial water 
claim is irreconcilable with its traditional fishing right claim in the same water. 
187     Philippines’ Memorial, p. 173.
188     Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 84~91, paras. 4.38~4.54.
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To be noted, during the July Hearing Professor Sands invoked Article 2(3) of 
UNCLOS and the award of Mauritius v. U.K. to the effect that China is required 
to act in good faith in its relations with the Philippines in the territorial water 
surrounding Scarborough Shoal. In other words, Philippines’ Submission 10 is 
treating China as a coastal State in that water.189 This conflict in legal positions 
may result in defeating Submission 10. Besides, the Mauritius-U.K. relation 
concerning Chagos Archipelagos is totally different from the Sino-Philippine 
relations concerning Scarborough Shoal, as nobody will expect what happened in 
April 2012 in Scarborough Shoal to occur in Chagos Archipelago. This makes such 
an analogy unreasonable. In short, before the Philippines formally abandons its 
claim of territorial sovereignty over the area concerned, its traditional fishing can 
hardly exist in the same area in the first place. Consequently, it remains doubtful 
whether any legality dispute can exist concerning China’s interference with the 
exercise by the Philippine fishermen of their so-called traditional fishing right in 
the “Philippines’ territorial water”. 
Fourthly, the core, primary, real and predominant190 issue underlying the 
maritime confrontation indicated by Submission 10 in the territorial water 
surrounding Scarborough Shoal is the Sino-Philippine competition of territorial 
title over Scarborough Shoal.191 Before resolving this territorial dispute, as the 
189    See First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 
2015, pp. 141~142. “The Philippines’ tenth submission is that: ‘China has unlawfully 
prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with 
traditional fishing activities at or near Scarborough Shoal ...’ This legal dispute is premised 
on fact that China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from carrying out 
traditional fishing activities within the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal. The dispute 
arises out of Article 2(3) of the Convention, which ‘contains an obligation on States to 
exercise their sovereignty subject to ‘other rules of international law’’, which, we say, in 
turn require China to act in good faith in its relations with the Philippines, and to respect 
traditional fishing rights of Filipino fishermen at Scarborough Shoal.”
190    Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 229.
191     See China’s Position Paper, paras. 6, 49. Also see First-round submissions by Mr. Martin, 
in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, p. 30, especially footnote 36 on that page. 
Also see Second-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 
July 2015, pp. 15~16. As said by Mr. Reichler, “Submission 10 concerns China’s denial 
of traditional fishing rights at and within 12 miles of Scarborough Shoal in and after 2012. 
The main sources are two Chinese statements. One, 24th May 2012: ‘Philippines should 
withdraw its vessels from Huangyan Island waters.’ Huangyan Island is China’s name 
for Scarborough Shoal. And two, 26th July 2012: ‘Philippine vessels, including fishing 
vessels, should not return to the area ... The two sides can talk about the possibility of 
Philippine fishing vessels in the area, under the condition that Chinese sovereignty is 
guaranteed.’ That has remained China’s position.”
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real dispute, it is pointless to examine the legality of (1) the alleged Philippines’ 
traditional fishing rights in this water, and (2) China’s interference with such 
fishing rights. The reason is simple. Should the Philippines win the territorial title 
for Scarborough Shoal after settling such a territorial dispute with China, it would 
be unnecessary for this Tribunal to address the Philippines’ traditional fishing 
rights in this water, as this issue becomes moot and the Philippines’ fishermen can 
harvest in that water without legal problems. However, this Tribunal is powerless 
to resolve such territorial dispute (not concerning the interpretation or application 
of UNCLOS) while giving a chance to the Philippines for winning the territorial 
dispute.
More importantly, only after the Philippines (1) loses such territorial title when 
such territorial dispute is settled, or (2) formally abandons the territorial claim over 
Scarborough Shoal, will it make sense for this Tribunal to address the issue whether 
the Philippines has nevertheless acquired any traditional fishing rights in China’s 
territorial water and whether China’s interference violated international law. 
However, the Tribunal has no role to play for the first condition, while the second 
condition cannot be fulfilled by the Philippines. This is strengthened by the relevant 
ruling of Mauritius v. U.K. that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over a dispute, 
the real issue (i.e. territorial dispute) of which is not concerning the interpretation 
or application of UNCLOS.192 Even assuming such underlying territorial issue is 
treated as only an ancillary issue, the Tribunal is still powerless to settle it, due to 
the deprivation of its jurisdiction by both Parties’ withholding of jurisdiction.
To conclude, the Philippines has given a mission impossible to the Tribunal to 
address Submission 10. The Tribunal first has to settle a territorial issue that is not 
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. After overcoming such an 
impossible hurdle, the Tribunal has to announce that the Philippines has lost in that 
case so as to make it possible for the Philippines’ traditional fishing right to exist in 
China’s territorial water surrounding Scarborough Shoal. Then again, the Tribunal 
will still find it hard to address this issue of traditional fishing right, as such right 
is not concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. Summing up, due 
to lots of issues brought to the Tribunal totally not concerning the interpretation or 
application of UNCLOS, Submission 10 should be considered inadmissible.
192    Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 220.
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3. For Submissions 11 and 13: Territorial Sovereignty Dispute 
as the Real Dispute
Submissions 11 and 13 of the Philippines complained about China’s certain 
actions and omissions occurring in territorial water surrounding Scarborough Shoal: 
first, China has violated its obligations under UNCLOS to protect and preserve the 
marine environment there (Submission 11); and second, China has breached its 
obligation under UNCLOS by operating its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous 
manner causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels navigating in that 
water (Submission 13). It is submitted that the disputes brought by the Philippines 
are all symptoms or consequences of the unsettled core territorial dispute. In other 
words, the real dispute as reflected by the confrontations stated in Submissions 11 
and 13 is a territorial one, which is not concerning the interpretation or application 
of UNCLOS. Below is the detailed reasoning.
Firstly, regarding Submission 11, it is alleged by the Philippines that, in the 
territorial water of Scarborough Shoal the Philippines’ law enforcement vessels 
discovered illegal poaching resulting in destruction of marine environment by 
Chinese fishermen. However, under the protection of China’s law enforcement 
vessels in that water, such illegal fishing activities have gone unpunished. 
With respect to Submission 13, the Philippines complained about two series of 
dangerous actions conducted by China’s law enforcement vessels in that water 
against Philippines’ law enforcement vessels in April and May of 2012. What 
China’s government vessels did was to obstruct the navigation of their Philippine 
counterparts, causing near-collision at sea. It is alleged by the Philippines that 
China thus violated Articles 21(4), 24, and 94 of UNCLOS, as well as the 1972 
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(hereinafter “COLREGS”). 
Secondly, the Philippine side of the story goes like this. In that water the 
Philippines is entitled to enforce its domestic laws against illegal fishing activities 
of Chinese vessels because territorial sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal belongs 
to the Philippines. Chinese fishing vessels in that water only have innocent passage 
which excludes the right to fish. The fishing activities engaged by them are already 
illegal. A fortiori, the Philippines has even stronger justification to punish Chinese 
fishing activities which destroyed Philippines’ marine environment. As to Chinese 
law enforcement vessels, the only right they have there is innocent passage, which 
excludes the right to obstruct Philippines’ law enforcement activities. Therefore, it 
is more than legitimate for the Philippines’ law enforcement vessels to complain 
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(and even counter) against such China’s obstructive activities. 
For the near-collision incident caused by China’s government vessels, 
the Philippines will contend that since the law enforcement vessels of both 
Parties encounter in the Philippines’ territorial water, the only right China’s law 
enforcement vessels have is innocent passage. In its own territorial water, the 
Philippines’ law enforcement vessels can exercise sovereignty. What has been done 
in Submission 13 by the Philippines’ vessels is legal under both national law and 
international law. It is China’s law enforcement vessels that violated the rule of 
innocent passage by obstructing the navigation of their Philippines’ counterpart. 
There is every reason for the Philippines to complain and counter against China for 
such obstructive activities. 
Thirdly, China would have its story as follows. The water surrounding 
Scarborough Shoal is China’s territorial water, as China enjoys territorial 
sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal which this Tribunal may not dismiss. It is 
lawful for Chinese fishing vessels to harvest the living natural resources in China’s 
own territorial waters. As to Philippines’ law enforcement vessels, the only right 
they have there is innocent passage, which excludes the activities of enforcing 
Philippines’ (foreign) law upon Chinese fishing vessels. It is thus reasonable 
for China’s law enforcement vessels to consider the attempted law enforcement 
activities by the Philippines’ vessels in China’s territorial water as signifying 
Philippines’ competitive territorial claim there, which undeniably is the national 
policy of the Philippines. As a Sino-Philippine territorial dispute exists over this 
water, it is impossible to expect China’s government vessels to tolerate Philippines’ 
law enforcement activities against Chinese fishing vessels there. 
For the alleged near-collision incidents caused by China’s government vessels, 
the incidents occurred in China’s territorial water. The only right Philippines’ 
law enforcement vessels has there is innocent passage. However, what these 
Philippines’ law enforcement vessels have been engaging are activities prejudicial 
to the peace, good order or security of China, the coastal State. Such Philippines’ 
activities have been considered by China as the threat of use of force against the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of China with regard to Scarborough Shoal. 
Scarborough Shoal had been under illegal control by the Philippines before April 
2012. From then on China regained effective control of this land territory. China is 
aware of Philippines’ unmistakable intentions to grab this territory when possible. 
In this connection, China’s obstructive actions against Philippines’ government 
vessels in that water fully demonstrate the on-going territorial dispute between 
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2015 No. 2)158
these two States.193 To answer the question posed by the Tribunal to the Philippines, 
the territorial issues involved here and other Philippines’ Submissions are by no 
means minor or ancillary.194 The territorial issues are in fact the primary and real 
disputes.
Fourthly, if we push the logic further, from Philippines’ perspective, as the 
Tribunal has no mandate to settle territorial dispute, the Philippines’ territorial 
claim over Scarborough Shoal shall remain intact after the award of this arbitration 
is issued. Winning this case or not, the legality of the above-mentioned Philippines’ 
counter-measures against China as reflected by Submissions 11 and 13 shall remain 
unaffected. On the other hand, China would argue that, since this Arbitration 
will not affect China’s territorial claims over, inter alia, Scarborough Shoal, the 
alleged China’s obstructive action against Philippines’ law enforcement vessels in 
that water indicated by these two Submissions may and will continue justifiably, 
no matter which Party wins the case. What have been reflected by Submissions 
11 and 13 are perfectly clear. They are the consequences of the unsettled Sino-
Philippine territorial dispute over the land and the territorial water of Scarborough 
Shoal, as the underlying real dispute that is “predominant”.195 The behavior of 
either Party has been aiming at bolstering its exclusive claim of sovereignty over 
Scarborough Shoal and the territorial water thereof.196 Besides, such territorial 
193    This is evidenced by the oral statements of Mr. Reichler on 13 July 2015. As said by Mr. 
Reichler, “China’s opposition to the claim set forth in submission 13 is well established, 
inter alia, by an exchange of notes in April and May 2012. The Philippines’ note 
of 30th April 2012 asserted that Chinese law enforcement vessels were threatening 
Philippine search and rescue vessels at Scarborough Shoal by making ‘provocative and 
extremely dangerous manoeuvres’ against them. China rejected the Philippines’ claim on 
25th May 2012: ‘The various jurisdiction measures adopted by the Chinese government 
over Huangyan Island and its waters...’ That’s China’s name for Scarborough Shoal: ‘... 
and activities by Chinese ships, including government public service ships and fishing 
boats, in Huangyan Island and its waters are completely within China’s sovereignty.’ See 
Second-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, 
p. 19.
194      Question 6 posed by the Tribunal to the Philippines during the Hearing has been answered 
by Professor Sands. According to him, “[t]he Tribunal has also asked in that question 
whether any issues of sovereignty that may be implicated in this case can be considered 
‘minor issue[s] of territorial sovereignty’ that fall within the Arbitral Tribunal’s ‘ancillary’ 
jurisdiction.” See Second-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the 
Hearing on 13 July 2014, p. 25.
195    Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 229.
196    Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award (18 March 2015), para. 230.
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dispute is the core dispute that needs to resolve before the confrontations indicated 
by these two Submissions can end (see conclusion of Section III-C-2 of this paper). 
However, such real and core (territorial) dispute is not concerning the interpretation 
or application of UNCLOS. It is submitted that these two Submissions, the real 
dispute of which is a territorial one, should be declared inadmissible by the 
Tribunal.
4. For Submission 11: Philippine Claims Based on Stockholm Declaration, 
Agenda 21, and Article 8(c)~(d) of CBD Cannot Assist in Interpreting Article 
192 of UNCLOS so as to Create a Dispute concerning the Interpretation or 
Application of UNCLOS
For Submission 11, Philippines’ Memorial cited Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration and Principle 17 of Agenda 21 for the purpose of interpreting Article 
192 of UNCLOS.197 In the July Hearing, Professor Boyle further invoked Article 
8(c)~(d) of CBD as relevant rules of international law to assist in interpreting 
Article 192.198 However, it is still hard to believe that any dispute concerning 
the interpretation or application of UNCLOS has been submitted this way. This 
has been addressed by the paper published in China Oceans Law Review by this 
author.199 
To begin with, Article 192200 is too imprecise to apply and needs other detailed 
provisions to substantiate its legal meaning and scope of application. Principle 21 
of Stockholm Declaration201 has been subsumed to paragraph 2 of Article 194 of 
197     See Section II-C-1 of Chapter 6 of the Philippines’ Memorial.
198    See First-round submissions by Professor Boyle, where he said: “we will not be alleging 
any separate breach of the Convention on Biological Diversity or of the UN Agreement on 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, although it is true that both parties to this 
arbitration are also parties to those treaties. Our argument with respect to these agreements 
is simply that the Biological Diversity Convention and the Fish Stocks Agreement are 
‘relevant rules of international law’ for the purposes of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.” See Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, p. 97.
199     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 268~269.
200     Article 192 (General obligation) of UNCLOS reads: “States have the obligation to protect 
and preserve the marine environment.”
201    Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration reads: “States have, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and 
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.” At http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=9
7&articleid=1503, 14 March 2015.
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UNCLOS (which is a separate rule invoked by the Philippines’ Submission 11) 
and will be discussed in the next section. Principle 17 of Agenda 21202 is a soft 
law and devoid of legally binding force. What is contended by the Philippines is 
that Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration and Principle 17 of Agenda 21 can be 
used to interpret and substantiate Article 192 of UNCLOS. However, Principle 
21 of Stockholm Declaration will only serve to defeat the legal arguments of the 
Philippines, as will be said in the next section. Principle 17 of Agenda 21, with 
its non-binding nature, may only weaken, instead of substantiating, Article 192. 
Besides, the Philippines fails to establish the linkage between such non-legally-
binding and inapplicable “rules” on the one hand, and UNCLOS on the other hand, 
so as to present a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS 
to the Tribunal.
As to Article 8(c)~(d) of CBD, it is hard to say that these provisions can 
assist in interpreting Article 192 of UNCLOS in the capacity of “relevant rule of 
international law”. As said by Section III-B-3 of this paper, Article 8(c)~(d) of 
CBD lack clear standards to judge when any legal obligations will be created, 
what obligations would be produced, or how these obligations will be violated. It 
is impossible for these ambiguous “rules” to play the role of substantiating Article 
192 of UNCLOS that is no less ambiguous in order to make the latter applicable to 
the present case.
5. For Submission 11: Article 194 of UNCLOS Relied on 
by the Philippines Is Inapplicable
As said in the preceding section, Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration 
has been used by Philippines’ Memorial to assist in interpreting Article 192 
of UNCLOS. However, Principle 21 has been subsumed to Article 194(2) of 
UNCLOS. Using Article 194(2) to define the scope of obligations imposed by 
Article 192 will be a good choice as the latter is too imprecise to apply. On the 
other hand, when using Principle 21 to interpret Article 192, the problem of linkage 
still needs to be addressed by the Philippines. As Article 192 is too imprecise to 
apply, substantiating this article by Article 194(2) which incorporates Principle 21 
will be tantamount to invoking Article 194(2) against China.
It is the position of the Philippines that China violated the obligations under 
certain paragraphs of Article 194 to protect and preserve the marine environment 
202    Agenda 21, at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf, 14 
March 2015. See Philippines’ Memorial, p. 187, paras. 6.71~6.72.
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at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Paragraphs 6.75~6.81 of the 
Memorial apply Article 194(1), (3), and (5) as the legal basis to establish the 
State responsibility of China for tolerating its fishermen who use cyanide in the 
waters concerned.203 However, the fundamental question is the applicability of 
Article 194204 to the alleged actions or omission of China in the first place. For the 
following reasons, Article 194 should be considered inapplicable to the incidents 
in Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Consequently, the “disputes” 
presented by Submission 11 can hardly concern the interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS. 
Clearly, for the purpose of Article 194(2) the “measures” China is obligated to 
take are confined to those necessary to ensure that activities under its jurisdiction 
or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to “other States 
and their environment”, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities 
203     Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 188~190.
204      Article 194 (Measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment) 
of UNCLOS reads: “1. States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures 
consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable 
means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavour 
to harmonize their policies in this connection. 2. States shall take all measures necessary 
to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause 
damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising 
from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the 
areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention. 3. The 
measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine 
environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to minimize to the 
fullest possible extent: (a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially 
those which are persistent, from land-based sources, from or through the atmosphere or by 
dumping; (b) pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents and 
dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing intentional 
and unintentional discharges, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, 
operation and manning of vessels; (c) pollution from installations and devices used in 
exploration or exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular 
measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety 
of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and 
manning of such installations or devices; (d) pollution from other installations and devices 
operating in the marine environment, in particular measures for preventing accidents and 
dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the 
design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices. 
4. In taking measures to prevent, reduce or control pollution of the marine environment, 
States shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other 
States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in conformity with 
this Convention. 5. The measures taken in accordance with this Part shall include those 
necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of 
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.”
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under China’s jurisdiction or control does not spread “beyond the areas where 
they exercise sovereign rights” in accordance with UNCLOS. So far no sufficient 
evidence has been provided by Philippines’ Memorial to demonstrate the existence 
of pollution on the ground. Even assuming there is any pollution in the areas 
concerned, the measures as defined by Article 194(2) are still inapplicable to China. 
Based on previous discussions on legal status of Scarborough Shoal205 and 
Second Thomas Shoal206 and the waters surrounding them, none of the conditions 
indicated above, namely, “causing damage to other State (that is: the Philippines) 
and their environment” and “pollution … spread beyond the areas where they 
(that is: China) exercise sovereign rights”, can be fulfilled. More important is the 
lack of evidences detailing the “wide-spread impact” of the use of cyanide from 
the Memorial. Somehow the Philippines has overlooked Article 194(2), while 
identifying Article 194(1), (3) and (4) as legal bases to criticize China. However, 
for the geographic scope of application the “measures” under Article 194(1), (3) 
and (5) that China is required to take are all defined by Article 194(2). As Article 
194(2) does not apply to the measures that China is requested to take in the 
“maritime areas concerned”, the obligations imposed by Article 194(1), (3) and (5) 
are all rendered inapplicable to China. To conclude, as the legal basis, i.e. Article 
194 is inapplicable to China’s measures expected by the Philippines by Submission 
11. 
6. For Submission 11: Breaching CBD Does Not Necessarily Lead to a 
Violation of UNCLOS
As said by Section III-B-3 of this paper, Article 8(c)~(d) of CBD should be 
deemed too imprecise to apply against China in this case. However, assuming the 
violation of these two provisions constitutes a breach of China’s legal obligations 
under CBD, the Philippines has not proved that such breach of obligation under 
CBD is equivalent to a breach of China’s legal obligation under UNCLOS. Put 
differently, the Philippines has not proved the existence of any Sino-Philippine 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS based on the 
alleged China’s violation of two provisions of CBD. 
In this context, the Philippines’ Memorial does mention that Article 22 is 
involved in two different ways that makes CBD related to UNCLOS. On the one 
hand, the Philippines argues that “to the extent that Chinese activities cause serious 
205     See Section III-C-3 of this paper.
206     See Section III-A-4 and Table 2 of this paper.
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damage or threat to biological diversity at Scarborough Shoal or Second Thomas 
Shoal, the CBD ‘affect[s] the rights and obligations’ of China under UNCLOS”.207 
Then the Philippines put a citation for this statement, which is footnote 729. That 
footnote invokes Article 22(1) of CBD which reads: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations 
of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, 
except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a 
serious damage or threat to biological diversity.208 
Clearly, the wording of Article 22(1) of CBD serves to warn how two parallel 
treaty regimes might clash and admits that an implementation of CBD may in 
exceptional situations undermine the rights or obligations of UNCLOS that a 
certain Contracting Party has. It does not touch upon the issue of violation of 
CBD rules. Hence, it is still hard to conclude that a breach of CBD is a breach of 
UNCLOS.
On the other hand, the Philippines argues that “the CBD must be implemented 
‘consistently with the rights and obligations of States under law of the sea’.”209 To 
support this statement, footnote 727 was used which cited Article 22(2) of CBD, 
which reads “Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention with respect 
to the marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States 
under the law of the sea.”210 To be submitted, such wording indicates that an action 
or omission inconsistent with UNCLOS may lead to a violation of CBD, not 
necessarily the other way around. It is still insufficient to justify the position that a 
breach of Article 8(c)~(d) of CBD definitely and necessarily constitutes a breach 
of any provision of UNCLOS, without proving the breach of concrete “applicable 
rules” of UNCLOS in each case. Section III-C-5 of this paper has proved that 
Article 194(1), (3), and (5) of UNCLOS is inapplicable to what is requested of 
China by the Philippines in Submission 11, while Article 192 of UNCLOS is too 
ambiguous to apply to any State. More efforts may have to be devoted by the 
207     See Philippines’ Memorial, p. 191, para. 6.83.
208     The text of Convention on Biological Diversity, at http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/, 14 
March 2015.
209     See Philippines’ Memorial, p. 191, para. 6.83.
210     The text of Convention on Biological Diversity, at http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/, 14 
March 2015.
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Philippines to identify really applicable provisions of the UNCLOS, in order to 
justify the value of those CBD provisions. Before then, the conclusion to be drawn 
for Submission 11 will be that all the legal bases invoked by the Philippines against 
China are either too ambiguous to apply, or unambiguous but inapplicable in terms 
of the geographic limitation. Consequently, this Submission should be deemed 
conveying no dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS.
7. For Submission 12: Articles 192, 194(5), and 206 of UNCLOS Relied on 
by the Philippines Are Either Too Imprecise to Impose Legal Obligations or 
Unambiguous but Inapplicable
Submission 12 also suffers from lack of dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of UNCLOS, as said by this author’s paper published in China 
Oceans Law Review.211 Here, the Philippines argues that “since January 1995, 
China – without obtaining the Philippines’ authorization – has constructed artificial 
islands on top of Mischief Reef”.212 According to the Philippines, Mischief Reef 
is “part of Philippines’ territory”213 and “not within 200 M of any other feature 
claimed by China that is capable of generating an EEZ or a continental shelf”.214 
Under Philippines’ protests, China responded by saying that the structures built 
on there were not military but of civilian nature and for civilian purposes.215 The 
Philippines contends that China has violated Articles 192 and 194(5) of UNCLOS, as 
China constructed artificial islands on the coral reef at Mischief Reef.216 Moreover, 
the Philippines considers that China violates Article 206 of UNCLOS due to lack of 
an environmental impact assessment and communication of its results.217 However, 
for the following reasons, Submission 12 should be deemed inadmissible as it does 
not convey any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS.
Firstly, the Philippines invokes Article 192218 as a legal basis to condemn 
China’s environmental violation by building artificial island on Mischief Reef. 
However, this provision is too imprecise to create any concrete legal obligation. 
211     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 278~280.
212     Philippines’ Memorial, p. 193, para. 6.92.
213     Philippines’ Memorial, p. 194, para. 6.93.
214     Philippines’ Memorial, p. 198, para. 6.103.
215     Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 194~196, paras. 6.93~6.94, 6.96~6.97.
216     Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 200~201, paras. 6.108~6.111.
217     Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 201~202, paras. 6.112~6.113.
218     Article 192 (General obligation) of UNCLOS reads: “States have the obligation to protect 
and preserve the marine environment.”
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Moreover, it is doubtful whether China’s action as identified by Submission 
12, which is only a tiny part of the massive subsequent practices of many State 
Parties to UNCLOS (including those bordering the SCS), can be singled out as a 
violation of this article and constitutes any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of this article.
Secondly, the Philippines also invokes Article 194(5)219 as legal basis. 
However, Section III-C-5 of this paper has indicated the inapplicability of this 
provision due to inapplicability of Article 194(2) to the activities done by China 
on the maritime feature within the EEZ and continental shelf China claims while 
the wide-spread damaging effect of such activities is yet to be proved by the 
Philippines.
Thirdly, the Philippines invokes Article 206220 to accuse China for not making 
environmental impact assessment. However, Article 206 again imposes no strict 
legal obligation for making such assessment in the first place. Hence, the dispute 
as indicated by the Philippines in Submission 12 cannot be considered as any legal 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of Article 206.
8. For Submission 13: Article 21(4) of UNCLOS Relied on by the Philippines 
Is Not Only Inapplicable but Also Conflicting with Article 24 as Another Legal 
Basis of the Philippine Claim
Philippines’ Submission 13 complains about China’s endangering of Philippine 
navigational safety in the territorial waters of Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines’ 
position is that it has territorial sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal and considers 
the adjacent water thereto its own territorial water. Based on this position, the 
Philippines invokes Article 21(4)221 of UNCLOS as a legal basis to condemn 
China’s “dangerous” actions. However, Article 21(4) is inapplicable to China’s 
vessels while in the territorial water of Scarborough Shoal, before a preliminary 
decision is made to (1) deny China the status of being “a coastal State” and (2) 
219     Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 188~190.
220      Article 206 (Assessment of potential effects of activities) of UNCLOS reads: “When Sta-
tes have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction 
or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the 
marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential effects of such 
activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of the results of such 
assessments in the manner provided in article 205.”
221      Article 21(4) of UNCLOS reads: “4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally 
accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.”
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make China’s vessels “foreign Ships”. Such a decision is tantamount to a settlement 
of a territorial dispute which is not concerning the interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS. Without mandate to settle Sino-Philippine territorial dispute over, inter 
alia, Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal may not address such a preliminary territorial 
issue, not to mention to resolve such a dispute in Philippines’ favor so as to put 
China’s vessels into a position of foreign ships. Lacking such pre-conditions, the 
Philippines’ claim as reflected by Submission 13 based on the inapplicable Article 
21(4) should not be considered as any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of UNCLOS. 
After applying (the still inapplicable) Article 21(4) of UNCLOS, the 
Philippines invokes Article 24 of UNCLOS222 against China, based on a 
contradictory premise by taking China as a “coastal State”. It is requesting the 
Tribunal to perform the equally impossible task to come to an opposite conclusion 
that China should be considered as a “coastal State” for the purpose of applying 
Article 24. By the same token as just mentioned, the impossible task of the Tribunal 
renders Article 24 equally inapplicable to China in Submission 13. Invoking two 
inapplicable and contradictory provisions (Articles 21(4) and 24 of UNCLOS) 
as legal bases, Submission 13 cannot constitute any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS. 
D. The Situations Precluding Part XV-Section 2 Mechanism from Taking
     Jurisdiction according to Articles 281, 283 and 286 of UNCLOS
Even if the Philippines’ Submissions are considered to have conveyed disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, extra legal problems 
would prevent these “disputes” from passing the thresholds erected by Articles 
281, 283, and 286 of UNCLOS so as to preclude an Annex VII-Tribunal from 
exercising jurisdiction over these “disputes”. This Section will provide reasons 
222    Article 24 (Duties of the coastal State) of UNCLOS reads: “1. The coastal State shall 
not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea except in 
accordance with this Convention. In particular, in the application of this Convention or of 
any laws or regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention, the coastal State shall 
not: (a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying 
or impairing the right of innocent passage; or (b) discriminate in form or in fact against 
the ships of any State or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State. 
2. The coastal State shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation, of which 
it has knowledge, within its territorial sea.”
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why Philippines’ Submissions 1~14 cannot pass such thresholds and should be 
considered inadmissible by the Tribunal.
1. For Submission 11: The Existence of Breach of CBD and the Application of 
Article 27 of CBD Will Deprive the Tribunal of Its Jurisdiction according to 
Article 281 of UNCLOS
Professor Boyle, as one of Philippines’ counsels, said in the Hearing of 
July 2015 that it is not the Philippines’ position that China has violated rules of 
the CBD in its Submission 11, as said in Philippines’ Memorial dated 31 March 
2014. Instead, the CBD rules are now used to interpret the rules of UNCLOS as 
“relevant rules of international law”.223 It would be the Philippines’ position that 
the rules of CBD, i.e. Article 8(c)~(d), serves to substantiate the meaning of Article 
192 of UNCLOS. The meaning of Article 192 would cease to be imprecise224 any 
longer after being embodied by Article 8(c)~(d). Thus, it cannot be denied by the 
223    See First-round submissions by Professor Boyle, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 
2015, pp. 96~98, 109~110. As said by Professor Boyle, “With regard to Scarborough 
Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal and Mischief Reef, we will therefore argue at the merits 
stage -- assuming that you conclude that you have jurisdiction – that Articles 192 and 194 
establish the following obligations: (a) to take measures to protect and preserve marine 
ecosystems, including coral reefs; (b) to ensure sustainable use of the biological resources 
which those coral reefs represent; (c) to protect and preserve endangered species found 
in the reefs; (d) to apply a precautionary approach in all these respects; and finally (e) to 
consult and cooperate with the Philippines and other relevant states in the management 
of the biological resources, ecosystems and marine environment of all of the reef systems 
in the South China Sea. In doing so, we will not be alleging any separate breach of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity or of the UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, although it is true that both parties to this arbitration are also 
parties to those treaties. Our argument with respect to these agreements is simply that the 
Biological Diversity Convention and the Fish Stocks Agreement are “relevant rules of 
international law” for the purposes of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. In our view, the normative content of Articles 192 and 194 should be 
informed by reference to those treaties and other relevant instruments. Previous UNCLOS 
tribunals have taken that approach. In the Saiga (No. 2) case, for example, the ITLOS 
took into account the Convention on the Conditions of Registration of Ships, the FAO 
Compliance Agreement and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement when interpreting Article 94 
of the Convention.”… “I can now proceed to the final section of what I have to say this 
afternoon, which is to deal with the Convention on Biological Diversity and to argue that 
it does not affect your jurisdiction. If it had appeared in these proceedings, China might 
have said that, in substance, the environmental dispute is about protection of biodiversity, 
and that it should be settled in accordance with the dispute settlement procedures of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Let me explain why this would be a bad argument. 
There are two reasons. First, this is not a dispute about the interpretation and application 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and references to biological diversity and 
marine ecosystems do not make it one.” Also see Second-round submissions by Professor 
Boyle, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 13 July 2015, pp. 42~43.
224      See Section III-C-4 of this paper and Article 192 of UNCLOS.
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Philippines that the meaning of Article 192 is overlapping, if not identical, with that 
of Article 8(c)~(d) of CBD. Consequently, when a certain action by a Contracting 
State to CBD violates Article 8(c)~(d) of CBD, that State will be committing a 
breach of Article 192 of UNCLOS if it happens to be a Party to UNCLOS. 
By the same token, for that State an act violating obligations imposed by 
Article 192 of UNCLOS will also violate the obligations under Article 8(c)~(d) 
of CBD, irrespective of the above-mentioned “denial” by Professor Boyle. Such 
a position is actually confirmed by the Philippines’ Memorial (that is not denied 
by Professor Boyle during the Hearing) that “the CBD must be implemented 
‘consistently with the rights and obligations of States under law of the sea’.”225 This 
statement was supported by footnote 727 of the Philippines’ Memorial citing Article 
22(2) of CBD which reads “Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention 
with respect to the marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations 
of States under the law of the sea.”226 Making this point in the beginning of this 
section is critical. As there is an undeniable issue of violation of Article 8(c)~(d) of 
CBD following the logic of Professor Boyle and the unmodified part of Philippines’ 
Memorial, Article 27 of CBD (premised on the existence of a dispute concerning 
the interpretation or application of CBD) would be activated undoubtedly. This “one 
act, two violations of rules, and parallel dispute settlement mechanisms” situation 
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
Assuming a violation of “obligation” under Article 192 (which is supposed to 
obtain a clear legal meaning after incorporating Article 8(c)~(d) of CBD according 
to the Philippines) on the part of China occurs in Submission 11 and a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS is materialized,227 the 
jurisdiction of this Tribunal would be however excluded because the conditions 
imposed by Article 281 of UNCLOS have not been fulfilled. Article 281(1) reads: 
225     Philippines’ Memorial, p. 191, para. 6.83.
226    Convention on Biological Diversity, at http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/, 10 March 
2015.
227    Such kind of assumption should not be done lightly. The award on jurisdiction and 
admissibility for Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) Case suggests that caution must be 
exercised when linking the UNCLOS with an “implementing treaty” so as to put the 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the implementing treaty into the 
compulsory dispute settlement procedure entailing binding decisions. See Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Case between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Decision of August 4, 2000, pp. 45~46, para. 63, 
at http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXIII/1-57.pdf, 10 March 2015.
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If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpre-
tation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the 
dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided 
for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse 
to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any 
further procedure.228 
Therefore, Philippines’ Submission 11 involves the situation of “one act, 
two violations of rules, and parallel dispute settlement mechanisms activated and 
interacting”, while one mechanism (under CBD) would yield to another mechanism 
(under UNCLOS) only when conditions said in Article 281(1) of UNCLOS are 
fulfilled.
In other words, if apart from UNCLOS, there is an agreement between China 
and the Philippines providing a separate dispute settlement mechanism as a peaceful 
means of their own choice which is also activated, the Annex VII-Tribunal, as one 
of the procedures provided in Part XV of UNCLOS, may have jurisdiction to try 
such dispute if and only if (1) no settlement has been reached between China and 
the Philippines by recourse to such separate dispute settlement mechanism; and (2) 
the agreement providing such separate and activated dispute settlement mechanism 
does not exclude recourse to the Annex VII-Tribunal as the further procedure of 
dispute settlement. As both of the two conditions are unfulfilled in the present case, 
the jurisdiction of this Tribunal would be removed for trying the dispute concerned, 
if any. The detailed reasoning is as follows.
First, as proved by the Philippines itself,229 CBD is not only an agreement 
between China and the Philippines, but also a legally binding treaty which 
doubtlessly fulfils the requirement of “the agreement” under Article 281(1). 
More importantly, CBD has a dispute settlement mechanism of its own, which 
is embodied in Article 27. It is a peaceful means of the common choice of China 
and the Philippines within the meaning of Article 281(1). Such mechanism is 
autonomous,230 self-sufficient, self-contained, and, most importantly, activated by 
the undeniable existence of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
228     Art. 281 of UNCLOS.
229     Philippines’ Memorial, p. 190, para. 6.82.
230     Compare with the reasoning of the Annex VII-Tribunal on the SBT Case. See Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Case between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Decision of August 4, 2000, pp. 43~44, para. 57.
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CBD.
Second, no evidence has been provided by either the Memorial or the oral 
statements of Philippines’ legal team during July Hearing, nor can any information 
be obtained from the news papers and internet, that the Philippines has ever 
negotiated (as required by Article 27 of CBD)231 or exchanged views (as requested 
by Article 283 of UNCLOS)232 with China for seeking solution of the dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of both CBD (Article 8(c)~(d)) and 
UNCLOS (Article 192) arising from the same act of China, prior to the initiation 
of this arbitration.233 In other words, the first requirement of “by recourse to such 
means” under Article 281(1) cannot be deemed as fulfilled. As rightly quoted by the 
Philippines in its Memorial, “It was considered to be consistent with international 
jurisprudence that a party may submit a case to the procedure specified in Part XV 
whenever it [i.e. the Applicant State] considers that the procedure chosen by the 
parties is no longer likely to lead to a settlement”.234 Given this, it will still be unfair 
to accept the Philippines’ conclusion that the dispute settlement mechanism under 
Article 27 of CBD is no longer likely to lead to a settlement between it and China, 
when the Philippines has not even had any recourse to such mechanism in the first 
place.
The Philippines may invoke Guyana v. Suriname to argue that there is no need 
to request for a separate exchange of views with respect to this particular dispute 
231     Article 27(1) of CBD provides the obligation to negotiate as a way to seek solution of the 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of CBD.
232    Article 283 of UNCLOS considers negotiation as a way to exchange views for the pur-
pose of settling disputes. It proves that one of the purposes for having negotiations is to 
exchange views between the disputing parties. It is inconceivable for any dispute to be 
settled without exchanging views even if the parties have been sitting together around 
the negotiating table. Therefore, it is safe to say that an integral part of the obligation 
to negotiate is the obligation to exchange views. Judicial decisions put emphasis on the 
importance of exchange of views. See Southern Bluefin Tuna, Order of 27 August 1999, 
ITLOS Reports, 1999, p. 280; MOX Plant, Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 
2001, ITLOS Reports, 2001, p. 95, para. 60; Land Reclamation, Provisional Measures, 
Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports, 2003, p. 10, para. 47.
233    One of the possible reasons for this absence may be that no such dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of CBD ever exists between China and the Philippines.
234      Philippines’ Memorial, p. 236, para. 7.60, and footnote 903.
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which has been subsumed within the main disputes between the two Parties.235 
However, Guyana v. Suriname is fundamentally different from the present case, 
making such analogy inappropriate. The main disputes in the present case are 
maritime boundary delimitation in the SCS plus territorial issues hidden inside as 
the core.236 Unlike Guyana and Suriname, China as the respondent has made written 
declaration according to Article 298 of UNCLOS to exclude Annex VII Tribunal 
from settling maritime boundary delimitation disputes. Such excluded main 
disputes are not formally and directly submitted by the Philippines to this Tribunal 
that is incapable of resolving such disputes in the first place. It will be impossible 
for the particular issues identified by Submission 11 concerning violation of CBD 
to be subsumed within such “unsubmitted main disputes” so as to do away with the 
requirement of exchange of views on the part of the Philippines.
Third, no matter whether the Philippines has been seeking a resolution of 
such dispute with China concerning the interpretation or application of both 
UNCLOS and CBD by recourse to the means provided by Article 27 of CBD, 
this article has undoubtedly excluded237 the recourse to Annex VII-Tribunal as 
one of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures entailing binding decisions. 
So the second requirement under Article 281(1) is unfulfilled, either. Article 27 
(Settlement of Disputes) of CBD reads:
235      Guyana v. Suriname, Award (17 September 2007), Annex VII Tribunal, para. 410, at http://
www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1147, 10 March 2015. “This dispute has as 
its principal concern the determination of the course of the maritime boundary between 
the two Parties – Guyana and Suriname. The Parties have, as the history of the dispute 
testifies, sought for decades to reach agreement on their common maritime boundary. The 
CGX incident of 3 June 2000, may be considered incidental to the real dispute between 
the Parties. The Tribunal, therefore, finds that in the particular circumstances, Guyana was 
not under any obligation to engage in a separate set of exchange of views with Suriname 
on issues of threat or use of forces. These issues can be considered as being subsumed 
within the main dispute.”
236        Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-Dash-
Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 28, 
2014, pp. 119~121.
237     To be noted, the Annex VII-Tribunal for the Southern Bluefin Tuna case even allows 
implied exclusion of further procedure. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Case between Australia 
and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Decision of 4 August 2000, p. 43, para. 57. In the Memorial of the Philippines, the 
dissenting opinions of Judge Keith was quoted as against such implied exclusion. 
However, such opinion has been outvoted by the majority of the Tribunal. It proves 
that the majority ruling supporting implied exclusion is more justified. See Philippines’ 
Memorial, p. 239, para. 7.68.   
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1. In the event of a dispute between Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall 
seek solution by negotiation.
2. If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation, they 
may jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation by, a third party.
3. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, 
or at any time thereafter, a State or regional economic integration organization 
may declare in writing to the Depositary that for a dispute not resolved in 
accordance with paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 above, it accepts one or both of 
the following means of dispute settlement as compulsory:
(a) Arbitration in accordance with the procedure laid down in Part 1 of 
Annex II;
(b) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
4. If the parties to the dispute have not, in accordance with paragraph 3 
above, accepted the same or any procedure, the dispute shall be submitted to 
conciliation in accordance with Part 2 of Annex II unless the parties otherwise 
agree.
5. The provisions of this Article shall apply with respect to any protocol 
except as otherwise provided in the protocol concerned.238
Strictly speaking, the conciliation under Article 27(4) is the only real 
compulsory means for dispute settlement provided by this article. However, it is a 
means not entailing binding decisions, unlike Annex VII-Tribunal. For the rest of 
the means of dispute settlement to be utilized, the consent in each case of all parties 
to the dispute is required. In other words, what Article 27 rules out includes any 
compulsory dispute settlement mechanism entailing binding decision, including 
UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal. 
Critically, what needs to be done to employ “compulsory” procedures entailing 
binding decisions provided by this article (i.e. Arbitration or ICJ) is by “opting in” 
by all the disputing parties before a dispute arises according to Article 27(3), instead 
of “at the request of any party to the dispute” (that is, after the dispute arises) in 
the words of Article 286 of UNCLOS. Such an arrangement is totally against the 
spirit of compulsory mechanism demonstrated by “opting out” formula under 
238     The text of Convention on Biological Diversity, at http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/, 14 
March 2015.
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Article 298 of UNCLOS.239 It reaffirms that all “compulsory” dispute settlement 
procedures entailing binding decisions have been ruled out and excluded from 
Article 27 of CBD. In toto et pars continetur. 240 Hence, the Annex VII Tribunal as 
one of such procedures should naturally be considered excluded by Article 27 as a 
matter of course. Even if we take the broader view by considering the two means 
under Article 27(3) as also real compulsory methods, the Arbitration under Article 
27(3)(a) of CBD241 is still different from Annex VII Tribunal of UNCLOS. In other 
words, what may be opted in by the operation of Article 27(3) as the “compulsory 
means” does not include Annex VII Tribunal. It proves the exclusion of Annex VII 
Tribunal under the dispute settlement regime of Article 27.
To be noted, the last five words of Article 27(4) provides an opportunity of 
creating compulsory dispute settlement procedure apart from the means identified 
by this article, if agreed by all the parties to the dispute in advance. However, 
China has not agreed to use Annex VII Tribunal to settle the disputes under 
Philippines’ Submission 11 with the Philippines before (and even after) such 
“dispute” concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS and CBD arises. 
Therefore, the last chance of using this Annex VII Tribunal as a compulsory means 
to settle the present dispute has been missed. 
To conclude, assuming there is a dispute concerning interpretation or 
application of UNCLOS (which undeniably leads to a dispute on interpretation or 
application of CBD), the jurisdiction of this Annex VII-Tribunal to try Submission 
11 is still removed in accordance with Article 281 of UNCLOS in joint operation of 
Article 27 of CBD.
2. For Submissions 1~14: Philippines’ Partial Submission of Its SCS Disputes 
with China for Arbitration Is Inconsistent with Articles 283 and 286 of 
UNCLOS
The Sino-Philippine disputes in the SCS are complicated with many layers. 
From inside out they are: (1) territorial disputes over Scarborough Shoal and all the 
239    See also the reasoning of the Annex VII-Tribunal on the SBT Case, which would be 
supportive for this line of arguments. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case between Australia and 
Japan and between New Zealand and Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Decision of August 4, 2000, pp. 43~44, para. 57.
240     The part is also included in the whole. See Guide to Latin in International Law, at http://
www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001/acref-97801953
69380-e-993, 10 March 2015.
241     See Part I of Annex II to CBD. It is clear that the Arbitration under CBD is definitely not 
the same as Annex VII-Tribunal of UNCLOS.
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maritime features within Philippines’ KIG, which is part of China’s Nansha Islands 
(Spratly Islands Group);242 (2) maritime boundary delimitation disputes due to 
overlapping maritime claims of EEZ and continental shelf by both States generated 
by the land territories they claim;243 (3) disputes concerning legal status of maritime 
features located in Spratly Islands Group (i.e. whether they are islands, rocks, or 
low-tide elevations) and maritime entitlements they produce (i.e. whether they can 
generate territorial water, EEZ, continental shelf, or nothing), as conditions taken 
into account in the settlement of maritime boundary delimitation disputes;244 (4) 
dispute over the legality of China’s alleged invocation of historic rights to justify its 
maritime claims in the SCS enclosed by the U-Shaped Line;245 (5) dispute over the 
legality of the U-Shaped Line as the “starting price” offered by China in its political 
negotiations with the Philippines in drawing/settling their maritime boundaries in 
the SCS;246 (6) various kinds of maritime confrontations between their government 
vessels and personnel that rather reflect the unsettled and deteriorated situations of 
the core (territorial and maritime boundary delimitation) disputes.247 
It is obvious that not all of these layers of disputes have been submitted by 
the Philippines to the Tribunal for resolution. Only the (3)~(6) kinds of disputes 
have been submitted by the Philippines to the Tribunal. Such partial submission 
of disputes is inconsistent with the requirement of Article 286 of UNCLOS, as 
242     See Section III-A-6 of this paper, especially the exchange of NVs between China and the 
Philippines between 2009 and 2011.
243     See First-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 
2015, p. 46, especially footnote 23. “23 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of 
the People’s Republic of China to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 
CML/8/2011 (14 Apr. 2011) (italics omitted) (emphasis added). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 201. 
China made this claim in the context of responding to the Philippines’ Note Verbale of 5 
April 2011 protesting the legality of China’s nine-dash line. See also Memorandum from 
the Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-070-2014-S (7 Mar. 2014), para. 4. 
MP, Vol. IV, Annex 98 (reporting on a meeting between Minister Evangeline Jimenez-
Ducrocq of the Philippines Embassy in Beijing and the Representative Xiao Jiangguo of 
the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in which Mr. Xiao stated: ‘we claim territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf from the 
Nansha Islands, and any overlapping claims we can engage in delimitation’.).”
244      Philippines’ Memorial, Submissions 3~7.
245      Philippines’ Memorial, Submissions 1~2.
246      Philippines’ Memorial, Submissions 1~2.
247      Philippines’ Memorial, Submissions 8~14.
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discussed by a paper of this author published in Ocean Yearbook.248 
More fundamentally, the Philippines has failed to perform its duty of 
exchange of views under Article 283. As the Tribunal has been concerned about 
such an obligation and its application to the behaviors of both Parties to this case, 
Mr. Martin, as Philippines’ counsel, provided information on 8 July 2015 at the 
Hearing. The evidences provided by Mr. Martine only demonstrate that for the 
above-mentioned (1)~(2) categories of unsubmitted (core) disputes between China 
and the Philippines, the exchange of views between them touched upon the means 
for dispute settlement. However, for those evidences provided for the foregoing 
(3)~(6) kinds of disputes by the Philippines to the Tribunal, the exchange of views 
fails to live up to the standard requested. They did not touch upon the “means” for 
dispute settlement concerning how to settle these kinds of ancillary and surface 
disputes.249 This is too important to be overlooked by the Tribunal.
Equally important is the higher standard of fulfilling the conditions of 
exchange of views under Article 283. This has been touched upon at the July 
Hearing. On 8 July 2015 Mr. Martin said this:
In its 23rd June questions, the Tribunal asked – assuming Article 283 requires 
an exchange of views on the substance of the parties’ dispute – “at what 
level of specificity must such an exchange of views occur”, and whether the 
Philippines has sufficiently exchanged views “with respect to each of its 
specific, individual submissions”.
Mr President, the award of the Annex VII tribunal in Guyana v Suriname 
sheds important light on these questions. The primary issue in that case was 
the delimitation of the parties’ maritime boundary, a subject on which they 
had negotiated literally for decades. But Guyana’s submissions also included 
a claim relating to Suriname’s forcible eviction from the disputed area of an oil 
rig operated under licence from Guyana. Suriname objected to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction over this submission on the grounds that the two [S]tates had 
never exchanged views on that subject.  
The tribunal rejected Suriname’s challenge, holding:
248    Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-
Dash-Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 
28, 2014, pp. 89, 118~123.
249     First-round submissions by Mr. Martin, in the Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, 
pp. 28~32, especially footnotes 33~40.
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“The Parties have ... sought for decades to reach agreement on their 
common maritime boundary. The CGX incident ... may be considered 
incidental to the real dispute between the Parties. The Tribunal, therefore, finds 
that in the particular circumstances, Guyana was not under any obligation 
to engage in a separate set of exchanges of views with Suriname on issues 
of threat or use of force. These issues can be considered as being subsumed 
within the main dispute.”250
…
It is also useful to recall the manner in which the Chagos Islands tribunal 
addressed the issues arising under Article 283 with respect to Mauritius’s 
fourth and final submission,
…
We think several general propositions can be extracted from the Guyana 
and Chagos Islands cases: (1) it is not necessary to exchange views on the 
substance of each and every submission per se; (2) as long as there has been 
an exchange of views on the general subject matter of the dispute, broadly 
construed, Article 283 is satisfied, both with respect to the main dispute as well 
as any incidental issues that are subsumed within it…251 
However, Guyana and Chagos Islands Cases are fundamentally different 
from the present case, making such analogy inappropriate. The primary and real 
disputes in the present case are maritime boundary delimitation in the SCS plus 
territorial issues hidden inside as the core.252 China as the respondent has made 
written declaration according to Article 298 of UNCLOS to exclude Annex VII 
Tribunal from settling maritime boundary delimitation disputes. Such excluded 
primary and real disputes are not formally and directly submitted by the Philippines 
to this Tribunal that is incapable of resolving such disputes even when submitted 
indirectly. It will be impossible for the particular issues identified by Submissions 
1~14 to be subsumed within such “unsubmitted primary and real disputes” so as to 
250     Guyana v. Suriname, Merits, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, 17 September 2007, para. 
410. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-56.  
251    First-round submissions by Mr. Martin, in the Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, 
pp. 32~35.
252     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-
Dash-Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 
28, 2014, pp. 89, 119~121.
The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on the South China Sea Disputes 177
do away with the requirement of exchange of views on the part of the Philippines.253 
Therefore, Mr. Martin’s invocation of Guyana and Chagos Islands Cases is again 
unhelpful. 
Due to Philippines’ default of fulfilling the requirements under Articles 283 
and 286, the Annex VII Tribunal should not have been established in the first place, 
while Submissions 1~14 should be declared as inadmissible by the Tribunal which 
has been established nevertheless.
E. The Situations Excluding Jurisdiction of the Tribunal according to
    Article 298 of UNCLOS and China’s 2006 Declaration
Assuming the Philippines’ Submissions are deemed conveying legal disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, while the requirements 
under Section 1 of Part XV of UNCLOS are considered fulfilled completely, such 
disputes are nevertheless covered by Article 298 of UNCLOS as well as by China’s 
2006 Declaration. This section will prove why Submissions 2~4, 6~9, 11~14 should 
still be deemed caught by Article 298. As a result, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to 
try these Submissions has been excluded.
1. For Submission 2: Disputes concerning the Historic Rights Are 
“Concerning” the Application of Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS
Philippines’ Submission 2 challenges the alleged invocation of historic rights 
by China to justify its maritime claim in the SCS within the U-Shaped Line which 
goes beyond what is allowed by UNCLOS. Apart from many unsettled preliminary 
issues that may turn this Submission inadmissible,254 China’s 2006 Declaration 
also deprives the Tribunal of its jurisdiction to entertain the issue of historic rights 
which is “a dispute concerning the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) relating 
to sea boundary delimitations” covered by Article 298(1)(a)(i).
Here, a clarification for a preliminary issue is needed. Is there a room for 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS to apply to the confrontations between China 
and the Philippines in the Relevant Area? The answer from the Philippines is no, 
253    Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
p. 275.
254     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 172~186, 223~228.
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because China simply has no EEZ and continental shelf in the Relevant Area.255 
As no Sino-Philippine disputes concerning overlapping EEZ and continental shelf 
claims will arise,256 Articles 74(1) and 83(1) become inapplicable in the Relevant 
Area. However, Sections III-A-4 and III-E-4 of this paper prove that China is 
undeniably entitled to claim EEZ and continental shelf in the SCS. Inevitably, the 
Sino-Philippine overlapping claims of EEZ and continental shelf exist in the SCS, 
making Articles 74(1) and 83(1) applicable.   
As Articles 74(1) and 83(1) apply in the Relevant Area, we now address the 
issue whether the disputes concerning the legality of China’s historic rights claims, 
if any, to support its sovereign rights in the area enclosed by the U-Shaped Line are 
concerning the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1). The question for decision 
is not whether the disputes in question are legally to be considered as “EEZ or 
continental shelf delimitation”,257 as argued by the Philippines.258 However, the key 
issue is the interpretation of the term “concerning” as the second word in the first 
sentence of Article 298(1)(a)(i).259 The ordinary meaning to be given to the term260 
255     See Figures 4.1 and 4.2 after p. 70 of Philippines’ Memorial. 
256     In footnote 374 of Philippines’ Memorial, the Philippines argues: “the question before 
this Tribunal is whether China’s claim to ‘historic rights’ survives its adherence to the 
Convention and can trump the Philippines’ entitlements to an EEZ and continental 
shelf…” Philippines’ Memorial, p. 98.
257       The ICJ was careful in such differentiation, see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Gree-
ce v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1978, p. 36, para. 86.
258     See First-round submissions by Professor Oxman, in the Transcripts of the Hearing on 
8 July 2015, pp. 49~51. Strangely, Professor Oxman completely ignores the 2nd word 
“concerning” in the first sentence of Article 298(1)(a)(i) in his interpretation of Article 
298(1)(a) of UNCLOS.
259    That is “disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 
relating to sea boundary delimitations …”
260    Articles 31~32 of the1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty provide general 
principles for the treaty interpretation. The starting point for interpretation is finding the 
ordinary meaning for the term to be interpreted. The ordinary meaning for the term to be 
interpreted can be found in standard dictionaries. At https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf, 10 March 2015.
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“concern” as a verb is261 (1) have relation to, (2) affect,262 and (3) be of importance 
to. Therefore, the term “concerning” should be interpreted as (1) having relation to 
or relating to,263 (2) affecting, and (3) being important to. It follows that any dispute 
relating to, affecting, or important to the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
should be considered as concerning the application of these two articles and caught 
by Article 298(1)(a)(i). 
Most interestingly, the Philippines itself admits that the legality dispute 
concerning China’s historic rights claims is relating to, affecting, or important to 
the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1). Contending that “there is no basis for 
China’s claim of ‘historic rights’ in the EEZ or continental shelf of the Philippines, 
or any other State”,264 the Philippine Memorial invoked international judicial 
decisions (in Chapter 4, Section II-A-2 entitled The Case Law) as evidences. 
Paradoxically, those judicial decisions all aim at resolving maritime delimitation 
disputes. They are the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), 
261    A. S. Hornby ed., Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980.
262     As confirmed by the ICJ in the Greece v. Turkey, the meaning of the term “concern” as a 
verb can be interpreted as “affect”. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. 
Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1978, p. 37, para. 89. “In the present case, moreover, 
quite apart from the question of the status of the above-mentioned Greek islands for the 
purpose of determining Greece’s entitlement to continental shelf, the Court notes that 
during the hearings in 1976 the Greek Government referred to a certain straight base-line 
claimed by Turkey which is, however, contested by Greece. Although it recognized that 
the resulting discrepancy between the Greek and Turkish views of the limits of Turkey’s 
territorial sea in the area is not great, it observed that the discrepancy ‘obviously affects 
the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf’. The question of the limits of a 
State’s territorial sea, as the Greek Government itself has recognized, is indisputably one 
which not only relates to, but directly concerns territorial status.”
263    The term “relating to” has been interpreted by the ICJ in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
Case as “emanating from” and “being an automatic adjunct of”. “86. … The question for 
decision is whether the present dispute is one ‘relating to the territorial status of Greece’, 
not whether the rights in dispute are legally to be considered as ‘territorial’ rights; and a 
dispute regarding entitlement to and delimitation of areas of continental shelf tends by its 
very nature to be one relating to territorial status … In short, continental shelf rights are 
legally both an emanation from and an automatic adjunct of the territorial sovereignty of 
the coastal State. It follows that the territorial regime – the territorial status – of a coastal 
State comprises, ipso jure, the rights of exploration and exploitation over the continental 
shelf to which it is entitled under international law. A dispute regarding those rights would, 
therefore, appear to be one which may be said to ‘relate’ to the territorial status of the 
coastal State.” Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports, 1978, p. 36, para. 86.
264     Philippines’ Memorial, p. 91, para. 4.55.
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2015 No. 2)180
Continental Shelf Delimitation Case (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Gulf of 
Maine case (Canada v. United States), Qatar v. Bahrain, Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, 
and Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration.265 
As proved by these judicial decisions, under the equidistance/relevant 
circumstances method266 historic right may constitute a “relevant circumstance”267 
265      Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 91~99, paras. 4.55~4.69.
266    According to the Annex VII Tribunal which decided Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, 
“the equidistance/relevant circumstances method is the method normally applied by 
international courts and tribunals in the determination of a maritime boundary. The 
two-step approach … results in the drawing of a provisional equidistance line and the 
consideration of a subsequent adjustment, a process the International Court of Justice 
explained as follows: ‘The most logical and widely practiced approach is first to draw 
provisionally an equidistance line and then to consider whether that line must be 
adjusted in the light of the existence of special circumstances (Qatar v. Bahrain, I.C.J. 
Reports 2001, p. 40, at p. 94, para. 176).’” See Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Award, 
UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (11 April 2006), para. 304, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1152, 10 March 2015; Guyana/Suriname, Award, UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal (17 September 2007), paras. 340~342, at http://www.pcacpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1147, 1 March 2015; Bangladesh v. Myanmar, Judgement, para. 
229; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. 
Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1993, p. 62, paras. 55~56. 
267    As to what constitute relevant circumstances, ICJ in Denmark v. Norway quoted the 
judgments of North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 50, para. 93) 
and Libya/Malta Case (I.C.J. Reports, 1985, p. 40, para. 48). “[U]nder the heading of 
‘special circumstances’ and that of ‘relevant circumstances’, as to what circumstances 
are juridically relevant to the delimitation process ... In fact, there is no legal limit to the 
considerations which States may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they 
apply equitable procedures, and more often than not it is the balancing-up of all such 
considerations that will produce this result rather than reliance on one to the exclusion of 
all others. The problem of the relative weight to be accorded to different considerations 
naturally varies with the circumstances of the case.” And, “although there may be no legal 
limit to the considerations which States may take account of, this can hardly be true for 
a court applying equitable procedures. For a court, although there is assuredly no closed 
list of considerations, it is evident that only those that are pertinent to the institution of 
the continental shelf as it has developed within the law, and to the application of equitable 
principles to its delimitation, will qualify for inclusion.” See Maritime Delimitation in the 
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 
1993, p. 63, para. 57. Also see Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta) Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports, 1985, p. 48, para. 65.
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to be considered when certain conditions are met.268 This happens when applying 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS to achieve “an equitable solution or result” 
268    The conditions for historic fishing rights to qualify as a relevant circumstance are 
“catastrophic” and “long usage” tests, originated in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Case of 1951. They were brought forward in the provisions inter alia of Article 7(5) of 
UNCLOS, and applied to the delimitation for overlapping EEZ and continental shelf as 
happening in the Eritrea v. Yemen. See Eritrea v. Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), Award, 
1999, para. 50, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160, 10 March 2015. 
Also see Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, where the Annex VII Tribunal confirms the 
resource-related criteria, i.e. traditional fishing activities may under certain circumstance 
be treated as a special circumstance. “241. Resource-related criteria have been treated 
more cautiously by the decisions of international courts and tribunals, which have not 
generally applied this factor as a relevant circumstance. As noted above, the Jan Mayen 
decision is most exceptional in having determined the line of delimitation in connection 
with the fisheries conducted by the parties in dispute. However, as the question of fisheries 
might underlie a number of delimitation disputes, courts and tribunals have not altogether 
excluded the role of this factor but, as in the Gulf of Maine, have restricted its application 
to circumstances in which catastrophic results might follow from the adoption of a 
particular delimitation line. In the Gulf of Maine case the Chamber held: ‘It is, therefore, 
in the Chamber’s view, evident that the respective scale of activities connected with 
fishing – or navigation, defence or, for that matter, petroleum exploration and exploitation 
– cannot be taken into account as a relevant circumstance or, if the term is preferred, as an 
equitable criterion to be applied in determining the delimitation line. What the Chamber 
would regard as a legitimate scruple lies rather in concern lest the overall result, even 
though achieved through the application of equitable criteria and the use of appropriate 
methods for giving them concrete effect, should unexpectedly be revealed as radically 
inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood 
and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned (I.C.J. Reports, 
1984, p. 342, para. 237).’” See Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Award, UNCLOS Annex 
VII Tribunal (11 April 2006), para. 241, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_
id=1152, 10 March 2015; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1993, p. 71, para. 75.
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in settling maritime delimitation dispute.269 Put differently, historic right constitutes 
one of the factors to be addressed in the application of the delimitation process, i.e. 
the equidistance/relevant circumstances method, conceived by Articles 74(1) and 
83(1), testified by, e.g. Eritrea v. Yemen,270 and Tunisia v. Libya.271
Therefore, the dispute of legality of the alleged claim of historic rights by 
China, if any, as the basis to support its sovereign rights in the SCS enclosed by the 
U-Shaped Line would be concerning the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
of UNCLOS and caught by Article 298(1)(a)(i). Being covered by China’s 2006 
Declaration, such dispute falls outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
2. For Submission 2: Disputes concerning the U-Shaped Line as a Maritime 
Claim Are “Concerning” the Application of Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS
269    The footnote 373 of the Memorial is worth quoting in this connection. It reads: “The 
question of whether, under UNCLOS, historic rights can exist in another State’s EEZ is 
fundamentally different from whether, in delimitating a maritime boundary between two 
States with overlapping EEZ entitlements, historic fishing practices can be taken into 
account as a ‘relevant circumstance’. In Gulf of Maine, the ICJ Chamber refused to treat 
the parties’ historic fishing practices as a relevant circumstance, because the economic 
consequence of depriving them of access to their traditional fishing grounds would not 
be ‘catastrophic’. Canada v. United States, para. 237. MP, vol. XI, Annex LA-12. The 
arbitral tribunal in Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago applied the same standard; it found 
that the consequences of denying Barbados access to its allegedly traditional fishing areas 
in waters claimed by Trinidad as its EEZ would not be ‘catastrophic’ and therefore were 
not relevant to the delimitation. Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Award, UNCLOS Annex 
VII Tribunal (11 Apr. 2006), para. 267. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-54. But in the Jan Mayen 
Case (Norway v. Denmark), the ICJ noted, as one factor justifying its delimitation of the 
parties’ overlapping EEZ entitlements, that it would preserve Greenland’s access to its 
traditional capelin fishing grounds. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland 
and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1993, p. 38. MP, Vol. 
XI, Annex LA-20.” Also see Tunisia/Libya, Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 18, para. 50; 
Guyana/Suriname, Arbitral Award, 2007, pp. 107~108, paras. 332~333.
270    For example, in Arbitration between Eritrea v. Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), the ques-
tion of fishing (including historical practice) in the red sea and the traditional fishing 
regime are both essential parts and addressed in Chapters II & IV, which is under the 
general title “Proceedings in the Delimitation Stage of the Arbitration”. Both Eritrea and 
Yemen were in agreement on the effect of historical fishing rights upon the application 
of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS. Paragraph 51 is worth quoting: “They also 
found an echo in the ‘equitable solution’ called for by paragraph 1 of Articles 74 and 83 
of the Convention, it being assumed that no ‘solution’ could be equitable which would 
be inconsistent with long usage, which would present a clear and present danger of a 
catastrophic result on the local economy of one of the Parties, or which would fail to take 
into account the need to minimize detrimental effects on fishing communities, and the 
economic dislocation, of States whose nationals have habitually fished in the relevant 
area.” The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, Award, para. 51, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1160, 10 March 2015.
271     Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1982, 
pp. 71~77, paras. 97~105.
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Section III-B-1 of this paper explains that the U-Shaped Line as allegedly used 
by China to mark its outer limits of the maritime claim in the SCS is a political 
position subject to change in a political negotiation leading to the settlement of 
Sino-Philippine maritime boundary delimitation in the SCS. Therefore, the dispute 
of the U-Shaped Line is actually not a legal but a political one, which should be 
declared by the Tribunal as non-justiciable.
Alternatively, should the Tribunal consider the issue of the U-Shaped Line as a 
legal dispute, then based on the same arguments provided in Section III-B-1 of this 
paper, it is fair to treat the issue of U-Shaped Line as affecting, relating to, being 
important to, and, therefore, concerning the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
of UNCLOS. It follows that the legal dispute of the U-Shaped Line may not be 
entertained by the Tribunal as its jurisdiction over such a dispute has been excluded 
by China’s 2006 Declaration.
3. For Submissions 3~4 and 6~7: Disputes concerning the Legal Status of 
Maritime Features Are “Concerning” the Application of Articles 74 and 83 of 
UNCLOS
It has been argued by Sections III-A-5 and III-A-6 of this paper that 
Submissions 3~4 and 6~7 brought no dispute to the Tribunal for settlement. The 
paper published by this author in China Oceans Law Review also discussed the 
reasons why these Submissions should be deemed inadmissible.272 However, 
assuming that the “disputes” concerning the legal status of the four “rocks” and the 
five “LTEs” as identified by these Submissions do exist, such “legal status disputes” 
should be deemed affecting, relating to, important to, and, therefore, concerning the 
application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS to Sino-Philippine maritime 
boundary delimitation disputes covered by Article 298(1)(a)(i). Such “legal status 
disputes” then become the ones that Annex VII-Tribunal is precluded from settling 
due to China’s 2006 Declaration. The reasons are as follows.
First, let us imagine, if China wins in any of the “legal status disputes”, a 
particular “rock” may turn into an island and generate entitlements of EEZ and 
continental shelf. One particular “LTE” may turn into a rock and generate territorial 
water or even EEZ and continental shelf for China. As China wins more of the “legal 
status disputes”, the size of the overlapping EEZ and continental shelf gets bigger. 
272    Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 229~233.
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The final result of “equitable solution” as required by Articles 74(1) and 83(1) will 
be shifted accordingly. 
If China loses in any of the “legal status disputes”, China will have one less 
territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf generated by that particular feature. The 
size of total overlapping area of EEZ and continental shelf becomes smaller. 
The application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) would lead to a different “equitable 
solution” accordingly. If China loses in all disputes of this kind, then from 
Philippines’ perspectives, China would have no EEZ and continental shelf in the 
Relevant Area.273 Under such a situation, Articles 74(1) and 83(1) will become 
inapplicable to the no-longer-existent delimitation dispute. It is hard to deny that 
such result affects the application of these two provisions. It simply ends the 
possibility for these rules to apply. 
Therefore, the “legal status disputes” as brought by the Philippines through 
Submissions 3~4 and 6~7 should be considered as affecting and concerning 
the application of Articles 74(1) and 83(1). The optional exception mechanism 
established by Article 298 then applies and deprives the Tribunal of its jurisdiction 
to try such “legal status disputes”.
Second, it is argued by the Philippines that neither the disputes brought to the Tri-
nal nor the disputes of legal status of maritime features occupied by China are concer-
rning maritime delimitation.274 However, such a disclaimer has already been repeatedly 
and impliedly negated by the oral statements of Philippines’ Foreign Secretary275
273     It is the Philippines’ position that China has no EEZ and continental shelf in the Relevant 
Area, as China only can rely on 5 LTEs and 4 “rocks” to claim maritime entitlements 
there. In short, there is no possibility for China to have any overlapping EEZ and 
continental shelf with Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf claims in the SCS. See 
Philippines’ Memorial, Submissions 3~7 and Chapter 5.
274      Philippines’ Memorial, p. 149, para. 5.113.
275    On 7 July 2015 which is the first day of the Hearing, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of 
the Philippines, Mr. Albert del Rosario, said: “China has pursued its activities in these 
disputed maritime areas with overwhelming force. The Philippines can only counter by 
invoking international law. That is why it is of fundamental importance to the Philippines, 
and, we would submit, for the law of rule in general, for the Tribunal to decide where 
and to what limit China has maritime entitlements in the South China Sea; where and to 
what limit the Philippines has maritime entitlements; where and to what extent the parties’ 
respective entitlements overlap, and where they do not.” It is obvious that the Philippines’ 
goal in this arbitration is maritime boundary delimitation in the SCS where maritime 
claims of China and the Philippines overlap. See First-round submissions by Secretary 
Del Rosario, in Transcripts of the Hearing, 7 July 2015, pp. 16~17.  
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and counsel276 at the July Hearing. Still, all the judicial decisions invoked by 
the Philippines in Chapters 5 and 7 of the Memorial are judgments on maritime 
boundary delimitations. They are (1) Qatar v. Bahrain;277 (2) Nicaragua v. 
276    See First-round submissions by Mr. Reichler, in the Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 
2015, pp. 42~44, 48, 58. “So now, if you will, let us take a look at where the parties’ 
maritime entitlements under the Convention do exist, where they overlap, where they do 
not, and how they are impacted by China’s claim of ‘historic rights’ within the nine-dash 
line. These matters may be best appreciated by looking at the northern half and southern 
half of the South China Sea separately. This is the northern half. To this map, we will 
first add a depiction of the maritime entitlements claimed by the Philippines, excluding 
entitlements generated by disputed insular features. In strict conformity with UNCLOS, 
the Philippines claims a 12-mile territorial sea under Article 3, a 200-mile EEZ under 
Article 57, and a 200-mile continental shelf under Article 76. To this depiction, we now 
add the entitlements of China under the same articles of UNCLOS. The Philippines accepts 
that China has 200-mile entitlements from its mainland coast and from Hainan Island, 
and we assume quod non, for purposes of these proceedings, that China has sovereignty 
over the Paracel Islands, and that at least one of these features may generate a 200-mile 
entitlement. You can see that there are large areas where only the Philippines has maritime 
entitlements under UNCLOS, and areas where the only entitlements under the Convention 
are China’s, as well as areas where the parties’ entitlements overlap with one another. We 
have now enclaved Scarborough Shoal within 12 miles. This is a disputed feature. Each of 
the parties claims sovereignty over it. Because parts of it protrude slightly above water at 
high tide, as you can see here, we accept that it is a rock; that is, a land feature. Because 
sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal is not at issue in these proceedings, we have here 
enclaved it within 12 miles. This shows that the Philippines has maritime entitlements 
under UNCLOS on all sides of the enclave, and that the Philippines’ entitlements are 
not overlapped by any entitlement that China could claim under the Convention. The 
Philippines’ third submission addresses the status of Scarborough Shoal under Article 121 
of the Convention, and seeks confirmation that it is indeed a rock and does not generate 
an entitlement beyond 12 miles. This confirmation is required in order to establish 
precisely where the Philippines enjoys maritime entitlements that are not overlapped, 
or not potentially overlapped, by China’s entitlements … Here are the Spratly Islands 
with 12-mile enclaves around those features that remain above water at high tide. In the 
Philippines’ view, these are the proper entitlements of the features under the Convention. 
Even assuming, quod non, that for purposes of these hearings all of the Spratlys belong 
to China, there are still large areas where the 12-mile entitlements generated by these 
features do not overlap the 200-mile entitlements attributed to Palawan, and where the 
Philippines therefore alone enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction under the Convention 
… If you will kindly allow me to turn back to those submissions at tab 1, you will see 
that your jurisdiction in regard to submissions 5, 8 and 9 follows from the arguments 
I have presented. They are a consequence of your finding that you have jurisdiction to 
determine the limits of the parties’ maritime entitlements under the Convention, including 
where their entitlements overlap and where they do not. Submission 5 calls upon you to 
determine that certain low-tide features lie within the maritime zones of the Philippines 
but not of China. They do, if you agree with the Philippines’ submissions on the character 
of these features and the consequences that has for where the parties have maritime 
entitlements.”
277    Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 117, 139~140, footnotes 423, 498, 500 and paras. 5.14, 
5.85~5.86.
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Colombia;278 (3) Libya v. Malta;279 (4) Eritrea v. Yemen;280 (5) Canada v. US;281 
(6) Romania v. Ukraine;282 (7) Bangladesh v. Myanmar.283 To be added, Professor 
Oxman, as Philippines’ counsel, invoked Nicaragua v. Colombia case at the 
Hearing on 8 July 2015, when addressing the issues of maritime entitlement and 
sea boundary delimitation. Once again, it is the maritime boundary delimitation 
case.284 
In those international judicial decisions settling maritime boundary delimi-
tation disputes, the issues concerning legal status of maritime features and their 
legal capability to generate maritime entitlements constituted both preliminary and 
integral issues for the Court or Tribunal to address before coming to the delimita-
tion issues proper. 
After examining closely, inter alia, Tunisia v. Libya,285 Canada v. US,286 Libya 
278     Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 121, 139~140, 147~149, 258, footnotes 444~445, 497, 500, 
540~544, 974~976 and paras. 5.23, 5.27, 5.85, 5.86, 5.107, 5.110~5.113, 7.122.
279      Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 127~128, 152, footnotes 459, 552, and paras. 5.44, 5.120.
280      Philippines’ Memorial, p. 128, footnote 460, and para. 5.45.
281      Philippines’ Memorial, p. 138, footnote 489, and para. 5.79.
282      Philippines’ Memorial, p. 147, footnote 538, paras. 5.107~5.108.
283      Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 257~258, footnotes 971~973, para. 7.121.
284     See First-round submissions by Professor Oxman, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 
2015, pp. 44~45. As said by Professor Oxman, “The question of maritime delimitation 
does not arise unless and until it is determined that there are overlapping maritime 
entitlements. To put it differently, ‘Delimitation presupposes an area of overlapping 
entitlements’. That is how the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea put it 
in paragraph 377 of its judgment in the Bay of Bengal case. In that case, the parties 
challenged each other’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 miles. Only after 
those contentions were considered and rejected in the judgment did that judgment 
proceed to delimitation of the overlapping entitlements. The International Court of Justice 
applied the same approach in its 2012 judgment in the Nicaragua v Colombia case. In 
the course of its analysis of entitlements generated by maritime features under the rules 
of international law articulated by the Convention, the court expressly declined (in 
paragraph 169 of its judgment) to consider whether an equitable delimitation would limit 
the islands’ maritime zones to 12 miles. The court first determined the entitlements of the 
features in question, and only then did it turn to delimitation of the areas in which those 
features are found. That is the logical and, we believe, correct approach.”
285     Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1982, 
pp. 88~89, paras. 128~129. In this case, the Kerkennah Islands, surrounded by islets and 
low-tide elevations, and constituting by their size and position a circumstance relevant for 
the delimitation, and to which the Court must attribute some effect.
286    Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. US), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1984, p. 329, para. 201.
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v. Malta,287 Eritrea v. Yemen,288 Qatar v. Bahrain, 289 and Romania v. Ukraine,290 it 
becomes clear that the issues of legal status of maritime features strongly affect the 
result of the settlement of maritime boundary disputes or, the application of Article 
74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS. This observation is even admitted by the Philippines 
287    ICJ in the Libya v. Malta invoked the Judgment of North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
to say that when drawing a median line, the Court needs to ignore “the presence of 
islets, rocks and minor coastal projections”. In this connection, “the islet of Filfla”, “the 
uninhabited islet of Filfla”, or “the uninhabited rock of Filfla” were repeatedly mentioned 
in the Judgment and was ignored as a base point at the first step of the delimitation when 
drawing the median line. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 
1985, pp. 20, 47~48, 52, 57; paras. 15, 62, 64, 72~73, 79-C. 
288      The award of Eritrea v. Yemen is worth quoting that “147. Yemen employed both the small 
island of al-Tayr and the group of islands called al-Zubayr as controlling base points, so 
that the Yemen-claimed median line boundary is ‘median’ only in the area of sea west of 
these islands. These islands do not constitute a part of Yemen’s mainland coast. Moreover, 
their barren and inhospitable nature and their position well out to sea, which have already 
been described in the Award on Sovereignty, mean that they should not be taken into 
consideration in computing the boundary line between Yemen and Eritrea. 148. For these 
reasons, the Tribunal has decided that both the single island of al-Tayr and the island 
group of al-Zubayr should have no effect upon the median line international boundary.” 
See Award (given on 17 December 1999) of the Arbitral Tribunal in the 2nd Stage of 
the Proceedings (Maritime Delimitation) pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate dated 3 
October 1996 between Eritrea and Yemen, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_
id=1160, 10 March 2015.
289     In the ICJ Judgment of Qatar v. Bahrain, the Court needs to determine the relevant coasts 
to measure territorial seas. “In order to determine what constitutes Bahrain’s relevant 
coasts and what are the relevant baselines on the Bahraini side, the Court must first 
establish which islands come under Bahraini sovereignty.” One of the issues is to decide 
whether Qit’at Jaradah is an island or low tide elevation. The ICJ decided that it should 
be considered as an island. “195. The Court recalls that the legal definition of an island 
is … The Court has carefully analysed the evidence submitted by the Parties … On these 
bases, the Court concludes that the maritime feature of Qit’at Jaradah satisfies the above-
mentioned criteria and that it is an island which should as such be taken into consideration 
for the drawing of the equidistance line.” Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports, 2001, paras. 184~187, 195. 
290    See 2009 ICJ Judgment of Romania v. Ukraine, where the ICJ needs to address the 
controversial legal status of certain features (Sacalin Peninsula and Sulina dyke) under 
UNCLOS legal regime so as to know if they may be treated as base points for constructing 
provisional equidistance line in the process of maritime delimitation. See Maritime 
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 
105~108, paras. 129~140.
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itself,291 and confirmed by leading law of the sea experts, e.g. Clive Schofield,292 
and Yann-Huei Song.293 That is why such disputes were requested to be handled 
first, and such requests were followed by ICJ in, e.g. Nicaragua v. Honduras.294 
Most interestingly, in the judgment of Nicaragua v. Colombia, the ICJ put the sub-
section of “Entitlements generated by Maritime Features” under Section V entitled 
“Maritime Boundary”.295 It proves that the issue concerning legal status of maritime 
features constitutes an integral part of maritime boundary delimitation, as also 
291    Philippines’ Memorial, p. 118, footnote 425. “As reflected in the Virginia Commentary 
(referring to the treatment of the issue in the United Nations Seabed Committee between 
1971 and 1973): ‘The diversity of islands, and the questions of their status and the criteria 
to be applied in determining that status, were important and contentious issues in the light 
of their importance in the delineation of maritime space.’ United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 3 (M. Nordquist, et al., eds., 2002), para. 
VIII.4. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-146”.
292     Clive Schofield, The Trouble with Islands: The Definition and Role of Islands and Rocks 
in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon Van Dyke eds., 
Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea, Leiden, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 33. 
293    Yann-Huei Song, Okinotorishima: A “Rock” or an “Island”? Recent Maritime Boundary 
Controversy between Japan and Taiwan/China, in Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon Van Dyke 
eds, Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea, Leiden/
Boston: Martinus Hijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 168.
294     Case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, ICJ Reports, 2007, 
pp. 35, 39, paras. 114, 135.
295    Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 2012, 
pp. 47~92, paras. 132~247.
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noted in Guyana v. Suriname,296 and Greece v. Turkey.297 
Third, one more comment must be made here on Professor Oxman’s statement 
at the July Hearing on 8 July 2015.298 It is submitted, such interpretation of 
Professor Oxman has the following legal problems. Firstly, this over-narrow 
interpretation ignores the second word “concerning” in the first sentence of 
Article 298(1)(a)(i), as explained in Section III-E-1 of this paper. Secondly, even 
assuming the word “concerning” does not enlarge the scope of excluded disputes 
under Article 298(1)(a)(i), i.e. maritime boundary delimitation and nothing more 
(if adopting Professor Oxman’s view), the integral parts of maritime boundary 
delimitation dispute should unavoidably be the substance being excluded by 
China’s 2006 Declaration. In toto et pars continetur.299 Accessorium non ducit sed 
296    “Turning to the question of whether there are any features in the geographical configu-
ration of the relevant coastlines which justify an adjustment of the equidistance line, the 
Tribunal must mention the following observation found in the report of the independent 
expert appointed by Guyana: ‘An important geographic reality in this case is that there 
are no offshore features, such as islands or low-tide elevations that influence the drawing 
of an equidistant line…’.” See Guyana v. Suriname, Award (17 September 2007), Annex 
VII Tribunal, para. 376, at http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1147, 10 March 
2015. 
297    Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 
1978, p. 35, para. 83. “83. The contention based on the proposition that delimitation is 
entirely extraneous to the notion of territorial status appears to the Court to encounter 
certain difficulties. Above all, it seems to overlook the basic character of the present 
dispute, clearly stated though it is in the first submission in Greece’s Application. The 
basic question in dispute is whether or not certain islands under Greek sovereignty are 
entitled to a continental shelf of their own and entitle Greece to call for the boundary to 
be drawn between those islands and the Turkish coast. The very essence of the dispute, 
as formulated in the Application, is thus the entitlement of those Greek islands to a 
continental shelf, and the delimitation of the boundary is a secondary question to be 
decided after, and in the light of, the decision upon the first basic question. Moreover, 
it is evident from the documents before the Court that Turkey, which maintains that the 
islands in question are mere protuberances on the Turkish continental shelf and have no 
continental shelf of their own, also considers the basic question to be one of entitlement.”
298    See First-round submissions by Professor Oxman, in the Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 
July 2015, pp. 50~51. As said by Professor Oxman, “China asserts that Article 298(1)
(a) excludes disputes on other issues if they constitute an integral part of a delimitation 
dispute. That is not consistent with the text. That is not what the words say. Acceptance 
of China’s assertion would, to put it charitably, require interpreting Article 298 very 
expansively indeed. The textual context of this provision indicates that such an expansive 
reading of the exception in Article 298(1)(a) is not justified.”
299    The part is also included in the whole. See Guide to Latin in International Law, at http://
www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001/acref-97801953
69380-e-993, 10 March 2015.
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sequitur suum principale.300 And the logic is simple. When a gentleman in an Italian 
restaurant orders a steak and says no to Ragu Spaghetti, it means that he would not 
like to see pasta and minced meat sauce even presented separately on the table. 
When any Contracting Party to UNCLOS says no to sea boundary delimitation as 
the dispute that an Annex VII Tribunal may try, it means that Contracting Party 
does not want to see the “parts” of sea boundary delimitation to be reviewed by 
the Tribunal. Thirdly, it is a non-issue whether the “integral part” approach should 
prevail over the “strict construction” approach adopted by Professor Oxman or 
vice versa.301 The two approaches exist in different levels. The “integral part” 
approach is used when defining the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
being interpreted. On the other hand, the “strict construction” approach looks at 
the context of the terms to be interpreted and comes after the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms is found. To sum up, Professor Oxman’s over-narrow 
interpretation of Article 298(1)(a)(i) is incorrect, as that version of interpretation 
is inconsistent with the first requirement in the treaty interpretation process under 
Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, i.e. the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms being interpreted. 
Fourth, this said, it will greatly help if the Philippines can identify any 
international judicial decision addressing the legal status dispute of maritime 
features while not being a maritime boundary delimitation decision, like what 
the Philippines brings to the Tribunal now. Otherwise, the conclusion will most 
probably be that the legal status dispute of maritime features affects and, therefore, 
concerns the settlement of maritime boundary delimitation dispute, as confirmed by 
300      The accessory does not lead, but follow its principal. At http://legal-dictionary.thefreedicti
onary.com/Accessorium+non+ducit+sed+sequitur+suum+principale, 10 March 2015. 
301    See First-round submissions by Professor Oxman, in the Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 
July 2015, pp. 51~52. As said by Professor Oxman, “The title of Section 3 is ‘Limitations 
and Exceptions to Applicability of Section 2’. Article 298 is part of Section 3. Its 
title is ‘Optional exceptions to applicability of section 2’. Paragraph 72 of the Arctic 
Sunrise award on jurisdiction specifically refers to ‘an exception that is permitted under 
article 298’. The permissible exceptions derogate from the principle that “any dispute” 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention may be submitted to the 
appropriate court or tribunal by a party to the dispute. This textual context suggests a strict 
construction, not a liberal one. It presents a classic case for applying the maxim that 
exceptions are to be narrowly construed, where a tightly framed exception derogates from 
a basic principle that is integral to the object and purpose of the instrument as a whole.” 
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the Philippines at the July Hearing.302
4. For Submissions 8~9, 11~12, and 14: Maritime Boundary Dispute 
as the Real Dispute
As said in this author’s paper published in China Oceans Law Review,303 
Submissions 8~9, 11~12 and 14 are premised on an overarching Philippine position 
that China does not have EEZ and continental shelf entitlements in the eastern part 
of SCS,304 which should be deemed Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf. Such 
a premise will be vindicated when the award on merits phase for Submissions 
3~7 is given in Philippines’ favor. When this happens, what China can have in 
the eastern part of SCS will be no more than four circles of territorial waters 
surrounding four “rocks” (i.e. Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef 
and Fiery Cross Reef) with disputed territorial status. Consequently, all the law 
enforcement activities by China in exercising its sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
under EEZ and continental shelf claims in the eastern part of SCS as contested 
by these Submissions will become groundless. It follows that these Submissions 
should be considered as challenging China’s actions overstepping Philippines’ 
EEZ and continental shelf.305 However, due to the following reasons, the real 
and predominant306 disputes reflected by these Submissions are Sino-Philippine 
maritime boundary delimitation disputes which have been removed from the 
scope of jurisdiction of this Tribunal, based on China’s 2006 Declaration and 
Article 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS. Due to the nature of such real disputes reflected 
by Submissions 8~9, 11~12 and 14, these Submissions can only create disputes 
302     See First-round submissions by Solicitor General Hilbay, in Transcripts of the Hearing 
on 7 July 2015, pp. 7~8. “Professor Oxman will also explain how your determination 
of the potential maritime entitlements of the parties will serve to narrow the disputes 
between them, reduce tensions, and facilitate the diplomatic resolution of those issues that 
lie outside your jurisdiction; namely, sovereignty over small maritime features and the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries.”
303     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration of the South China Sea Nine-
Dash-Line Dispute: Applying the Rule of Default of Appearance, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 
28, 2014, pp. 246~251.
304     Para. 6.15 of the Memorial said that China relied on historic right as the basis to exercise 
sovereign rights in all the waters enclosed by U-Shaped Line. Such Philippines argument 
is based on a theory that China has no EEZ and continental shelf in the Relevant Area to 
justify its exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction. See Philippines’ Memorial, p. 164. 
Also see First-round submissions by Professor Oxman, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 
July 2015, pp. 39~40.
305     China’s Position Paper, para. 27.
306    Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award, 18 March 2015, para. 229.
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beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The detailed reasons are as below. 
Firstly, China and the Philippines have been maintaining territorial disputes 
for all the maritime features in the KIG and Scarborough Shoal,307 at least 12 of 
which have been recognized as islands according to Article 121 of UNCLOS.308 
The objects of such territorial disputes thus go beyond those China-occupied 9 
maritime features identified by Submissions 3~7. China and the Philippines have 
not submitted such territorial disputes to any third party judicial body (including 
this Tribunal) for resolution. Should the Philippines submit such disputes to this 
Tribunal either directly or indirectly, the Tribunal would not have power to resolve 
them, as such disputes are neither concerning the interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS, nor falling within the mandate of this Tribunal absent consent of the 
Parties.309 Besides, both Parties to this litigation have yet to start negotiations for 
resolving such disputes bilaterally. It will be highly unpractical for the Tribunal 
to expect such disputes to be settled during this arbitration so as to use such a 
settlement as a basis to adjudicate the disputes presented by the Philippines. Until 
the territorial disputes are resolved, it is impossible for China to concede that it has 
no sovereignty over, inter alia, those islands that can generate EEZ and continental 
shelf according to Article 121 of UNCLOS. It is thus inconceivable for China to 
abandon its position that it has maritime entitlement of EEZ and continental shelf 
in the eastern part of SCS generated by either Spratly Islands Group as a whole, or 
those “islands” fulfilling conditions of Article 121 of UNCLOS. By the same token, 
it is impossible for China to give up its status as a coastal State in this area.
Secondly, the EEZ and continental shelf China can claim in the SCS310 will 
reach the sites of Reed Bank, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal (see Table 
2 of this paper). On the other hand, these 3 maritime features are all within EEZ 
and continental shelf claimed by the Philippines from its archipelagic baselines 
307    See Section III-A-6 of this paper, China’s 2009 & 2011 NVs and Philippines’ 2011 NV, 
especially the exchange of NVs between China and the Philippines between 2009 and 
2011; Notification, p. 8, para. 20; China’s Position Paper, paras. 6~7.
308     See Section III-A-4 and Tables 1 & 2 of this paper.
309    See First-round submissions by Professor Sands, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 7 July 
2015, pp. 67~68. As said by Professor Sands, “… there is agreement between the parties 
that their differences in the South China Sea are complex and multifaceted. One aspect 
certainly concerns sovereignty over insular features in the South China Sea, but that issue 
is not before this Tribunal, not directly and not indirectly.”
310     Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Poten-
tial South China Sea Change, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 
29, 2014, pp. 204~206.
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facing the eastern part of SCS. Hence, these 3 maritime features (deemed as no 
more than LTEs by the Philippines) are located in the overlapping area claimed as 
EEZ and continental shelf by both China and the Philippines.311 According to Qatar 
v. Bahrain and Malaysia v. Singapore quoted by Philippines’ Memorial, only after 
drawing maritime boundary can we know “on which State’s EEZ and continental 
shelf these 3 LTEs stand”.312 Hence, before Sino-Philippine maritime boundary 
delimitation in the eastern part of SCS (as the ancillary issue) is completed, either 
State is justified to claim that these 3 maritime features fall on its side of EEZ and 
continental shelf. The Tribunal can do nothing to settle this ancillary issue, due to 
its lack of competence to draw maritime boundary for these two States.313 In other 
words, China is still justified to claim its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the 
waters surrounding Reed Bank, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal as a 
coastal State under UNCLOS.
Thirdly, as the Tribunal cannot draw Sino-Philippine maritime boundary in the 
SCS so as to know on whose (China’s or Philippines’) EEZ and continental shelf 
these 3 maritime features sit, the Tribunal cannot deny that China is in the position 
to claim EEZ and continental shelf covering the locations of Reed Bank, Mischief 
Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal, as a coastal State. Therefore, China’s actions/
omissions complained of by the Philippines in Submissions 8~9, 11~12, and 14 can 
all be justified by China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction derived from its EEZ 
311    These 3 maritime features are considered by the Philippines as no more than LTEs and 
incapable of generating their own maritime entitlements under UNCLOS, not even 
territorial sea. Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are requested by the Philippines 
to be declared by the Tribunal as LTEs according to Submission 4 of the Philippines’ 
Memorial, p. 271. Reed Bank is not even a LTE, as it is a submerged feature. This makes 
the legal status of the surrounding maritime areas very important. LTEs form part of the 
seabed and subsoil, and are subject to the regime of the maritime zone in which they are 
found and located. See United States Department of State, China: Maritime Claims in the 
South China Sea, Limits in the Seas, No. 143, p. 9, at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/234936.pdf, 10 March 2015.
312    This is required by the rulings of Qatar v. Bahrain and Malaysia v. Singapore that were 
recognized by the Philippines itself in the Memorial: “The Court has made clear that 
‘low-tide elevation[s] cannot be appropriated under general international law, and that 
sovereignty and other rights in relation to them are determined by the law of the sea, 
namely by the maritime zones in which they are located … In Qatar v. Bahrain, the Court 
held that Qatar had sovereignty over Fasht al-Dibl, a low-tide elevation, because it was 
located within Qatar’s territorial sea. Likewise, in Malaysia/Singapore, the status of South 
Ledge, a low-tide elevation, was held to depend on the outcome of the as-yet unresolved 
maritime delimitation under UNCLOS still to occur between Malaysia and Singapore.” 
See Philippines’ Memorial, pp. 199~200, paras. 6.105~6.106.
313      See Philippines’ Memorial, p. 257, para. 7.120. Also see the Notification, p. 16, para. 40.
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and continental shelf entitlements according to UNCLOS, for the following details:
(1) For the Reed Bank Incident from February 2010 to March 2011 when 
China interfered with Philippines’ survey vessel MV Veritas Voyager in the area 
“GSEC 101” near Reed Bank as identified by Philippines’ Submissions 8~9: The 
situation should be fairly characterized as Philippines’ marine scientific research 
for the purpose of the exploration and exploitation of natural resources on China’s 
continental shelf as defined by Article 246(5)(a)~(c).314 Accordingly, China as a 
coastal State in that water may withhold its consent and exercise jurisdiction by 
interfering with the team dispatched or authorized by the Philippines, i.e. the survey 
vessel MV Veritas Voyager.315 The Philippines’ objection to China’s interference 
amounts to Philippines’ denial of China’s legal status as a coastal State here.
(2) For the actions of China’s government vessels in interfering with 
Philippines’ fishing activities in the waters adjacent to Mischief Reef and Second 
Thomas Shoal as identified by Submission 8~9:316 For the living natural resources 
found in the water adjacent to these two LTEs, China as a coastal State for the EEZ 
may (1) exercise its sovereign rights for conservation and management purposes, 
and (2) exercise jurisdiction for protecting and preserving the marine environment, 
314     Article 246(5)(a)~(c) of UNCLOS reads: “5. Coastal States may however in their 
discretion withhold their consent to the conduct of a marine scientific research project of 
another State or competent international organization in the exclusive economic zone or 
on the continental shelf of the coastal State if that project: (a) is of direct significance for 
the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether living or non-living; (b) 
involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the introduction of 
harmful substances into the marine environment; (c) involves the construction, operation 
or use of artificial islands, installations and structures referred to in articles 60 and 80...”
315     Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
pp. 251~252.
316      See Philippines’ Memorial, para. 6.35.
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in accordance with Article 56 of UNCLOS.317 It is fair to characterize the dispute 
as denying China’s status of coastal State and relating to China’s sovereign rights 
with respect to the living resources in China’s EEZ and China’s exercise of such 
sovereign rights under Article 56.
(3) For the actions of Chinese government vessels to obstruct Philippines’ 
government vessels from enforcing the latter’s laws upon Chinese fishing vessels 
in the water adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal as identified in Submission 11: As 
Second Thomas Shoal is undeniably lying in China’s EEZ and continental shelf, 
the legality disputes concerning the obstruction of Philippines’ law enforcement 
activities should be re-characterized as a dispute concerning the exercise of the 
sovereign rights of China (as a coastal State)318 for “conserving and managing” 
the living resources in its EEZ according to Article 56(1)(a) of UNCLOS. Such 
sovereign rights have an exclusive nature. China cannot exercise such rights 
without first precluding the competing Filipino law enforcement activities against 
Chinese fishing vessels in the same water. Therefore, such obstruction of Filipino 
law enforcement activities should be deemed an inherent and inseparable part of 
the exercise of China sovereign rights under Article 56(1)(a). Again, the essence of 
the dispute is Philippines’ denial of China’s status as a coastal State here. 
(4) For China’s actions of occupation and construction on Mischief Reef as 
identified in Submission 12: As Mischief Reef is undeniably located in China’s 
EEZ and continental shelf, China cannot be denied the status of “coastal State” 
317    Article 56 (Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic 
zone) of UNCLOS reads: “1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed 
and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, 
currents and winds; (b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this 
Convention with regard to: (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations 
and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment; (c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 2. 
In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other 
States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 3. The 
rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in 
accordance with Part VI.” 
318    To be noted, the Philippines denied China the status as a coastal State in this area. See 
First-round submissions by Professor Boyle, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, 
p. 103. As said by Professor Boyle, “[i]n respect of Second Thomas Shoal and Mischief 
Reef, China is not the relevant coastal [S]tate. China is not bringing the case. It’s the 
Philippines, less than 200 miles away, that is the relevant coastal [S]tate.”
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endowed with sovereign rights and jurisdiction to exercise in the water adjacent to 
Mischief Reef. According to Articles 56(1)(b), 60(1)~(2)319 and 80320 of UNCLOS, 
China is entitled to have jurisdiction for building artificial islands in Mischief 
Reef as a part of China’s EEZ and continental shelf, not to mention that what 
has been built on Mischief Reef is much less than artificial islands, but a normal 
land reclamation. Therefore, it is fair to re-characterize the dispute as reflected by 
Submission 12 to be the ones with regard to the exercise by China, as a coastal 
State, of its jurisdiction provided for in the UNCLOS. On the other side of the coin, 
the dispute here is concerning whether China has the status as a coastal State.
(5) For China’s interference with Philippines’ navigational rights, resupply 
and rotation of personnel stationed on BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas 
Shoal as identified by Submission 14: As China is undeniably a coastal State for 
the water adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal, China can exercise sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction under UNCLOS legal regimes of EEZ and continental shelf in 
that region. Articles 60(1)(c) and 80 of UNCLOS provide the coastal State with 
the exclusive right to authorize and regulate the operation and use of installations 
and structures which may interfere with the exercise of its rights as the coastal 
State in the zone. Besides, according to Article 60(2) the coastal State shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction over such installation and structures, including jurisdiction 
with regard to immigration laws and regulations. Applying the rules to the situation 
on the ground, as the immobile Filipino ship BRP Sierra Madre can serve as a 
solid military base which is highly expected to be used for interfering with China’s 
exercise of its sovereign rights in its undeniable EEZ and continental shelf here, 
China as the coastal State may take actions to regulate the use of such immobile 
vessel according to Articles 60(1)(c) and 80. By appearance the vessel is not as 
permanent as an installation and structure. However, since China has the exclusive 
319     Article 60(1)~(2) of UNCLOS (entitled Artificial islands, installations and structures in the 
exclusive economic zone) provides: “1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State 
shall have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, 
operation and use of: (a) artificial islands; (b) installations and structures for the purposes 
provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes; (c) installations and structures 
which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone. 2. The 
coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations 
and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and 
immigration laws and regulations.”
320    Article 80 of UNCLOS (entitled Artificial islands, installations and structures on the 
continental shelf) provides: “Article 60 applies mutatis mutandis to artificial islands, 
installations and structures on the continental shelf.”
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right to authorize and regulate the operation and use of installation and structure 
that is, by nature, fixed and more permanent than vessels. A fortiori, China should 
be no less entitled to such exclusive right for the less permanent thing like this 
foreign-occupied vessel which however can be more functional and threatening than 
a normal installation and structure. Not to be overlooked, such a heavy metal vessel 
is actually hard to move by force of its own or from outside, making it as fixed 
as a normal installation and structure.321 On the other hand, since the Philippine 
personnel to be transported to such immobile vessel may serve to interfere with 
China’s future exercise of its sovereign rights under its EEZ and continental shelf 
entitlements, China may invoke Article 60(2) to exercise jurisdiction to enforce 
China’s immigration laws and regulations upon those personnel engaging in illegal 
rotation, too. Put differently, China would invoke Articles 60 and 80 to justify its 
actions while the Philippines will oppose the applicability of these articles due to 
Philippines’ denial of China’s status as a coastal State in the first place.
Fourthly, as indicated by Section III-A-6 of this paper and China’s 2009 
& 2011 NVs and Philippines’ 2011 NV, the Philippines also claims territorial 
sovereignty over those 12~15 proper islands located in KIG (see Tables 1 & 2 
of this paper). It denies China’s status as a coastal State in the water adjacent to 
Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Reed Bank. As a consequence of such a 
core territorial dispute as the primary or principal dispute, the dispute materializes 
as to whether China can enjoy the status as a coastal State in these areas. This 
dispute will go beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, if following the award of 
Mauritius v. U.K. which is both relevant and applicable to the present case.322 
Fifthly, as the Tribunal cannot deny China’s territorial claims over the entire 
Spratly Islands Group (including those proper islands therein), the real and 
predominant323 disputes as reflected by Sino-Philippine maritime confrontations 
identified by Submissions 8~9, 11~12, and 14 turn to be Sino-Philippine maritime 
boundary delimitation disputes, as evidenced by the oral statements of Philippines’ 
321     See China’s Position Paper, para. 51.
322    Chargos Marine Protection Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award, 18 March 2015, paras. 203~221.
323    Chargos Marine Protection Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award, 18 March 2015, para. 229. 
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Foreign Secretary324 and counsel325 at the July Hearing. Put differently, such 
confrontations demonstrate the consequences of the unsettled sea boundary 
delimitation disputes.326 Should such real and predominant disputes be settled, no 
more issues will exist between China and the Philippines concerning “on whose 
EEZ and continental shelf those 3 maritime features lie”. Then all the complaints 
from these Philippines’ Submissions, as the consequences of such an unsettled 
real dispute, will die down,327 similar with Mauritius v. U.K.328 In other words, 
Submissions 8~9, 11~12, and 14 should be properly characterized as relating to 
sea boundary delimitation. The Parties’ differing views on “whether China may 
have the status of coastal State” in these Submissions are simply one aspect of this 
larger dispute.329 As a matter of course, the settlement of the maritime boundary 
delimitation dispute as the real disputes underlying these Submissions cannot be 
completed without resolving first the Sino-Philippine territorial disputes as the core 
dispute. This impossible mission for the Tribunal has been discussed by Sections 
III-C-1, III-C-2, and III-C-3 of this paper.
5. For Submission 13: The Alleged China’s Endangering of Filipino 
Navigational Safety at Scarborough Shoal Should Be Deemed as Military 
Activities under Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS
As known to the world, the Sino-Philippine territorial dispute over, inter 
324    On 7 July 2015 which is the first day of the Hearing, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of 
the Philippines, Mr. Albert del Rosario, said: “China has pursued its activities in these 
disputed maritime areas with overwhelming force. The Philippines can only counter by 
invoking international law. That is why it is of fundamental importance to the Philippines, 
and, we would submit, for the law of rule in general, for the Tribunal to decide where 
and to what limit China has maritime entitlements in the South China Sea; where and to 
what limit the Philippines has maritime entitlements; where and to what extent the parties’ 
respective entitlements overlap, and where they do not.” It is obvious that the Philippines’ 
goal in this arbitration is maritime boundary delimitation in the SCS where maritime 
claims of China and the Philippines overlap. See First-round submissions by Secretary 
Del Rosario, in Transcripts of the Hearing, 7 July 2015, pp. 16~17.  
325     Supra note 276. Also see Professor Oxman’s oral statement on 8 July 2015, in Transcripts 
of the Hearing on 8 July 2014, pp. 47~48.
326    Chargos Marine Protection Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award, 18 March 2015, para. 211. 
327     If the waters adjacent to these 3 maritime features are considered to be on China’s side of 
EEZ and continental shelf after boundary delimitation, then there will be no reason for the 
Philippines to enforce its domestic laws there and to treat those areas as Philippines’ EEZ 
and continental shelf any more, and vice versa.
328    Chargos Marine Protection Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), UNCLOS 
Annex VII Tribunal, Award, 18 March 2015, para. 211. 
329      Philippines’ Memorial, p. 194, para. 6.93.
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alia, Scarborough Shoal continues and remains unsettled. From the observation 
of this author, China, as the one getting upper hand only since April 2012, has 
been vigilant for the danger of its territory to be lost again to the Philippines. No 
matter what kind of operations carried out by the Philippines, be it by civilians330 
or officials, through fishing boats or law enforcement vessels, either navigable or 
immobile,331 the reactions of China may be primarily for maintaining its territorial 
integrity by holding on to the territories it has recovered. The rules governing 
China’s law enforcement vessels, in this context, turn to be the limitations imposed 
by the principle of self-defense under the United Nations Charter and customary 
international law.332 When sovereignty is at stake, demanding China to apply 
Article 94 of UNCLOS and COLREGS to prevent the near-collision incidents in 
the territorial water of Scarborough Shoal is tantamount to asking China to tolerate 
the ever-increasing Philippines’ forces and to accept the mounting risk of losing 
Scarborough Shoal once more. Under such kind of mentality and distrust between 
China and the Philippines, it will be naive to deny China’s actions disputed by 
Submission 13 as military activities due to China’s denial of such a nature. Thus, 
the dispute will be removed from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as it falls within 
the scope of disputes concerning military activities covered by Article 298(1)(b),333 
330    The Philippine civilian, Cloma, who was an owner of a fishing company and director of 
the Philippine Maritime Institute, sailed to Spratly Islands and “discovered” Kalayaan 
Islands (the Freedomland) in May 1956. Then in December 1974, President Marcos of the 
Philippines received a document from Cloma transferring all the rights of Tomas Cloma 
& Associates in “Freedomland” to the Philippine Government. In June 1978 President 
Marcos issued a decree officially claiming part of the Spratly Islands and making it a 
municipality in Palawan province. The area claimed was almost identical with Cloma’s 
claim. See Wu Shicun, Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in 
the South China Sea: A Chinese Perspective, Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2013.
331    On Second Thomas Shoal, the Philippines uses an immobile warship, BRP Sierra Madre, 
to occupy that maritime feature since 1999. See Philippines’ Memorial, p. 61, para. 3.59. 
332    For the two authoritative treatments of this topic, see D.W. Bowett, Self-Defense in 
International Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958; Ian Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963; China’s 
Position Paper, paras. 6~7.
333    Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS reads: “1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this 
Convention or at any time thereafter, a State may, without prejudice to the obligations 
arising under section 1, declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of 
the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following 
categories of disputes: … (b) disputes concerning military activities, including military 
activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and 
disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign 
rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297, 
paragraph 2 or 3...” 
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and the scope of disputes excluded by China’s 2006 Declaration.
6. For Submission 14: The Alleged China’s Interference with Filipino 
Navigational Rights, Resupply and Rotation of Personnel at Second Thomas 
Shoal Fulfills the Conditions of Military Activities under Article 298(1)(b)
Apart from certain unsettled preliminary issues that make Philippines’ claim 
in Submission 14 inadmissible334 (see Sections III-D-2 and III-E-4 of this paper), 
the dispute brought under this Submission also suffers from lack of jurisdiction 
on the part of the Tribunal. The Philippines itself has quoted the remarks made by 
Major General Zhang Zhaozhong concerning China’s “cabbage strategy” at Second 
Thomas Shoal. 
As said by the Philippines, China’s strategy at Second Thomas Shoal and 
other features within SCS was explained by one Chinese senior military official, 
Major General Zhang Zhaozhong, who said that China was employing a cabbage 
strategy. China would seal and control a maritime feature by surrounding it with 
fishing administration vessels, marine surveillance vessels and navy warships until 
the feature is wrapped layer by layer like a cabbage. “Without the supply for one 
or two weeks, the troopers stationed there will leave the islands on their own. Once 
they have left, they will never be able to come back”.335
As evidenced by the Philippines’ Memorial indicated above,336 the “inter-
ference” carried out by those Chinese government vessels, i.e. China Marine Sur-
veillance vessels, Chinese navy missile frigate, and China Coast Guard vessels, 
constituted military activities to obtain the exclusive presence on Second Thomas 
Shoal, as part of the continental shelf claimed by China (see Table 2 of this paper) 
as a coastal State in this water. Such activities are covered by Article 298(1)(b). As 
China’s 2006 Declaration has removed the jurisdiction of Annex VII Tribunal to 
settle the category of dispute referred to in Article 298(1)(b), the Tribunal has no 
jurisdiction over such dispute as constituted by Submission 14.
334    Michael Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: 
Admissibility and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, 
p. 288.
335     Philippines’ Memorial, para. 3.67, p. 64.
336     Professor Oxman said in the July Hearing that China has to prove the existence of military 
activities. However, the Philippines itself has proved such a point. See First-round 
submissions by Professor Oxman, in Transcripts of the Hearing on 8 July 2015, pp. 81~93.
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F. The Situations Limiting the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
    according to Article 297(1) of UNCLOS
1. For Submission 12: The Dispute of China’s Building of Artificial Islands 
in Mischief Reef as Part of China’s EEZ and Continental Shelf Fits in the 
Chapeau of Article 297(1) of UNCLOS
Section III-C-7 of this paper has argued that the dispute brought by Philippines’ 
Submission 12 should be considered inadmissible as no dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS is being conveyed. Alternatively, should 
the Tribunal consider the dispute reflected by Submission 12 as concerning the 
interpretation or application of UNCLOS, the following extra reasons will deprive 
the Tribunal of its jurisdiction over such a dispute.
As demonstrated by Section III-E-4 and Table 2 of this paper, China has 
undeniable maritime entitlements of EEZ and continental shelf in the SCS that 
reach the location of, inter alia, Mischief Reef. According to Articles 56(1)(b), 
60(1)~(2) and 80 of UNCLOS, China is entitled to have jurisdiction for building 
artificial islands or land reclamation less than artificial islands in Mischief Reef as 
part of China’s EEZ and continental shelf. Therefore, it is fair to re-characterize the 
dispute as reflected by Submission 12 to be the ones concerning the interpretation 
or application of UNCLOS with regard to the exercise by China, as a coastal State, 
of its jurisdiction provided for in the UNCLOS. Such a dispute is covered by the 
chapeau of Article 297(1) concerning limitation on applicability of section 2 of Part 
XV.337 Consequently, the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to try the dispute in 
337    Article 297(1) of UNCLOS (entitled Limitations on applicability of section 2) provides: 
“1. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention with regard 
to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction provided for 
in this Convention shall be subject to the procedures provided for in section 2 in the 
following cases: (a) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of the 
provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of navigation, overflight 
or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in regard to other internationally lawful 
uses of the sea specified in article 58; (b) when it is alleged that a State in exercising the 
aforementioned freedoms, rights or uses has acted in contravention of this Convention 
or of laws or regulations adopted by the coastal State in conformity with this Convention 
and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention; or (c) when 
it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of specified international rules 
and standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment which are 
applicable to the coastal State and which have been established by this Convention or 
through a competent international organization or diplomatic conference in accordance 
with this Convention.” 
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question.
2. For Submission 14: The Alleged China’s Interference with Filipino 
Navigational Rights, Resupply and Rotation of Personnel at Second Thomas 
Shoal Fulfills the Conditions Said in the Chapeau of Article 297(1)
Sections III-E-4 and III-E-7 of this paper have argued that the dispute 
presented by Submission 14 has been excluded by China’s 2006 Declaration as 
first, the real dispute of Submission 14 is a maritime boundary delimitation dispute, 
caught by Article 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS; and second, China’s interference 
with Philippines navigational rights, resupply and rotation of personnel should 
be deemed military activities, covered by Article 298(1)(b). Apart from these 
jurisdictional obstacles, there is one more hurdle that prevents the Tribunal from 
trying such a dispute.
As demonstrated by Section III-E-4 and Table 2 of this paper, China has 
undeniable maritime entitlement of EEZ and continental shelf in the SCS reaching 
the location of, inter alia, Second Thomas Shoal. Therefore, China should not 
be denied the status of a coastal State concerning Second Thomas Shoal for the 
purpose of application of chapeau of Article 297(1) of UNCLOS. Consequently, 
the legality dispute of China’s interference with the actions of the Philippines 
to resupply its military personnel stationed on BRP Sierra Madre is concerning 
the exercise by China as a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction of 
continental shelf and EEZ as provided for in Articles 60(1)(c), 60(2), and 80 of 
UNCLOS. The application of these provisions and legal arguments China may 
provide can be seen in Section III-E-4 of this paper. In short, the alleged China’s 
interference with Philippines’ navigational rights, resupply and rotation of 
personnel at Second Thomas Shoal fulfills the conditions said in the Chapeau of 
Article 297(1), and thus precludes the Tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction over 
Submission 14.338
IV. Conclusions: Insurmountable Obstacles of 
       Admissibility and Jurisdiction for Each and Every
       Submission of the Philippines and the Prospects of 
       This Arbitration
338    As to why such China’s activities are not covered by Article 297(1)(a)~(c), see Michael 
Sheng-ti Gau, The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: Admissibility 
and Jurisdiction Issues, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 2015, No. 1, 2015, pp. 291~292.
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Section III of this Paper answers 6 different levels of questions concerning 
admissibility and jurisdiction issues for the Philippines’ Submissions 1~14. To wit, 
among these Submissions,
(1) which Submission suffers from lack of dispute and why – answered by 
Section III-A; 
(2) which Submission does not convey legal dispute and why – answered by 
Section III-B; 
(3) which Submission fails to provide a dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of UNCLOS and why – answered by Section III-C; 
(4) which Submission fails to fulfill the requirements contained in Section 
1 of Part XV of UNCLOS and should be deemed as inadmissible for the dispute 
settlement mechanisms under Section 2 of Part XV to address and why – answered 
by Section III-D; 
(5) which Submissions may not be entertained by the Tribunal due to 
application of Article 298 and why – answered by Section III-E; 
(6) whether Article 297 limits the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to address 
Philippines’ Submissions and why – answered by Section III-F.
To be noted, the (1)~(4) levels of questions relate to admissibility, while the 
(5)~(6) levels of questions concern jurisdictional issues. All these questions need 
to be scrutinized before an award on jurisdiction and admissibility can be granted. 
These questions obviously cover more issues than China’s Position Paper. Hence, 
this paper serves as a private response to the second part of questions covered 
during the July Hearing (i.e. other possible issues of jurisdiction and admissibility). 
To comprehensively address this part of Tribunal’s questions, the answers to the 
foregoing 6 levels of questions go far beyond what had been addressed by the 
Philippines’ counsel during the Hearing. Meanwhile, as can be seen from the text 
and the footnotes of this paper, this author has attempted to comment on as many 
Philippines’ statements made during the Hearing as possible.
Summing up, each of the Philippines’ Submissions 1~14 encounters plural 
obstacles in admissibility and/or jurisdiction that are hard to surmount. Table 3 will 
assist the readers in having an overview of Section III of this paper and to quickly 
grasp first, what kinds of admissibility and jurisdictional hurdles each Philippines’ 
Submission faces, and second, where to find such obstacles and the legal bases. 
Table 3 is entitled “Inadmissibility and Lack of Jurisdiction for Philippines’ 14 
Submissions Based on Reasons Provided by Identified Sections of This Paper”. 
For both kinds of the obstacles facing Submissions 8~14, Table 4 entitled “Filipino 
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Submissions 8~14 & Admissibility/Jurisdiction: Some Common Grounds” is 
produced to assist the readers in understanding how these obstacles can jointly 
affect Philippines’ Submissions. After reading through Section III together with 
Table 3 and Table 4, it should be fair to say that no Submissions of the Philippines 
should survive these procedural challenges and enter into the merits phase by this 
Tribunal.
Taking a huge jump further, should the Tribunal finally consider any 
admissibility and jurisdiction hurdle raised by China’s Position Paper and by the 
academic papers being surmounted by Philippines’ legal arguments, one word of 
caution must be said. Namely, are the losing Party (be it the Philippines or China) 
in the merits phase really losing all the legal justifications to continue its disputed 
actions? If not, what will this arbitration look like? This author has ventured to 
provide all the possible legal arguments that the losing Party can use to justify the 
continuation of its disputed actions in Section II of this paper and another article in 
Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs. All such arguments 
are based on the unaffected legal positions of that Party in its territorial disputes 
and/or sea boundary delimitation disputes with the other Party in this arbitration. 
These two kinds of disputes are the core disputes but un-submitted to this Tribunal, 
as repeatedly confirmed by the Philippines’ counsel at the Hearing. All those legal 
arguments that the losing Party can advance demonstrate the fact that it is these 
core disputes that cause the Sino-Philippine maritime confrontations reflected by 
the Philippines’ Memorial. Even if the Tribunal has jurisdiction to try the ancillary 
and surface disputes submitted by the Philippines, the confrontations called by 
the Philippines as the consequences of those submitted disputes will remain, 
for overlooking the root causes of the confrontations. Unless the Tribunal can 
indirectly settle the core disputes despite both Parties’ withholding of authorization, 
the end result will show the ineffectiveness of the award. To wit, it is impossible for 
the award to settle anything, including the ancillary and surface disputes submitted. 
This is because they are not disputes per se, but simply the consequences of the 
unsettled core disputes. Such predictable impasse should render the continuation of 
arbitral proceedings unnecessary pursuant to Article 27(2) of ROP. The advice for 
the Tribunal will be to terminate the arbitral proceedings for the Sino-Philippine 
Arbitration on the South China Sea Disputes accordingly.
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